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– Introduction – 
 
“We who are homeless – Among Europeans today there is no lack of 
those who have the right to call themselves homeless in a distinctive and 
honourable sense […] We are unfavourably disposed towards all ideals 
that might make one feel at home in this fragile, broken time of 
transition; as for its 'realities', we don't believe they are lasting. The ice 
that still supports people today has already grown very thin; the wind that 
brings a thaw is blowing; we ourselves, we homeless ones, are something 
that breaks up the ice and other all too thin 'realities'... We 'conserve' 
nothing; neither do we want to return to any past; we are by no means 
'liberal'; we are not working for 'progress'; we don't need to plug our ears 
to the market-place's sirens of the future. […] No, we do not love 
humanity; but on the other hand we are not nearly 'German' enough, in 
the sense in which the word 'German' is constantly used nowadays, to 
advocate nationalism and racial hatred and to be able to take pleasure in 
the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning with which 
European peoples nowadays delimit and barricade themselves against 
each other as if with quarantines. For that, we are too uninhibited, too 
malicious, too spoiled, also too well-informed, to 'well-travelled' […]. 
We who are homeless are too diverse and racially mixed in our descent, 
as 'modern man', and consequently we are not inclined to participate in 
the mendacious racial self-admiration and obscenity that parades in 
Germany today as a sign of a German way of thinking and that is doubly 
false and indecent among the people of the 'historical sense'. In a word – 
and let this be our word of honour – we are good Europeans, the rich 
heirs of millenia of European spirit, with too many provisions but also 
too many obligations.”1 
The immoral, anti-modern (truly post-modern?) disclaimer by Friedrich Nietzsche in 
The Gay Science evokes the essence of its time. To the scholar in the field of study 
of nations and nationalism, it appears indeed as an “untimely” text about a reality 
that, despite Nietzsche's prediction it would not last, is still part of our 
contemporaneity. The “homes” Nietzsche refers to in the qualification of “homeless” 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs, Bernard Williams [ed.], Josefine Nauckhoff, Adrian Del Caro [trans.], Cambridge Texts 
in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001 [1887], pp. 241-242 
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are to be understood as homelands.2 This text was written by a philosopher who tried 
to blow the “winds that bring thaw” in living across the homelands – literal and 
literary – of most of his contemporaries while at the same time looking for alter-
egos: Others similarly living as cross-borders.3 More than a century later, the ice of 
the nationalist boundaries, which appeared thin to Nietzsche, has turned into a solid 
background of modernity. 
A Very Late Modernity 
Nietzsche's imprecation could have been written a century later. But for a more 
accurate suggestion, and regardless of the particular and somewhat peculiar style 
and tone of the text, some formal details would need to be contextualised. For 
example, liberalism, as a dominant ideology, was thriving at the time of Nietzsche 
State-based liberalism came to be known as liberal democracy.4 After two world 
wars, the liberal democratic model established itself as the model of western 
modernity. But in the past thirty years, the ideological status quo and the interactions 
between these two dominant ideologies, liberalism and democracy, which had been 
negotiated in the decades after the Second World War, have been disrupted by the 
rise of the neoliberal ideology. The balance between liberalism and democracy 
elaborated during these Trentes Glorieuses (“the Glorious Thirty) – as the three 
decades of relative prosperity which followed the Second World War are referred to 
in France – have been transformed into a more spectacular approach to politics 
centred around ideas of economic liberalisation.  
After the collapse of the Soviet block, little has remained of the pseudo communist 
regimes which stood as symbolic barriers to the global spread of liberalised 
                                                 
2 The original title of the aphorism 377 of The Gay Science is 'Wir Heimatlosen' which literally 
translates into “We who are homeless”, but bears no ambiguity in German as it does in English. 
Heimat denotes clearly the home of the  homeland – a place, literal or imagined, from where a 
person is native, originates from. “The homeless” in the sense of the persons who lack 
permanent housing would translate as die Obdachlosen in German.   
3 Michel Onfray, Contre-histoire de la philosophie. Vol. 14. Nietzsche [audio conference], Paris, 
Frémeaux et Associés/Grasset, 2009. 
4 ''Democratic liberalism' would seem to fit better, as as far as the ideology and the practice goes, 
liberal democracy is a democratic compromise in favour of liberalism. See Francis Dupuis-Deri, 
“L’esprit antidémocratique des fondateurs de la«démocratie» moderne”, Agone, no. 22, 
September 1999, pp. 95-113. 
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economy. China, for instance, is now more accurately described as a nationalist 
authoritarian capitalist state than as a communist popular republic – not that any 
such state lived up to its formal denomination. In the eerie balance between 
liberalism and democracy, after the collapse of the Soviet Block, change has come in 
the form of a new world disorder,5 establishing the spectacle of neoliberalisation on 
the global stage. 
But these processes of economic liberalisation, often described as neoliberalisation, 
have little in common with the ideological depth of liberalism. Historian David 
Harvey defines neoliberalisation as follows:  
“We can [...] interpret neoliberalization either as a utopian project to realize a 
theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a 
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to 
restore the power of economic elites. […] the second of the objectives has in 
practice dominated.”6  
In this sense, what is described as neoliberalism is often contradictory and 
confusing. The contemporary political, social and economic imaginaries are still 
imbued with traditional modern ideologies – such as liberalism for instance. The 
confusing association of liberalism with processes of neoliberalisation point to the 
more general confusion which characterises the contemporary global disorder. In 
this context, the instrumentalisation of traditional ideological terms is widespread in 
political discourse and in elite discourses more generally.7 
Three decades before the 2008 economic crisis, the neoliberal thought was being 
elaborated in the corners of western academia in opposition to the then dominating 
                                                 
5 Amin Maalouf, Le dérèglement du monde, Paris, Grasset, 2009, p. 11.  
6 David Harvey, Neoliberalism, A Brief History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 19. 
7 This is also what Thorsen Dag Einar suggests in “The Neoliberal Challenge - What is 
Neoliberalism?” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice,Vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 15-
41. Harvey argues in a similar direction: “The theoretical utopianism of neoliberal argument has, 
I conclude, primarily worked as a system of justification and legitimation for whatever needed to 
be done to achieve this goal. the evidence suggests, moreover, when neoliberal principles clash 
with the need to restore or sustain elite power, then the principles are either abandoned or 
become so twisted as to be unrecognizable. This in no way denies the power of ideas to act as a 
force for historical-geographical change. But it does point to a creative tension between the 
power of neoliberal ideas and the actual practices of neoliberalization that have transformed how 
global capitalism has been working over the last three decades.” David Harvey, Neoliberalism, A 
Brief History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 19. 
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Keynesian paradigm of embedded economic liberalism.8 Since then, with the 
enactment of neoliberal policies from the late 1970s onwards,9 the rates of exchange 
of goods and capital have globally escalated, particularly after the walls of the Cold 
war collapsed in the early 1990s. Between 1995 and 2007, the European Union 
expanded from 12 to 27 members, creating the largest tax-free zone on the planet. 
New ways of consuming and acting have emerged as corollaries to processes of 
economic liberalisation, on the global and local scales, not necessarily in favour of 
the increase of social liberties. The citizens of the member states of the European 
Union have been granted the right of free movement. But this right does not equally 
concern all European citizens. Nationals of central and eastern European states have 
only gradually gained the possibility to travel and live in certain of the western 
European states.10 Some walls have collapsed, but other walls have been maintained 
and further erected; between people who are favoured by the free movement of 
capital and those who are constrained by the outflow of capital; between those who 
had already been enjoying open borders and those who had been restrained behind 
the Iron Curtain. Twenty-first century modernity may present less quarantines that in 
the late nineteenth century – although for Europe, the quarantine has simply 
expanded to fortress Europe – but it has certainly plugged its ears to the sirens of the 
market. 
The Significance of Nationalism  
The new lifestyles of contemporary modernity are also reflected in the fast paced 
technological evolutions which characterise the spectacle of consumer society. The 
older generations in the first decades of the twenty-first century where born at a time 
when television did not exist. Their grandchildren can today access television on 
                                                 
8 Harvey dates the emergence of neoliberal thought back to the formation of the Mont Pelerin 
Society in 1947, whose members prominent members were Friedrich Von Hayek, Ludvig Von 
Mises, Milton Friedman and even at some point, Karl Popper.  Harvey, Neoliberalism, pp. 19-
21. 
9 Notably by Ronald Reagan in the United States, Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and 
François Mitterand in France, see Harvey, Neoliberalism, pp. 23-31. 
10 While Britain, along with Ireland and Sweden, opened their borders to the citizens of those 
states which joined in 2004, most of other western states, such as France or Germany, have only 
gradually granted equal rights to citizens of the new member states.   
 INTRODUCTION 13 
their cells phones. The constantly changing new means of organisation and 
communication participate in the generalised feeling of volatility associated with 
late modernity. In a deeper sense, they also contribute to the formation of new 
imaginings across and about the world. Since the 1990s, the most prominent of these 
means has certainly been the World Wide Web. To be connected through a 
seemingly endless network, and sending fluxes of information or capital with an 
unprecedented ease even from a home desk, it certainly seems as if no walls are 
being reproduced on the 'Web', that they are virtually gone. But even on what is 
certainly the most open of means of communication, symbolic walls are also 
represented. For example, most major free web-mail providers offer a localised 
service, or to be more precise, a nationalised service. The default offer provides the 
user with a national suffix to his or her email address. Other examples are online 
social networks or gaming websites, where one of the first pieces of information 
alongside a person's name or nickname is their geopolitical localisation in the form 
of a country's name or flag.11 This is of course harmless as such. In fact, it has 
certainly become the most basic information necessary to make sense of a globalised 
world where boundaries seem to have become liquid.12 
This permeating national imaginary has for a time been considered to have been 
weakened by the recent economic liberalisation. But the widespread and frequent 
manifestations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War, some of which are the 
subject of this study, point to the ongoing fundamental significance of the national 
imaginary. As we read in Nietzsche's quote, nationalism was already a dominant 
ideology in the late nineteenth century which, decades before the rise of Nazism, and 
was already defined along lines of racial hatred and xenophobia. Nietzsche talks 
about its manifestation in Germany, but he could just as well have talked about any 
of the liberal democracies. Even if considered a less extreme form of nationalism in 
comparison to Nazism, nineteenth century liberal democracies appear in Nietzsche's 
                                                 
11 Once again, this a default setting of social and gaming websites which can be customised in 
certain instances. 
12 In reference to Zygmunt Bauman's famous metaphor for Post-Modernity. See Zygmunt Bauman, 
Liquid Modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 2000. 
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mind to be breaking the cosmopolitan vision of a world perceived across lines of 
difference.13 
State-centred nationalism, which is the main focus of this work, has continuously 
been reproduced in the processes of democratisation and liberalisation of the past 
two centuries. These corresponding significations, as it is implied in Harvey's 
explanation of the processes of neoliberalisation, provide a purpose for nationalism 
to be reproduced in the eyes of political and economic elites. This reproduction, or 
rather the promotion of state nationalism, also operates in a dialectical relationship 
to popular demands for political and symbolical recognition. This relationship does 
nevertheless not explain the historical reason of nationalism; it simply locates its 
significance in late modernity. As far as the history of nationalism is concerned, the 
historical invention or formation of nationalism, and its uses and abuses, suggest that 
nationalism breeds on the wider social and historical context of the various moments 
of late modernity. It is a fluctuating form between a political doctrine and a social 
imaginary. The spacial and temporal fluctuations of nationalism make it a discursive 
field par excellence. Nationalism was already a global discursive formation long 
before neoliberalism became significant.14 Yet, the contemporary significance of 
nationalism should not be interpreted as more (or less) important. Rather, if a recent 
discursive formation such as neoliberalism already presents us with a confusing 
complexity, the true extent of the significations of nationalism may consequently be 
unfathomable. This should nevertheless not prevent us from engaging with it to gain 
a critical perspective on one of the foundational threads of our contemporary 
imaginaries, keeping the limitations of our insights in mind. 
The aim of the present study is to investigate nationalism by taking into 
consideration its transhistorical significance as a continuously reproduced dominant 
                                                 
13 The expression “across lines of difference” is borrowed from Craig Calhoun [ed.], Social Theory 
and the Politics of Identity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, p. 329.  
14 On an inquiry on the original development of nationalism outside Europe, see Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London. Verso. 
1983. Otherwise, the formulation of colonies gaining independence in a process of national 
liberation suggests the further spread of nationalism around the globe and its discursive 
presupposition. 
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discursive formation of late modern social imaginaries. The structure of the work is 
elaborated around two epistemological angles. The first one is concerned with the 
elucidation of the critical and historically localised rationality about nationalism and 
contemporary social imaginaries in Europe. The second angle is concerned with the 
clarification of the modus operandi of nationalism as a social imaginary, through an 
exploration of historical and contemporary illustrations – or texts – drawn primarily 
from the discursive and actual spaces of Britain, France and Poland. Although these 
two angles are elaborated dialectically, the first two chapters focus on the elucidation 
and parallel elaboration of a logos to approach the interpretation of the fragments of 
the cosmos of national imaginaries analysed in the remaining two chapters. 
Logos 
The questions which have motivated this study can be formulated as follows: how, 
and thus partly why, is nationalism being reproduced in contemporary social 
imaginaries in Europe as a dominant political signification? The question could be 
rephrased with a normative angle: in spite of the 'banalisation' of nationalism which 
has been observed in established nation-states, does the national imaginaries of 
European societies run the risk of reproducing the totalitarian character which the 
common sense use of the term 'nationalism' generally refers to?15 The different terms 
and notions contained in these questions need to be clarified before engaging in 
setting a framework for the further analysis of nationalism. The first aspect to 
elaborate is consequently the comprehension of nationalism, not only primarily as a 
political doctrine or principle,16 but as a feature of modern social imaginaries, as 
mode of imagining modern societies, or in other words, nations.17 
Common sense definitions of nationalism compared to those elaborated in the 
academic field of the study of nations and nationalism are the starting point of the 
critical inquiry of the first chapter. This inquiry aims at getting a wider sense of how 
                                                 
15 Banalisation is used here in the sense elaborated by Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London, 
Sage, 1995. See Chapetr 1, Part 2.3 of the present work. 
16 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, London, Blackwell, 2006 [1983], p. 1. 
17 In the terms used by Benedict Anderson, as “imagined communities”, hence imagined in a 
particular way. Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 5-7. 
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nationalism is being described and analysed and to set the basis of a framework to 
make sense of the complexity of nationalism. This step leads to a critical evaluation 
of our own perspective, as we do not speak from beyond national imaginaries and as 
such reproduce part of its discourse, not the least by designing its significance. In 
order to further this critical assessment, it is necessary to overview some of the 
theories which will enlighten our understanding of nationalism.  
The second chapter aims at elaborating an open theory for the analysis of the 
illustrations which will constitute the focus of the two remaining chapters. 
Nationalism has been described in academic theories a discursive formation in the 
Foucauldian sense.18 Foucault elaborated a concept of discourse which while 
referring to basic cultural functions, involved an intricate conceptualisation which 
will partly be clarified as the starting point in the elaboration of a theoretical 
framework. In order to consider the social imaginary as a space of inquiry, the 
relation between nationalism as a discursive formation and the space of the social 
imaginary needs to be laid out. The thread of discourse as it is analysed in the first 
sections of the second chapter, appear as a way to make sense of the labyrinthine 
complexity of nationalism engaged with in the first chapter. Starting from the 
elucidation of discourse and related notions, the framework is further consolidated in 
clarifying the relationship between formal expressions and social significations 
which is situated in the space of the social imaginary.  We present a logical 
cosmology of the social imaginary which aims at organising the intersections of the 
various threads brought in during the elaboration of the framework. The 
transdisciplinary character of this elaboration appeared as necessary to make sense 
of the cultural complexity of the formation and reproduction of social significations, 
and consequently of nationalism. The methodological strategy aims at putting 
'things' in relation or in correlation, through their concurrent action or reaction, 
expecting that the analysis will still leave open interpretative spaces for elements 
which were omitted. This study is not an attempt to list all the components of the 
                                                 
18 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p. 4. 
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complexity of the social imaginary of nationalism, but to elucidate at least part of the 
nebulae it constitutes.  
Cosmos 
The logical cosmology is thus the expression of the localised perspective from 
which the social and historical texts of the British, French and Polish imagined 
communities will be analysed in the subsequent chapters. The third chapter proposes 
a fragmentary inquiry into the complexity of the histories of nationalism as a social 
modern imaginary in Britain, France and Poland. This inquiry into social-historical 
cosmologies informs and verifies the logos elaborated in the second chapter. It 
further inquires into the formation of the social-historical ensembles of Britain, 
France and Poland which are often presented as model formations of nationalism. 
While this is more evidently the case for Britain and France given their prominence 
in traditional discourses on nations and nationalism, the case of Polish nationalism 
redefines the significance of Britain and France through its concurrent and particular 
formation. This suggests that the centrality of Britain or France is relative and needs 
to be put into perspective. But more significantly, we observe that it is across 
national imaginary borders that the representations of 'identity' and 'otherness' have 
and are being discursively formed and reproduced.19 
The history written in the third chapter could appear as an expression of a European 
history. But it appears as such due to the necessary epistemological limitations. The 
framework established as loosely European appears to be sufficiently inclusive to 
express the diversity of nationalism which, although produced in the region of 
Europe, has become globally reproduced. Its global spread allows the consideration 
of nationalism as a signification of a global imaginary. If anything, nationalism 
should be considered as the both having contributed to the successes and excesses of 
what could be referred to as the European modern civilisation. A point of departure 
is nothing more than a point. Even if in the historical narration it may seem to 
                                                 
19 Although we would like to argue against 'models', for arguments in favour of considering the 
case of Polish nationalism as a model, see Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, Karl 
Marx versus Friedrich List, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 84-85. 
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express the significations it allowed a posteriori, it did not express most of them a 
priori. 
The analysis focuses on contextualised negotiations of nationalist significations and 
the selection of texts has no pretension to be exhaustive, but was motivated by how 
representative and enlightening of social and historical negotiations of social 
significations related to nationalism these illustrations could be. The historical 
sections of the third chapter attempt to comprehend the interactions of social 
significations which have participated in establishing national imaginaries in its 
developments as a state-centred ideology. The idea of national liberation appears as 
having been the leitmotiv of nationalists since their original formation as opponents 
of established orders. In contrast, the contemporary sections in the fourth chapter, 
which focus is the reproduction of nationalism in the years 2004-2009 in the three 
nation-states mentioned above, first present an analysis of the discursive promotion 
of nationalism by mainstream political actors. This promotion expresses a 
negotiation in favour of a culturalist management of contemporary social issues 
concurrent with policies of securitisation and a more general droitisation des esprits 
(reactionary shift to the right). These elements characterises the dominant political 
'mood' in Europe which followed the wind of change brought by the collapse of the 
Soviet Block. While this reactionary shift may be associated with the ageing of 
European populations, illustrations focusing on popular expressions of nationalism, 
which are contrasted to the preceding analyses of political discourses, show a more 
complex picture of the significance of nationalism and its potential for social and 
political exclusion in contemporary issues related to belonging. The final part of the 
fourth chapter inquires the extent to which the exclusionary element of nationalism 
and maybe nationalism in general, can be transcended by looking into alternative 
illustrations in both academic and popular discourses, moving away from the centre 
and focusing of the margins of national imaginaries.  
Answers to the questions which have motivated this study will nevertheless appear 
as localised and fragmentary as the study itself. The issue whether the ongoing 
reproduction of nationalism can still fester extreme forms of exclusion is in itself a 
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historically localised issue even if it suggests a critical judgement about the 
contemporary signification of nationalism. But as historian Norman Davies writes: 
“In the last analysis, of course, differences of opinion about the ethics of 
nationalism cannot be resolved. Like Democracy or Autocracy, Nationalism in 
itself is neither virtuous nor vicious. It can only be judged in relation to the 
particular motives of its particular adherents. According to circumstances, it has 
been espoused both by noble idealists and also by scoundrels for whom the 
means is an end in itself.”20 
In the light of the perspicacity of Davies's description, this study aims more humbly 
to be a rational lay out of the path of the present author in his inquiry into the fabric 
of national imaginaries. 
                                                 
20 Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland. Volume II: 1795 to the Present, 
[Revised Edition], Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 4-5. 
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– Overture – 
De Labyrintho 
 
“[...] its nucleus […] is a regular maze in which without a clue, one 
may wander indefinitely up innumerable blind alleys and in 
interminable vicious circles, or one may picture it as a deep-sea 
octopus with tentacles twisting away through the obscurity, an 
obscurity which it increases at critical moments with floods of self-
secreted ink. […] [T]he clue to the maze, the motive of the drama, the 
key that gives meaning to the cipher, is 'nationalism'”21 
While nationalism may appear to be a simple answer to intricate questions, or at 
least so it seemed a century ago, trying to disentangle the cobweb in which one is 
ensnared when entering the realm of nations and nationalism in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century turns out to be a daunting task. Faced with such a dazzling 
predicament, one asks oneself what is the key to nationalism? 
A warning should be heeded: I do not propose to provide the reader with a key for 
the disentanglement of this cobweb. In a more humble attempt, the following study 
presents some portions of the cobweb's maze in which sense could be made. Thus, 
some minor keys for the unravelling of certain threads may be found, which for 
some, have already shifted or ceased to exist. They nevertheless prove useful for the 
continuous decryption of our social imaginaries. 
One generally makes sense of one's (intellectual) peregrinations from the position 
one has in history, in one's own story, and with the sensitivity of a historical 
moment. While a higher ground is always helpful and more than advisable to gain a 
wider viewpoint, I do not pertain to achieve a higher ground beyond my own 
historical moment. But higher grounds never come easy or as expected: bold is the 
person who claims he did not lose his way. 
                                                 
21 George Young and Leonard Henry Courtney, Nationalism and War in the Near East, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1915, p.1. 
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– Part 1 – 
Approaching Nationalism 
 
1. Selected Manifestations of Nationalism in Europe since 1989 
Nationalism – vast and ramified as most '-isms' are – is defined both by the 
standpoint from which it is studied as well as by the objects through which it is 
studied.22 Decades of studies have answered many questions about nationalism, but 
it would not be an exaggeration to say that they have raised at least as many. After 
the collapse of the Soviet block, many expectations – social, political, theoretical, or 
even epistemological – were that a new and better world would be formed. In this 
idyllic picture of a world at last united and finally free of ideology, nationalism – 
seen as one the of backward ideologies of the past – was consequently bound to be 
on the decline.23  
History unfolded in a different direction. While dreams of a positive globalisation 
were being upheld, others exerted different dreams, which in certain cases turned out 
to be nightmares. In a reckless and neglectful failure of memory, the joyous 
cosmopolitans and the many others who were celebrating the new horizons had 
forgotten that 'independence', 'democracy' and 'self-determination' come at a price 
and have rarely – if ever, in modern times – been found outside a nationalist 
framework.  
This omission can partly be explained by the erroneous idea that communism had 
resolved the question of nationalities. Although one could argue that from a 
theoretical point of view such a prospect would have been more than desirable, as 
                                                 
22 The formula “vast and ramified” is borrowed from John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(Eds), Nationalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 3. 
23 The thesis of the “end of ideology” was first appeared in the 1960's with Daniel Bell's The End 
of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, Glencoe, Ill., New Press, 1960, 
before being popularised again in the 1990's.  
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far as 'real socialism' went, nationalism was painstakingly involved.24 Even if the 
organisation of the USSR was that of an empire, Russian nationalism retained the 
political, cultural and economic hegemony, which is carried on to this day.25 Moving 
further away from geographical Europe, the case of the Popular Republic of China is 
also enlightening in this respect as its leaders have consistently followed a Jacobin 
state formation imbued with nationalism. Nationalism in China renewed itself 
following the internal legitimacy crisis that led to the second Tiananmen square 
massacre in 1989 and was further fuelled by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its 
related ideology. This further demonstrates the central and voluntary role 
nationalism played and still plays in the so-called communist regimes.26 
Thus, the last decade of the twentieth century came as a dire reminder that 
nationalism is here to stay as it filled in the void between dreams and the at times 
dreary, at others lively, reality of the post-Cold war world. History did not come to 
                                                 
24 The ontological turning point from ideal socialism to real socialism happened after Stalin 
dropped the idea of a world revolution in favour of “socialism in one country” (between 1924 
and 1926, eventually becoming state policy). Furthermore, the satellite states were organised in 
nation-state-like entities, with their own borders, flags, anthems and languages, thus retaining all 
the symbols and the cultural productions of nationalism (state sovereignty being evidently left 
aside). The fifteen union republics which constituted the Soviet Union (including the Russian 
republic) have since 1991 all pursued the recognition of a nationality in building their state 
institutions. See Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993; Marcin Zaremba, 
Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm: Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej 
w Polsce [Communism, Legitimisation, Nationalism: Nationalist Legitimisation of the 
Communist Power in Poland], Warsaw, Trio, 2001.  
25 Since 2007, the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin's and Dmitry Medvedev's rule has promoted a 
patriotic rewriting of Russian history through new uniform history textbooks which downplay 
the horrors of the Soviet period and even rationalise Stalin's crimes. The deputy head of the 
Duma's constitutional law committee, Irina Yarovaya, supported the project saying “We need a 
united society. We need a united textbook” making the obvious political design look like an 
evidence (quoted in Miriam Elder, “Set text seeks Soviet 'glories'”, in The Guardian Weekly, 
25.06.2010, p.12; see also Shaun Walker, “Vladimir Putin rewrites Russia's history books to 
promote patriotism”, in The Independent, 20.08.2007). 
26  See Suisheng Zhao, “A state-led nationalism: The patriotic education campaign in post-
Tiananmen China”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 31, Issue 3, September 
1998, p.287-302.    
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an end.27 Even if certain ideologies had waned, history unstoppably carried on, and 
in many instances “nationalism reigned supreme.”28 
The formation, re-formation or re-institution of independent states from the Soviet 
sphere of influence applied the core doctrine of nationalism – “one state, one 
people” – and maybe even furthered the traditional pattern of nation-state 
formation.29 The obvious examples are the formation of new states from the break-
up of borders established during the Second World War. While the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia presented the world with a peaceful resolution of nationalist 
tensions,30 Yugoslavia was on its way towards its 'Balkanization' plunging into an 
announced civil war.31 The former coalition of South Slavic peoples became the 
dramatic locus which Europe and the world contemplated with awe as ethnic and 
religious strife turned into war and ethnic cleansing. In July 1995, the atrocities 
                                                 
27 In spite of the repeated claims of Francis Fukuyma in “The End of History?”, The National 
Interest 16, Summer 1989 and The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 
1992. After having been the proponent of a messianic and uncritical linear history of democracy 
and capitalism which have fuelled neoconservatism in the United States throughout the 1990's, 
Fukuyama has tried to distance himself from what finally appeared to be a misinformed path, to 
say the least. See Anatol Lieven, “The Two Fukuyamas”, The National Interest Online, 
01.06.2010, retrieved 05.11.2009: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=10332>. 
Ironically, albeit wrongly, others were stating the opposite, e.g. Misha Glenny, The Rebirth of 
History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy, London, Penguin Books, 1990.  
28 Norman M. Naimark, in the foreword to Suny, The Revenge of the Past, p. ix. 
29 Many commentators have described the upsurge of nationalist fervour in Central and Eastern 
Europe as “ethnic”  nationalism opposed to the more “civic” nationalism of Western states, 
reviving the old opposition between Eastern and Western nationalisms (describing the 
nationalisms of Germany and France respectively in their development up to the Second World 
War). Although this categorisation posits more questions that it resolves, the fact that Western 
commentators found the need to ascribe a category to the phenomena they were observing may 
show their surprise, their ideological contempt (as in this dual categorisation, “ethnic” is a 
negative qualifier) and more importantly, the significance of these phenomena. The question of 
the categorisation of various types of nationalisms is discussed further below.  
30 On 25 November 1992, the Federal Assembly of Czechoslovakia agreed on its dissolution. On 
31 December 1992 the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic was effectively dissolved leaving 
the ground for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, formally created on 1 January 1993. They are 
the only two states amongst those joining the European Union in 2004 and 2007 which had been 
reformed after the collapse of the Eastern Block.  
31 “Division of a multinational state into smaller ethnically homogeneous entities. The term also is 
used to refer to ethnic conflict within multiethnic states. It was coined at the end of World War I 
to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly in the Balkans. (The term Balkanization is today invoked to explain the 
disintegration of some multiethnic states and their devolution into dictatorship, ethnic cleansing, 
and civil war.)” From the entry "Balkanization",  Encyclopædia Britannica 2010, retrieved 
09.06.2010: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/50323/Balkanization> 
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taking place in former Yugoslavia hit a nadir, the horror of which many believed to 
have been buried in history.32 On “the edge of the sleepy and peaceful European 
Union”,33 more than 8,000 Muslim Bosnian men and boys were murdered by the 
Bosnian Serb Army in Srebrenica during a campaign which cost the lives of about 
30,000 civilians in the region.34 Shortly after, the armed conflict drew to an end, but 
it wasn't long before another series of conflicts were triggered. From 1998 to 1999, 
tensions between communities living in Serbia and Kosovo once again slid into 
armed conflict.  
In the following decade, as the international community was focusing much of its 
attention on bringing peace to the region and international courts were judging 
perpetrators of war crimes, the Balkans – theatrically, yet less dramatically – were 
carrying on breaking-up. On 3 June 2006, Montenegro which had been part of all the 
unions with Serbia declared its independence following the 21 May 2006 
referendum. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo, which had been an autonomous 
province of Serbia, declared its independence after weeks of unrest. The unrest did 
not turn into a bloodbath, but the Serbian state refused to recognise the 
independence of Kosovo.35  
In the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, the geopolitical map of the Balkans showed a 
radically different picture from the one it had during the Cold War. Each of the seven 
self-recognised states making up the former Yugoslavia developed new discourses 
                                                 
32 In fact, the mass massacres perpetuated during the wars in former Yugoslavia had been the 
largest in Europe since the Second World War. Although atrocities of many but also of a similar 
kind had been and were being perpetuated outside Europe (one obvious instance being the 
Rwandan Genocide in 1994), candid Europeans stood in disbelief in front of the atrocities. 
33 Michael White, “Revulsion and pain are agents of change”, in The Guardian Weekly, 
18.06.2010, p.14. 
34 In 2004, the Srebrenica massacre was ruled as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. For additional information on the Srebrenica massacre 
and the war in former Yugoslavia, see e.g. the website of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale 
University: <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/former_yugoslavia/index.html> [last accessed on 
30.05.2010] 
35 By summer 2010, 69 states had formally recognised the Republic of Kosovo. Following a non-
binding ruling by the ICJ on 22 July 2010 that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not 
violate general international law, Serbian President Boris Tadic declared that Serbia would never 
recognise its independence. A curious project associated to the government of Kosovo follows 
the international recognition of the Republic and lists them on its website to thank them: 
<http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/> [last accessed on 28.07.2010] 
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opposing both the national discourse of communist Yugoslavia as well as the re-
imagined and burgeoning nationalist discourses of their neighbours, inside and 
outside the former federation. The most obvious examples are the creation of 
national symbols, such as flags or anthems. In February 2008, the brand new flag of 
Kosovo could suddenly be seen fluttering in the wind.  
Another manifestation of state legitimising nationalism, both intriguing and yet 
derisory, is the development of the century old 'Macedonian question' that pitched 
Greece and the Republic of Macedonia in a conflict over national historical symbols 
and myths. After declaring its independence in November 1991, the Republic of 
Macedonia faced a symbolic conflict over its denomination: 
“The declaration set off a diplomatic, cultural, and international struggle over 
the recognition of the new state. Greece opposed recognition of the new state 
because of its use of the name “Macedonia” and engaged in intensive 
diplomatic efforts to prevent its recognition by the international community. At 
the heart of the dispute lies the thesis that the Republic is the official homeland 
of the Macedonian nation.”36 
Nearly twenty years since the struggle began, the story continues. The Greek state 
has consistently promoted a reconnection with the mythical Greece of antiquity as a 
way to distance itself from the Ottoman Empire. While this ongoing promotion may 
suggest insecurity over issues related to cultural heritage and identity, it is difficult to 
imagine a linear history which would link contemporary Greece to the Greece of 
antiquity apart from its denomination. In 2009, one of the official slogans of a 
promotional campaign by the Greek Tourism office was precisely: “Greece: 5000 
years of history.”37 Such a timespan is hard to beat if longevity is the basis of 
legitimacy.  
                                                 
36 Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, 
Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question, London, Praeger, 2002, p.29. 
37 See photographs in Annex 2.  
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Discourse on the issue in the Republic of Macedonia since the parliamentary 
elections of 2006 has drifted into a nationalist Greek-like reinvention.38 The 
mirrored situation of Greece in the Republic of Macedonia may sound bitter and 
ironic, but this dispute is an example of the repetitive pattern of discourse used in 
state-based nationalist policies as well as the issue of the consequent appropriation 
of history by politicians. Mythical histories and lineages have always been used as 
means to legitimise a discourse, be it legal, political, religious or more broadly 
cultural. It is no less problematic than in the past to repeatedly turn bits and pieces of 
history into fabled ideological memory-histories, especially in an age when 
rationality is assumed to be the base of institutions and policies. But even a rational 
mind makes use of symbols, myths, and short-cuts, and if ill-informed, it will 
represent realities under a narrow and biased light. Common-sense understanding of 
nationalism usually falls under such a projection. The misguided self-confidence that 
a rational understanding of nationalism is immune from the use of symbols, myths 
and shortcuts is to be discussed in the following chapter.  
2. Typologies and Binary Oppositions   
A common-sense understanding of what nationalism can be taken from the use of 
the word 'nationalist' by mainstream media or political actors. What is usually 
referred to in mainstream discourse as 'nationalist' is the marginal or foreign 
promotion of radical ideologies, often linked to racism or xenophobia or extremism; 
in other words, far-right political ideologies, of which the official forefront are 
parties such as the British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom or the Front 
National (FN) in France. The scope of the term 'nationalist'  also extends to 
independentist or separatist organisations, which, although they may less often be 
linked to racism or xenophobia as such, are nonetheless associated with sometimes 
violent anti-state and anti-establishment tactics – even if this association reduces the 
                                                 
38 “[…] Macedonia, under the nationalist government, has embarked on a misguided project of 
“antiquisation”, or appropriation of ancient Macedonian figures and symbols as the foundation 
of the modern Macedonian identity. Skopje's Petrovec airport was renamed Alexander the Great 
airport in 2006. A plan has long been mooted to build a 40-metre Alexander statue in Skopje's 
main public square […].” Ivo Petkovski, “Macedonia and Greece: a very Balkan affair”, in The 
Guardian Weekly, 02.07.2010, p.12. 
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diversity and does not recognise the generally increasing conventionality of a 
number of separatists movements.39  
Nationalists are not only portrayed within Western European nations as existing on 
the margins of those nations, but the nationalist, according to such discourse, is also 
to be found leading the nation on the margins of the European continent. The 
selected manifestations of nationalism presented in the previous section have all 
evoked the idea of nationalism as an exception to the rule, to the western European 
liberal-democratic model. They confirm the general understanding that nationalism 
is the overt and atavistic celebration of the nation, linked to extreme-right wing 
politics. But less extreme politics are similarly nationalist politics, and not merely 
'national' in a geopolitical and descriptive sense. They also promote representations 
of the unity between state and society, especially in so called established nation-
states, which is generally considered to be the form of most states in western 
Europe.40 
The alignment of the state and nation in Western European states is generally 
overlooked as nationalism at work and the nationalist is generally assumed to be a 
person for whom the nation is the absolute reference. All the other elements of the 
world-view of such a nationalist are subjected to the paramount position of the 
nation. Indeed, such a view reaches to definitions of ultra-nationalism, or even of 
                                                 
39 Regional separatists organisations such as ETA for the Basque country in France and Spain have 
regularly been hitting the headlines with terrorist acts, usually against state institutions such as 
the police or official buildings. Yet, the cases of Catalan, Breton, Welsh or Scottish separatist 
movements, to name but a few, cannot be simply equated with terror actions. In many cases, a 
fringe of radical separatists have perpetrated acts of violence, but many are organised in 
associations or political parties that increasingly look alike the traditional national parties, e.g. 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), which has in recent years enacted policies closer to what 
would be expected from the Labour party than from the BNP.   
40 See Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London, Sage Publications, 1995, pp.5-7.  
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integral nationalism,41 where the world-view is held in a holistic pseudo-rationality 
which erases all incoherence and contradictions to celebrate whatever the nation is 
supposed to be. Ironically, striving not to be essentialist, this view is actually an 
essentialist conception of nationalism which leaves the vast array of nationalist 
phenomena out of the picture.  
This has informed the traditional academic typology consisting of an opposition 
between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, which was reconvened after 1989. 
This typology identifies a first type of nationalism that has been a positive integral 
force in the formation of western nation-states, which was followed by the current 
common-sense understanding of nationalism in the form of the second type, 
considered to be a ill-formed copy of the first. The developments after the collapse 
of the Soviet block in central and eastern Europe appeared as new and additional 
confirmations of the wrongdoings of what is also called Eastern, or organic 
nationalism as opposed to the original Western, liberal version.42 
“Like nationalism itself, [the contrast of ethnic to civic nationalism] seems 
almost natural, a reflection of reality rather than a construction of it. But while 
the distinction does grasp important aspects of modern history and 
contemporary politics, it does so in a specific way, shaping evaluations and 
perceptions, reinforcing some political projects, and prejudicing thinkers 
against others. And it was invented.”43 
                                                 
41 While I used it in a more generic way here, 'integral nationalism' is one of the five categories 
Carlton Hayes elaborated to define nationalism in The Historical Evolution of Modern 
Nationalism, New York, R.R. Smith, 1931. His other types were humanitarian nationalism, 
Jacobin nationalism, traditional nationalism and liberal nationalism. Hayes was referring to the 
“nationalisme intégral” of French nationalist Charles Maurras (1868-1952), ideologist of the 
Action Française – a traditionalist and counter-revolutionary movement launched in 1899 during 
the Dreyfus affair. To put it in a nutshell, integral nationalism is indeed a fundamentalist 
nationalist doctrine (“intégriste” in French), which Hayes links to fascism and totalitarianism, 
that places the nation above all else, considering it an organic entity, a symbiosis of blood and 
soil. See Calhoun, Nations Matter, p.145. 
42 There is a formal correspondence of civic nationalism with the common-sense notion of 
patriotism in the sense that both are considered in there respective binary oppositions as morally 
positive notions. In this regard, and leaving any differences aside, patriotism is to nationalism 
what civic nationalism is to ethnic nationalism. 
43 Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream, London, 
Routledge, 2007, p.117 and “Introduction to the Transaction Edition” in Hans Kohn, The Idea of 
Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background, New Brunswick, Transaction, 2008 
[originally New York, Macmillan, 1944], p.ix.  
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This typology first came into existence to contrast the English and French 
nationalisms, which were traditionally considered to be based on the political 
principle of citizenship, from German nationalism, considered to be based on blood 
ties. From this perspective, national-socialism appears to be the uttermost expression 
of German nationalism, as argued by Hans Kohn, one of the first scholars to have 
written about nationalism and whose civic/ethnic typology has been the most 
influential.44 This typology was taken up in 1993 by Michael Ignatieff in his book 
Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism.45 Ignatieff distinguishes 
the two types of nationalism in the way they construe the nature of belonging to the 
nation. The two concepts of nationalism and nation have therefore two distinct 
meanings, while they both identify the nation as the primary form for human 
societies.  
In the case of civic nationalism, state and society are based on the rule of law: all 
citizens are equal and share the civic and political values, independently of the 
colour of their ethnic particularities. A colour-, creed-, and culture-blind formation, 
although not gender-blind, is closely related to republican ideas and especially to the 
notion of laicité (secularism). Ignatieff places the emergence of this type of 
nationalism in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century. The 
civic type of nationalism is linked to the formation of nation-states based on liberal 
political principles. Kohn identifies eighteenth century Britain as the first case of a 
nation which was justified by a “rational societal conception”,46 holding the 
ethnically different English, Scottish and Welsh people together. Appealing as it may 
be, this presentation leaves the fundamental imperialist essence of Britain out of the 
                                                 
44 Apart from The Idea of Nationalism, New York, Macmillan, 1944, Kohn developed his typology 
in other works, such as A History of Nationalism in the East, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1929, 
“The Eve of German Nationalism” in Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 12, no. 2, 1951, 
pp. 6-84, or Prelude to Nation-States: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815, 
Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1967. For a critical introduction to Kohn's approach to nationalism, see 
Craig Calhoun, “Inventing the opposition of ethnic and civic nationalism: Hans Kohn and The 
Idea of Nationalism” in Calhoun, Nations Matter, pp.117-146.  
45 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism, London, BBC 
Books, 1993. 
46 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 331. 
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picture, which actually functioned as one of the founding national bonds.47 This 
explains, for instance, the dominance of English elites and the somewhat passionate 
interests of Scottish elites for the new prospects brought about by the empire. 
The second type of nationalism, ethnic nationalism, is based on the symbiosis of the 
nation made up of the people and the nation as a state. The people, the ethnie as 
Anthony D. Smith would put it,48 are thus considered a natural and pre-political 
ethnic community which coming of age, as the Hegelian vision goes, forms a nation-
state.49 The example of Germany is the traditional example of a state nationalism 
that bases belonging to the nation on ethnic ties. In the formation of the German 
nation-state, citizenship was, according to Kohn, replaced by “the infinitely vaguer 
concept of 'folk'.”50  
Kohn, who avoids equating ethnic nationalism to traditional and atavistic loyalties 
the way Ignatieff does, relates it to a different intellectual branch of an anti-liberal 
challenge to civic nationalism: 
“The idea of nationalism, in Kohn's view, developed specifically in the West as 
part of the pursuit of a social order based on reason and universal justice. It was 
central to liberalism and liberalism was central to it – until it was appropriated 
and transformed, mainly in the East, by Romantics, traditionalists, mystical 
irrationalists, and those pursuing a different raison d'état governed not by 
universal ideals but by the desire to claim an equal or even dominant place in 
the world remade by the West.”51 
Yet, despite all the caution in defining ethnic nationalism, Kohn places the contrast 
between the two types of nationalism on a moral ground between idealised types of 
social projects. Nationalism as a historical phenomenon, even when considered 
contrived to a given society or a given state, presents itself – even philosophically – 
                                                 
47 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, [2nd ed.]Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 2005 [1992], p. 8. This is further elaborated in the course of the third chapter of the 
present work. 
48 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991, see Chapter 2. 
49 “Nations may have had a long history before they finally reach their destination – that of 
forming themselves into states.” Georg Wolfgang Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History, trans. H.N. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1975, p.134. Quoted 
in Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, London, Blackwell, 2006 [1983], p.47.  
50 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 331. One could ask what about the concept of 'people', 
'peuple' in French. 
51 Calhoun, Nations Matter, p. 118. 
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under more varied and less consistent standards. Without digging too deeply in the 
components of nationalism in the exemplary cases of Britain or France, elements of 
atavism, traditionalism and romanticism are plentiful. They may not appear as 
dominant as in other less “positive” cases (although this supposition is problematic 
in itself), but they are no less integral to nationalism both in particular and in 
general. The belief that political opinion of citizens has been informed 
independently of cultural or ethnic particularities and interests is a misconception 
nurtured by ideological prejudice and in turn still nurtures grand approaches to 
social projects. Jürgen Habermas, who has been promoting a European 
“constitutional patriotism”, or in other words, a positively distilled cosmopolitan, 
liberal and democratic project, still writes about nationalism in the same terms: 
“The nation-state owes its historical success to the fact that it substituted 
relations of solidarity between citizens for the disintegrating corporative ties of 
early modern society. But the republican achievement is endangered when, 
conversely, the integrative force of the nation of citizens is traced back to the 
prepolitical fact of a quasi-natural people, that is, to something independent of 
and prior to the political opinion and will-formation of the citizens 
themselves.”52 
Habermas's formulation seems a bit clumsy as it suggests he acknowledge the 
existence of the 'natural' communities which the political (republican) nation 
replaced or ignored without the concurrent formation of a wider culture of its own. 
The possibility of a society based on ideals of equality and tolerance is obviously 
tantalising, but it is misguided by a moralist liberal reading of the history of 
nationalism, which, focusing on ideals and ideas, fails to take into account the wider 
ideological interrelations which render nationalism a protean form, however positive 
or negative. The civic/ethnic typology based on a moral contrast between the two is 
also a philosophical deadlock. While it is obvious that extreme nationalism is more 
than reprehensible, such a conceptualisation risks assuming that an idealised civic 
vision cannot fester some form of extremism – which is very questionable. 
Moreover, such an idealised vision does not allow the consideration that nationalism 
is to be considered as part of a particular historical moment, which explains the 
                                                 
52 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1998, p. 115. 
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tendency to de-contextualise. Proponents of this binary typology de facto follow – 
even if unwillingly and contradictorily – the Hegelian progressive and linear 
historical account of nations and nationalism, ultimately determined by a 
sophisticated sophism that dictates what nationalism should be or should have 
been.53  
A critical understanding of nationalism is not only be beneficial to a general 
understanding of modern and contemporary times, but also to the devising of 
political theory. As an evident consequence of the protean form of nationalism, the 
academic field of study of nations and nationalism has presented a variety of 
theories which, more or less critically, attempt to make sense of the complexity of 
nationalism.54 Some aspects of these theories will be discussed in the following 
section. 
3. Approaches to Nationalism  
The binary classification elaborated by Kohn was itself situated during the time of 
national-socialism, perhaps the foremost example of totalitarianism. In this respect, 
it can be assumed the classification was an attempt to make sense of a phenomenon 
which, as the most despicable form of nationalist ideology, could only be considered 
against the values it opposed and as morally wrong. This moment also marks the 
beginning of academia's growing interest in nationalism. 
In Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, Umut Özkirimli presents a 
chronology of the study of nationalism in four stages.55 The first one ranging from 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, when the idea of nationalism concerns 
                                                 
53 If involuntary, it can be put down to the certainly complex situation in which a critical stance 
towards something which is part of one's everyday reality often falls on sophistic 
conceptualisations. A lot of caution has to be taken to maintain a self-critical positioning and 
despite all efforts, failure often awaits post hoc.   
54 For authoritative arguments against the civic/ethnic typology used to group specific cases, see 
Oliver Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented 
Approach to National Identity" in Nations and Nationalism Volume 9, Issue 2, 2003, pp. 173-
193; and Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 2004, Chapter 6.  
55 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2000, presents the most thorough overview of theories of nationalism to date. 
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thinkers who have contributed to the development and spread of nationalism. The 
second stage is in fact the one when nationalism becomes a subject of academic 
inquiry. Özkirimli dates this stage from 1918 to 1945. The third stage, starting after 
World War 2, ends in the late 1980's when the fourth and present stage takes over. 
Up to the 1980's – during Özkirimli's third stage –, the academic debate diversified 
in terms of disciplinary interest and it is during this period that the most important 
modernist theories were formulated. The current stage, Özkirmli argues, is 
distinguishable from the previous as theories of nationalism formulated in the last 
two decades seem to share a common characteristic that was not present in the third 
stage. Namely, these theories attempt “to transcend the classical debate 
(characteristic of the third stage)” which was centred on the question of the origins 
of nations.56 This chronology succeeds in highlighting the hallmarks of the dominant 
debates about nationalism. However, it consciously leaves little consideration for 
less prominent works, such as the aborted attempts by early sociologists to theorise 
the concept of nation,57 or theories developed on the margin of international debates 
such as Rudolf Rocker's Nationalism and Culture originally published in 1936.58 
These works have contributed to the variety and the ramification of the possible 
understanding of nations and nationalism. 
These remarks, falling short of criticising Özkirimli's achievement, are meant to put 
it in context. Even if minor works were taken into account, the chronology would 
probably need little or no adjustment. More importantly, by setting out to overview 
and assess theories of the now extensive field of nationalism, Özkirimli's work is in 
itself performative (and indeed a performance) of the fourth stage and the 
transcendence of classical theories. As will be discussed further below, one of the 
major questions concerning nations and nationalism is the question of their 
                                                 
56 Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, pp. 8-9.  
57 E.g. Marcel Mauss, “La nation” in Oeuvres 3: Cohésion sociale et division de la sociologie. 
Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1969, pp. 573-625. Gérard Noiriel presents these developments in 
Etat, nation et immigration, Gallimard, Paris, 2001, see Chapter 3.   
58 A work which was much ahead of its time: Rudolf Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, trans. Ray 
E. Chase, Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1998.  To this, one could also add all the contributions 
of those thinkers, such as Franz Fanon who, as the field of study was undergoing a 
specialisation, did not formally write about nationalism: Franz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, 
Paris, Editions La Découverte, 2002 [1961].  
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reproduction. And such a reproduction goes by talking and thinking – and imagining 
– nations and nationalism, neither necessarily in an academic nor a direct way, 
somewhat like the nineteenth century contributors to nationalist thinking. 
In Theories of Nationalism, Özkirimli uses the traditional categories for describing 
the different trends that have been and still are for some part, particular to the field 
of study of nations and nationalism. These trends cannot be equated to schools of 
thought because they present too many internal variations. They are as follows: the 
perennialists and primordialists, the modernists and post-modernists, and the ethno-
symbolists.59 The main element that differentiates these trends is how they consider 
the modernity or antiquity of nations and nationalism.60 Historically, the first trend is 
primordialism, which corresponds to the first stage in the afore-mentioned 
chronology. As the first trend in all its variants continues, modernist approaches start 
to appear in the second stage and are dominant during the third alongside post-
modernist theories. Finally, the fourth stage presents a combination of all previous 
trends with the latest being ethno-symbolism.  
Özkirmli stresses that these terms are 'umbrella' terms. For example, pirmordialism: 
“describes scholars who hold that nationality is a 'natural' part of human beings, 
as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since time 
immemorial.”61  
It is obvious to see how primordialist theories could easily be qualified as 
'nationalist' because primordialist beliefs leave little room for the adoption of a 
                                                 
59 Some have used the term 'nationalist' as an additional category closely related to the 
primordialists and perennialists, see e.g. Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or geology? The Role 
of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations” in Nations and Nationalism, Volume 1, Issue 1, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp.3-23. Such an equation would be misleading, 
and I would rather ague along with Billig and Calhoun, that studying nationalism does not 
necessarily mean one is critical of it, even more so today as we are all confronted with 
nationalism in our everyday life. Considering a category for 'nationalists' would surmise the 
opposite.  
60 In this sense, the fourth stage described by Özkirimli is still very much influenced by the 
preceding stage. 
61 Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, p.64. Smith suggests a slight variation with the 
perennialists: “for [them] too, the nation is immemorial. National forms may change and 
particular nations may dissolve, but the identity of a nation is unchanging. Yet the nation is not 
part of any natural order […]. The task of nationalism is to rediscover and appropriate a 
submerged past in order the better to build on it.” in Smith, “Gastronomy or geology?”, p.18. 
 CHAPTER 1 – PART 1 39 
critical stance. For Özkirimli, the common denominator of modernists is a focus on 
the modernity of nations and of nationalism, while ethnosymbolists focus on the 
relationship between pre-national social ties and cultures, and modern national 
forms. It is with modernism that critical approaches to nationalism emerged, as 
critical engagements were often influenced by the experience – close or distant – of 
two world wars. This explains the general adverse tendency of modernist theories 
towards nationalism (which the ethno-symbolists will react to). As a consequence, 
modernist theories generally focus on the constructed realities of nations and 
consider nationalism to be the ideological structure used to invent nations. Or, as 
Ernest Gellner famously put it: “It is nationalism which engenders nations, and not 
the other way round.”62  
The post-modernists share a preoccupation with the modernity of nations with their 
modernist counterparts. Postmodernism differs in that it has generally generated 
alternative epistemological methods (with a focus on popular culture for instance) 
which, as well as influencing nationalism studies, have also encouraged an 
increasing interdisciplinarity across the social sciences, and for the current concern, 
in nationalism studies as well.63 But neither postmodernism nor modernism are 
necessarily opposed to nationalism. For example, Smith gives a summary of how the 
postmodernist nationalist operates: 
“[For the postmodernist] the past is more problematic. Though nations are 
modern and the product of modern cultural conditions, nationalists who want to 
disseminate the concept of the nation will make liberal use of elements from 
the ethnic past, where they appear to answer to present needs and 
preoccupations. The present creates the past in its own image. So modem 
nationalist intellectuals will freely select, invent and mix traditions in their 
quest for the imagined political community.”64 
All the above mentioned trends are ideal types, and while different scholars and 
intellectuals are more clearly anchored in one trend than in another, their particular 
approaches often interact with other trends and naturally present internal 
contradictions, to the extent that as no single thinker presents the figure of an ideal 
                                                 
62 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.54. 
63 See Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, pp.195-198. 
64 Smith, “Gastronomy or geology?”, p.18. 
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type. 65 However, in the case of ethno-symbolism, Anthony D. Smith might be 
considered an ideal type as he acknowledged the term of the trend and has 
elaborated his theories in radical opposition to modernist theories such as Gellner's, 
a former mentor of his. Smith is the most prominent scholar to ascribe to and 
describe these essentialist categories. While discussing “the role of the past in the 
creation of the present” for what he rightly considers to be one of the most central 
questions in “our understanding of nationalism”, Smith provides descriptions of the 
various approaches to nationalism such as the one cited previously about 
postmodernists, which he considers unsatisfactory. It rhetorically allows him, 
without engaging with the complexity of any such theory,66 to dismiss them and 
place his own as the logical alternative:  
“The challenge for scholars as well as nations is to represent the relationship of 
ethnic past to modem nation more accurately and convincingly.”67 
Smith's contribution to the study of nationalism is indisputable, and he has indeed 
been a central figure in the numerous debates in the field. Smith has also objected to 
the widespread tendency of using the ideal types of civic and ethnic nationalisms 
which, in his view, create a confusion between these ideal types and the actual 
historical phenomena they supposedly describe.68 But his objection is not based on 
the ideological prejudice the typology induces, as it has previously been argued, but 
on what composes nations: 
“By definition the nation is a community of common myths and memories, as 
is an ethnie. It is also a territorial community. […] In other words nations 
always require ethnic 'elements'. These may, of course, be reworked; they often 
                                                 
65 See e.g. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, London, Routledge, 1998. 
66 As a hint of the complexity of modernist theories, which attempt to make sense of the role of the 
past, one should refer to what follows Gellner's famous formulation: “It is nationalism which 
engenders nations, and not the other way round” is precisely concerned with the question of 
historical relationship: “Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited 
proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most 
often transforms them radically.” Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.54. 
67 As well as preceding quotations: Smith, “Gastronomy or geology?”, pp.18-19.  
68 “Conceptually, the nation has come to blend two sets of dimensions, the one civic and territorial, 
the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases.” Smith, National 
Identity, p.15. 
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are. But nations are inconceivable without some common myths and memories 
of a territorial home.”69 
One should wonder what ethnie means in Smith's approach. While the term is as 
problematic as the term of 'nation', and is in itself central to numerous debates, 
Smith redefined the term distancing his definition from anthropological or 
sociological and political definitions of the term.70 This redefining and the way in 
which concepts are used in the ethno-symbolist trend, has prompted criticism due to 
the conceptual confusion it generates.71 But it has also been praised as it provides a 
novel conceptualisation considered “more consistent” than previous definitions and 
one which opens up spaces for further inquiry.72 Smith's definition of ethnie reads as 
follows: 
“An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role 
of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or 
more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. Such 
collectivities are doubly 'historical' in the sense that not only are historical 
memories essential to their continuance but each such ethnic group is the 
product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change 
and dissolution” 
                                                 
69 Smith, National Identity, p.40. The definition of 'nation' Smith refers to is “a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.” p. 14. 
70 To provide a succinct and indeed unsatisfactory explanation, anthropological and sociological 
definitions of 'ethnicity' are usually related to notions of 'otherness' and 'authenticity' and have 
been criticised for their Orientalist underpinnings. In anthropological literature, ethnicity has in  
fact been re-conceptualised as a dynamic aspect of social relations, along the same lines as 
identity is re-framed as 'identification'. See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Anthropological Perspectives, London, Pluto Press, 1993; Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, [3rd 
ed.], London, Routledge, 2008 [1996]. As a political concept, it denotes the geopolitical situation 
of yet another debated concept, i.e. 'minority' groups, which often denotes a  politicised use of 
the category in e.g. egalitarian politics. For an inquiry on the intellectual history of the concept 
of 'ethnicity', see Marcus Banks, Ethnicity: Anthropological Constructions, London, Routledge, 
1996;  Steve Fenton, Ethnicity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010.  
71 See Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism, pp.183-184. 
72 Eric Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer, “Dominant ethnicity' and the 'ethnic-civic' dichotomy in the 
work of Anthony D. Smith” in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson [eds.], History and 
National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, pp.63-78, p.75. 
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Smith continues with a listing of the six main attributes of ethnic community. The 
more of these attributes a population has, the closer it is to the ideal type of ethnie73 
With this ideal type, despite the cautious precision on historical change, there is a 
risk of an essentialist and deterministic reading of ethnicity and nationalism as the 
overarching ideal type of ethnie comes to corresponds quite perfectly to an ideal 
type of the nation.74 Ethno-symbolist theories risks then revert to a less radical 
version of primordialism,75 as ethnicity is no longer considered as a construct,76 
either conceptually or in the realities it allegedly describes.77 
4. Transcending or Realigning Tendencies? 
In a period when nationalism, under the call of “national identity”, is expressed  as 
we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, across the traditional European 
eastern-western divide, and possibly across the globe, it is not surprising, or  rather it 
is symptomatic, that the dominant debates in the field of theories of nationalism 
have been intensively mobilised around issues opposing the construction or 
imagination of nations based on their 'natural', 'organic or 'ethnic' foundations. 
                                                 
73 These attributes are: “1. a collective proper name 2.  a myth of common ancestry 3. shared 
history 4. one or more differentiating elements of common culture 5. an association with a 
specific 'homeland' 6. a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.” Smith, 
National Identity, pp.20-21. 
74 In spite of Smith's inclusion of related realities in his distinction between 'lateral' and 'vertical' 
ethnies. Smith, National Identity, pp.52-68. 
75 John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism”, in Gopal Balakrishnan [ed.], Mapping the Nation, 
London, Verso, 1996, pp.146-174, p.150; Özkirmli, Theories of Nationalism, p.168. 
76 For Immanuel Wallerstein, the notion of ethnic community is part of the lager phenomenon of 
the construction of 'peoplehood'  of capitalist societies, alongside notions of race and nation 
which, even if using class terminology, is ideologically detached from it. As a consequence, the 
concept would be inefficient for a generic application such as Smith's. Immanuel Wallerstein, 
“The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity” in Etienne Balibar and 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, trans. Chris Turner, London, 
Verso, 1991, pp. 71-85. 
77 Another point on which Smith's theory is questionable is the relevance of such an overarching 
ethnicity concept, which Smith uses to analyse complex realities which if indeed cultural, go 
beyond the notion of ethnicity, such as the less subjective category of class which involves 
dynamic power relations and is integral in the historical development of nationalism. These 
power relations which involve the creation and promotion of social meanings and myths seem to 
be levelled off in Smith's theory. One finally wonders if such a conception isn't misleading as far 
as notions of identity are concerned: 'identification' is a complex phenomenon involving 
numerous other 'levels' of social categorisation. On 'identification' see: Jenkins, Social Identity, 
p.18. 
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The focus on the 'ethnic origins of nations' which have focused much of the attention 
in the last decade of the twentieth century was not only linked to the critical question 
of the resurgence of nationalism in the so-called East in Europe but was also 
probably a by-product of the progressive reaction of political discourse along 
nationalist lines mainly in western Europe and northern America in the late 1970's 
and the 1980's. These developments were, according to John Breuilly, indicative of 
the evolution of general consensual politics towards “sharper political conflict” with 
the coming to power of personalities such as Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan. 
Academic discourse, not only in nationalism, saw “the re-emergence of general 
theory and more polarised debate.”78 
Modernism in the study of nationalism and its critical underpinnings emerged as the 
dominant trend during this period.79 Breuilly also points a finger at the re-emergence 
of nationalism in Western Europe. In Britain, before Thatcher was brought to power, 
Breuilly argues that the increasing sway of nationalism in wetsern Europe was 
demonstrated by the downfall of the Labour government in 1979 as it came under 
pressure from nationalist emergence. The question of the devolution of power 
brought the Labour government down in Ulster, Scotland and Wales and calls for the 
devolution of power.80 There were many other examples of 'regional nationalism' 
across western Europe confronting state-centred national institutions as the same 
time as the first electoral successes of far-right parties often formed in the previous 
                                                 
78 John Breuilly, “Interview for H-Nationalism”, March 2006, <http://www.h-
net.org/~national/Breuilly.html> [accessed 23.10.2008] 
79 John Breuilly, with his seminal work Nationalism and the State, 2nd Edition, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1993 [1982] is considered as one of the leading scholars of this 
emergence, along with Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1983, Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, Verso, 
1983, and to a lesser extent, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger [eds.], The Invention of 
Tradition, [Canto Edition] Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992 [1983]. 
80 Breuilly, “Interview for H-Nationalism”.  
 44 CHAPTER 1 – PART 1 
decade.81 Such movements are generally associated with the ethnic type of 
nationalism discussed in part 1.2 of this chapter. 
The nationalist emergence following the fall of the Soviet Union needs to be 
reconsidered in this wider perspective. As it has been suggested, this re-emergence 
did certainly not appear ex nihilo: nationalism was an integral part of social and state 
formation on the eastern side of the Iron curtain as well as a part of the opposition 
and dissident movements and organisations such as Solidarność, albeit under the 
less controversial denomination of 'patriotism'. But the Iron curtain did not separate 
sides on nationalist grounds. In fact, nationalism, in all its forms, has been one of the 
most shared elements of states and societies on both sides of the “Wall”. Nationalist 
discourses in the 'West' were not suddenly silenced to let the ones in the 'East' take 
over. The latter were made more visible in the media and even while they were 
unexpected from a 'Westocentric' perspective.82 But nationalist discourses and 
sentiments carried on and evolved, and were even normalised. In this way, the re-
emergence of nationalism in central and eastern Europe could be considered as a 
kind of 'update', a 'normalisation' to the realities of the “free world”. An upsurge 
which was partly due to the release of ideas and sentiments contained by state 
coercion and to the sudden supply of discursive and political practices already 
commonplace in liberal-democracies.83 
                                                 
81 The clearest example is the case of France's Front National, which has progressively gained 
ground in local and parliamentary elections from 1982 to 1986, when FN representatives 
obtained 35 seats in parliament. The party's significance was further reinforced in the 
presidential election of 1988 when the leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, obtained more than 14% of 
the votes in the first round. The electoral results of the FN stabilised during the 1990's, before Le 
Pen reached the second round in the dramatic presidential election in 2002 with close to 17% of 
the vote. Le Pen's share of the vote fell short of 18% in the second round and he lost to Jacques 
Chirac. 
82 For reasons which will be made explicit in part 2.3 of this chapter. The term 'Westocentric' is 
borrowed from Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, London, Sage, 1997, p.3. 
83 The case of ex-Yugoslavia is one of the exceptions in the sense that local political practices lead 
to numerous wars and extreme violence, while in the majority of the ex-satellite states as well as 
in the newly formed states, transition was peaceful and political. Legal and civic practices tried 
to consolidate the liberal model by emulating practices in western states. This does not mean 
there are no political elements that have run counter to this liberal model, but in all the 10 states 
which have joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007, they have not been a determining part 
of the general consensus.  
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These remarks on the transnationality and historicity of nationalism leave out all 
analogous correlations that have taken place through colonisation and 
decolonisation. Beyond the apparently geographic confines of Europe, the impact of 
colonisation and decolonisation should not be overlooked. As part of a world 
organised by colonialism, all European countries are undoubtedly related to the 
colonial and postcolonial conditions, in one form or the other.84 Postcolonial studies 
in general have indeed been one of the major influences of nationalism studies over 
the past couple of decades. Özkirmli indicates that one of the major theoretical gains 
in this period has been the “re-reading” of power, symbolic and knowledge 
relationships between the 'West' and the 'Rest', “the deconstruction of nationalism's 
negative codings” on the basis of historical contingencies.85 A further inquiry into 
Postcolonial theory, and more particularly on the concept of 'Hybridity', will be 
conducted in the last part of the fourth chapter. 
The deeper understanding brought about by Postcolonial theories has been informed 
by the dependencies and relationalities between different ideologies, trends and 
practices, such as the interaction between contemporary modern democratic 
principles and imperialism and colonialism, and of course, nationalism. Taking into 
account this relational complexity can consequently be considered as the basis for a 
possible transcendence of classical debates, and in nationalism studies in particular. 
The efforts of Postcolonial theorists show a different side in the normalisation of 
nationalism as a given and topical element of the modern world. The somewhat 
depoliticised ethnie of Smith's theoretical framework is symptomatic of such a 
                                                 
84 On the colonial and postcolonial condition in Poland, see Clare Cavanagh “Postcolonial Poland” 
in Common Knowledge, Volume 10, Issue 1, Winter 2004, pp. 82-92; Bogusław Bakuła, 
“Colonial and Postcolonial Aspects of Polish Discourse on the Eastern 'Borderlands'” in Janusz 
Korek [ed.], From Sovietology to Postcoloniality. Poland and Ukraine in the Postcolonial 
Perspective, Södertörn Academic Studies 32, Stockholm, 2007, pp.41-59; Tomasz Zarycki, 
“Polska i jej regiony a debata postkolonialna ” in Małgorzata Dajnowicz, Oblicze polityczne 
regionów Polski, Białystok, Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania, 2008, pp. 31-48. 
85 Other major influence being Gender Studies, see Özkirmli, Theories of Nationalism, pp.190-194. 
Özkirmli refers to the insights of Geoffrey Eley and Ronald Grigo Suny, these negative codings 
being “the ways in which even the nation's most generous and inclusively democratic 
imaginings entail a process of protective and exclusionary positioning against others.” in 
“Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation” in 
Eley and Suny [eds.], Becoming National: A Reader, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, 
p.28; quoted in Özkirmli, Theories of Nationalism, p.194. 
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normalisation, or even 'naturalisation'. It has previously been suggested how 
considering nationalism simply in its most extreme form leads to a misconception of 
what nationalism is and how it functions. Conversely, acknowledging the endemic 
condition of nationalism should not lead to an uncritical appraisal which would 
render nationalism too conventional or customary.86 
The line between the two is difficult to navigate. In his provocatively entitled 
collection of essays “Nations Matter”, Craig Calhoun underlines this difficulty: 
“We should approach nationalism with critical attention to its limits, illusions, 
and potential for abuse, but we should not dismiss it. Even where we are deeply 
critical of the nationalism we see, we should recognize the continued 
importance of national solidarities. Even if we wish for a more cosmopolitan 
world order, we should be realistic enough not to act on mere wishes.”87 
As a consequence, nationalism is not “a moral mistake”, but the organising fabric of 
the modern world. Just that. When critically engaging with nationalism, one in fact 
delivers a political engagement. Not about petty nor party politics, but the politics of 
how modern societies organise and represent themselves.  
The line is hence even more difficult to navigate. Acknowledging nationalism as a 
fundamental historical phenomenon in modern times, with all the implications it 
entails, means that the first step of a critical engagement is acknowledging one's own 
nationalism, however passive it is. In practice, it means taking distance both from 
oneself and from the every-day world one lives in and where nationalism, even in 
the first decades of the twenty-first century, is continuously blooming – in petty 
politics as well. Özkirimli, in his own critical engagement, starts off writing: “The 
nationalists have no country.”88 Candidly, he could have also written: “We all are 
nationalists.” 
                                                 
86 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 6.  
87 Calhoun, Nations Matter, p. 1. 
88 Umut Özkirmli, Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2005, p. 1. 
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– Part 2 – 
The Reproduction of Nationalism  
 
“Whoever believes in the necessary sequence of all historical events, 
sacrifices the future to the past.”89 
1. History and Tradition  
Although certain elements of the conceptualisation elaborated by Smith have been 
subject to criticism, his reflections have the merit of showing the past to be a crucial 
element of nationalism and for its study and understanding. Or one should rather say 
'pastness', which is the way the past is perceived, constructed and reproduced.   
“Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in 
ways they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each 
other. Pastness is a central element in the socialization if individuals, in the 
maintenance of group solidarity, in the establishment of or challenge to social 
legitimation. Pastness therefore is pre-eminently a moral phenomenon, 
therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary phenomenon. That is 
of course why it is so inconstant. Since the real world is constantly changing, 
what is relevant to contemporary politics is necessarily constantly changing. 
Ergo, the content of pastness necessarily constantly changes. Since, however, 
pastness is by definition an assertion of the constant past, no one can ever 
admit that any particular past has ever changed or could possibly change.”90 
Wallerstein's analysis corroborates the conclusive remarks of the previous part 
related to the political foundation and the entanglement of power relations in the 
study of nationalism. Reconnecting with the notion of pastness is, in the sense 
presented above, constitutive of any form of identification as it provides for 
representations of identity. In the case of the “historical socio-political groups” as 
Wallerstein qualifies nations, the content of what constitutes pastness for national 
imaginings is contextually defined by nationalism.  
Etienne Balibar argues that what can be acknowledged as retrospectively pre-
national  institutions made “possible certain features of nation-states”:  
                                                 
89 Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, p. 27. 
90 Wallerstein, “The Construction of Peoplehood”, in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class, 
p. 78. 
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“This pre-history [of the national formation] differs in essential features from 
the nationalist myth of a linear destiny. First, it consists of a multiplicity of 
qualitatively distinct events spread out over time, none of which implies any 
subsequent event. Second, these events do not of their nature belong to the 
history of one determinate nation.”91  
Balibar addresses certain idiosyncrasies of the “use and abuse of history” for 
national formation.92 Evidently, nationalism cannot be charged in being the sole 
social form using and abusing history. In fact, the definition of pastness indicates 
there is nothing exceptional about in the centrality of pastness in nationalism. But 
the formation of nations is not entirely determined by the process of pastness 
formation which it informs. Nationalism appropriates and adapts history to form a 
national past and this process is certainly historically conditioned, but these specific 
modalities how nationalism forms its own past need to be clarified.  
The historical circumstances which have defined the forming of national pasts are 
linked to the modernity of the Nation form. Pierre Nora argues that a definitive 
characteristic of modernity is the increased pace of history, in other words, its 
acceleration.93 The thesis of the acceleration of history is long-running.94 Real or 
imagined, it has been described in many different ways and at different times 
throughout history.95 The question should be posed in those terms: by what means 
have national pasts been produced and reproduced in the context of the acceleration 
of history? 
                                                 
91 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology”, in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, 
Nation, Class, pp. 86-106, p. 88. 
92 The formulation is an allusion to Nietzsche's essay “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life”, 
cf. e-text, Revised Edition 2010, trans. Ian Johnston, Vancouver Island University, Canada, 
<http://records.viu.ca/~joh 
nstoi/nietzsche/history.htm> [last accessed 17.06.2010] 
93 Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in Pierre Nora [ed.], 
Rethinking the French Past: Realms of Memory. Volume 1: Conflicts and Division, Lawrence D. 
Kritzman [ed. English version], trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1986, p. 1. 
94 Pierre Nora, like many other many other French historians of his generation, refers to an essay 
originally published in 1948 by Pierre Halévy, Essai sur l'accélération de l'histoire; suivi de 
L'histoire va-t-elle plus vite? La Conquête des forces de la nature ; Leibniz et l'Europe, Jean-
Pierre Halévy [ed.], Editions de Fallois, Paris, 2001. For a critical examination see:  Jean-Noël 
Jeanneney, L'histoire va-t-elle trop vite? Essai sur un vertige, Gallimard, Paris, 2001; and 
Alexandre Escudier, “Le sentiment d’accélération de l’histoire moderne : éléments pour une 
histoire”, in Esprit, no. 345, June 2008, pp. 165-191.  
95 We should perhaps less hurriedly replace it by the spacial and quantitative amplification of 
social exchanges, associated to technologies characteristic of capitalist modernity (these 
exchanges not always resulting in civil encounters). 
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The national attitude to history has two paradigms: the first one is a link between the 
present and glorious deeds and people of the past, and the second is the claim that 
the contemporary national form is the logical achievement of this glorious 
genealogy. These paradigms engender the belief that the nation is not a construct, 
but  
“a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind, only obscured 
by that long, persistent and mysterious somnolence.”96  
Although the belief in the naturalness and universality of the national order may be 
genuine, it provides no clue to explaining the process through which national history 
fulfilled its assumed destiny. In other words, the aim of forming into nation-states 
does not comprehend the process of its formation. Many scholars have described the 
national process as a creative process. As such, all legitimating historical narratives 
are creative processes based on rituals, commemorations and institutions, which 
affect and unite the whole community. The anthropologist Robert J. Foster explains 
how “the creation or invention of tradition […] necessarily involves the constitution 
of a past.”97 
Furthermore, historical memory generates the formation of a social self. Such a 
memory is formed using institutionalised history and fixating the would-be common 
elements of this shared historical memory. Nora describes the vessels of such a 
memory as Lieux de Mémoire – ‘realms of memory’. Nora says the ontological 
justification for such realms of memory comes from the need to strengthen an 
identity considered to be under threat:  
“Lieux de mémoire arise out of a sense that there is no such thing as 
spontaneous memory, hence that we must create archives, mark anniversaries, 
organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and authenticate documents because 
                                                 
96 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p.47. 
97 “Similarly, the nation as imagined community requires the constitution of a national past – the 
continuous history of the community unfolding through ‘homogeneous, empty time’ into an 
equally infinite past and future. [...] Historical precedence functions, of course, to legitimate 
present and contingent communal relations by naturalizing them or rendering them as ‘given’. 
But the centrality of history to nationhood inheres in the relationship between historical 
consciousness and ‘everyday life,’ the everyday historical memory that informs a subject’s sense 
of what is ‘normal, appropriate or possible’. [...] Similarly it is historical memory – a particular 
if often unarticulated concept of the past – that above all defines the nation as a collective 
subject and generates ‘a sense that ‘we’ are the achievements of history’. Robert J. Foster, 
“Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene”, in Annual Review of Anthropology, no. 20, 
1991, pp.235-260,  pp.240-241. Quotation: P. Wright, On Living in an Old Country: The 
National Past in Contemporary Britain, Verso, London, 1985, p.148. 
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such things no longer happen as a matter of course. When certain minorities 
create protected enclaves as preserves of memory to be jealously safeguarded, 
they reveal what is true of all lieux de mémoire: that without commemorative 
vigilance, history would soon sweep them away. These bastions buttress our 
identities, but if what they defended were not threatened, there would be no 
need for them.”98  
The threat, which Nora identifies as the acceleration of history, is thus considered as 
the historical reason which necessitates the “buttressing” of identities. Even 
considering the fact that social bodies generally tend to build up symbolic and 
ideological walls for protection when they perceive themselves to be under threat, 
this does not explain the massive and homogeneous production of realms of memory 
unless it is explained as a production which occurred under the auspices of state-
centred nationalism.  
In “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, Hobsbawm explains how the 
invention of traditions in France was essential to the establishment of the Third 
Republic:  
“three major innovations are particularly relevant. The first was the 
development of a secular equivalent of the church – primary education, imbued 
with revolutionary and republican principles and content, and conducted by the 
secular equivalent of priesthood – or perhaps, given their poverty, the friars – 
the instituteurs. […] The second was the invention of public ceremonies. […] 
The third was the mass production of public monuments.”99   
All these inventions did not naturally come out of history and many were the result 
of power struggles. For example, by recuperating of the imagery of the Revolution, 
the moderate Republicans in the late nineteenth century were able to negotiate the 
terms of a political peace with the radical Jacobin Republicans, thus incorporating 
themselves into the fabric of the symbols of the Republic. Consequently, as the 
dividing line between the different republican movements became less fraught with 
conflict, efforts could be focused on the lines dividing the Republic from outside its 
symbolic frame. 
When examining the process of refocusing the constitution of a national past 
through the creation of traditions, there are two levels on which analysis should take 
                                                 
98 Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in Nora [dir.], Rethinking the 
French Past, p.7. 
99 Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition, pp. 263-307, pp.271-272. 
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place: on the one hand the structure or means through which traditions are 
constructed, and on the other hand the content which is spread through this 
construction. Nationalism, falling in accordance with the past it construes, provides 
the content of these traditions. To questions that those who would design the realms 
of memory could ask, nationalism provided its plain and appealing glorious 
genealogical history: 
“But which culture and what territory? Only a homeland that was ‘theirs’ by 
historic right, the land of their forebears; only a culture that was ‘theirs’ as a 
heritage, passed down the generations, and therefore an expression of their 
authentic identity”100 
The innovations of national traditions are novel in their quantity, scope and 
homogeneity, but not in the quality of their function. They reproduce the attitude 
towards history from which they were produced. The single fact that they aimed at 
spreading a national 'consciousness' means that they could not be made sense of 
prior to their institutionalisation apart from in the circles which considered them 
necessary – these circles holding the answers to “which culture and what territory” 
they were aimed for. 
Coming back to realms of memory, and putting the motivation for their 
institutionalisation aside, there is a clear correspondence between the 'mass' 
traditions pointed out by Hobsbawm and Nora's definition: 
“Lieux de mémoire are complex things. At once natural and artificial, simple 
and complex, concrete and abstract, they are lieux – places, sites, causes – in 
three senses: material, symbolic, and functional. An archive is a purely material 
site that becomes a lieux de mémoire only if imagination invests it with a 
symbolic aura. A textbook, will, or veteran’s group is purely functional object 
that becomes a lieu de mémoire only when it becomes part of a ritual.”101  
To a certain extent, what he calls lieux de mémoire appear to be logical building 
blocks for an evolution of history conceived as 'natural'. Nora limits his critical study 
to the description of the ‘psychological’ state of mind of a historical consciousness, 
pin pointing here and there ‘facts’ or ‘proofs’ of the change that triggered a demand 
for establishing these lieux de mémoire. He does suggest a creative process, in his 
description of the redefinition of identity in “dredging up its past”, and in his 
                                                 
100 Hutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, p.4. 
101 Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in Nora [dir.], Rethinking the 
French Past, p.14. 
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description of an imposed aspect in the lieux de mémoire (“Memory dictates”). 
These descriptions suggest Nora retains a critical understanding towards what he 
calls an “elusive identity” and the “illusion of eternity.”102 But Nora does not look 
more into other historical motivations – ideological, political, and cultural – that 
could have been involved in the creative process. Instead, he implies that lieux de 
mémoire are consequences of a particular or revolutionary change, without reserving 
his judgement that certain developments may have been prompted by historically 
negotiated representations, or a historically contingent imagination. All in all, his 
analysis appears not to consider the possibility that the whole phenomenon of lieux 
de mémoire and its development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries involve 
symbolic power relations. 
What opposes Hobsbawm to Nora is the idea that the traditions encapsulated by 
realms of memory are invented traditions, and therefore new social meanings. For 
Nora, what is new is the intensity of the threat “History” and its pace pose to these 
traditions, and not the content of these traditions. Hobsbawm suggests that the 
setting up by the state of monuments, and other public institutions, like “the opulent 
ensembles on the Place de la République and the Place de la Nation in Paris”, was 
designed to facilitate a particular recognition, which can be summed up as political:  
“such monuments traced the grass roots of the Republic – particularly in its 
rural strongholds – and may be regarded as the visible link between the nation 
and the voters.”103  
This process of institutionalisation of national symbols indeed suggests a 
fundamental political symbolism, whether the implementation of realms of memory 
was solely decided in the high rungs of the state apparatus or triggered by the 
demand of the people concerned. For the symbolism to be recognised by society, it 
also needs to be accepted and assumed as such, at least de facto. If the 'people' did 
not immediately the symbol or importance of national institutions, their symbolic 
deposit came to be socially accepted in time, partly due to the spread and acute 
presence of such lieux de mémoire. Otherwise, it is hardly conceivable how these 
                                                 
102 “Museums, archives, cemeteries, collections, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, 
monuments, sanctuaries, private associations – these are relics of another era, illusions of 
eternity.” in Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in Nora [dir.], 
Rethinking the French Past, p.6, see also pp.10, 13 and 17. 
103 Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition, pp. 263-307, p.272. 
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tokens of state identity would have retained such symbolism for longer than a 
moment. Nevertheless, even if social acceptance provides these institutions with a 
necessary legitimacy, it is more problematic to assign to the creative will behind the 
institutionalisation of realms of memory to this social acceptance. Speaking in terms 
of imposed state ideology may seem too simple as there may have been a certain 
social willingness to suspend that allowed the imposition of social meanings. But the 
responsibility of the choice (of what is to be erected, where and why, in the case of 
commemorative monuments) is nevertheless assignable to the people participating in 
state administration. Nationalism in general provides the basic principle for looking 
to the pastness it creates to choose what should be erected, represented, remembered. 
Nevertheless, if nationalism is objectified in such a way, it consequently has no 
agency. It is individuals with nationalist beliefs who, providing they have the means, 
take up the challenge of setting and applying these rules.104 
2. Selection and Determinism 
A problem arises when the rules provided by nationalism to select the content of 
national traditions truncate aspects of a reality necessary for the identity these rules 
propose and produce. This becomes obvious when looking at history. While 
historical developments are intricate phenomena which are hard to ‘make sense’ of, 
at least in a “monumental” way, nationalism offers a packaged history which is by 
definition reduced, but also penned to a certain type of events.105 The events which 
are then commemorated through education, celebrations and monuments, are chosen 
in accordance with identity politics: events worth being remembered and considered 
highly relevant for the reproduction of the community. Hobsbawm presents the 
following example of how historical cuttings were used to blend the German 
national history into the contemporary state ideology of the late nineteenth century:  
“The major difficulty in the way of achieving [the establishment of the new 
Empire as the realization of the secular national aspirations of the German 
                                                 
104 Raymond Taras, in referring more generally to ideology, similarly argues that ideas and ideology 
are not autonomous but are produced by human beings. Raymond Taras, Ideology in a Socialist 
State: Poland 1956-1983, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 45. 
105 The choice of events is dependent on classical political myths such as analysed by Raoul 
Girardet in Mythes et mythologies politiques, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1986. The general 
categories are “the Conspiracy”, “the Saviour”, “the Golden Age”, and “Unity”. For a thorough 
inquiry on the nationalist cultural selection in Europe see Anne-Marie Thiesse, La création des 
identités nationales : Europe XVIIIe-XIXe siècle, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1999. 
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people, and to stress the specific historical experiences which linked Prussia 
and the rest of Germany in its construction in 1871] was firstly the history of 
the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation was difficult to fit into 
nineteenth-century nationalist mould, and secondly that its history did not 
suggest that the denouement of 1871 was historically inevitable, or even likely. 
It could be linked to a modern nationalism only by two devices: by the concept 
of a secular national enemy against whom the German people had defined their 
identity and struggled to achieve unity as a state; and by the concept of 
conquest or cultural, political, and military supremacy, by means of which the 
German nation, scattered across large parts of other states, mainly in central 
and eastern Europe, could claim the right to be united in a single Greater 
German state. […] Buildings and monuments were the most visible form of 
establishing a new interpretation of German history […].”106 
While Nora posits a pre-existing nation that seeks national sanctuaries when under 
threat from historical change, in the case of the advancement of a greater German 
state, the new construction is change itself. In other words, it cannot be assumed that 
nationalism is the only response to the changes of history, or that nationalism is an 
untimely response to timely developments. Objectified history, just like nationalism, 
has no agency. This suggests, as Gellner writes, that nationalists make use of “the 
pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though 
it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically.”107 
The active cultural selection and transformation of social meaning was implemented 
across Europe in the late nineteenth century by the upper social strata (who should 
be considered as the fist 'believers')108 to fill the gap between the centre of power, 
ideally the state, and the people who were recognised as such by the centre. National 
education curricula, commemorations, buildings and political and social theories and 
discourses are all attempts, Machiavellian or benevolent, calculated or naturalised, to 
fill in or hide that problematic gap. 
“[...] the identity of the nation is provided in arbitrary ways. The leap from 
culture to politics is made by portraying the nation at one moment as a cultural 
community and at another as a political community whilst insisting that in an 
ideal state the national community will not be ‘split’ into cultural and political 
spheres. The nationalist can exploit this perpetual ambiguity. National 
independence can be portrayed as the freedom of the citizens who make up the 
(political) nation or as the freedom of the collectivity which makes up the 
(cultural) nation. Nationalist ideology is a pseudo-solution to the problem of 
                                                 
106 Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914”, in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition, pp. 263-307, pp.276.277. 
107 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 56.  
108 The term is used in the same sense as in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 12. 
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the relationship between state and society, but its plausibility derives from its 
roots in genuine intellectual responses to that problem.” 109   
The “genuine intellectual responses” Breuilly refers to are primarily linked to 
historicism. In associating it with various other concepts (such as authenticity) and 
political ideas, Breuilly presents how nationalism came to be “a type of political 
ideology which is beyond critical examination.”110 Patrick J. Geary echoes this in his 
historiographical critique of nationalism which he presents as the product of “an age 
that combined the romantic political philosophies of Rousseau and Hegel with 
‘scientific’ history and Indo-European philology.”111 
Geary proposes a further interpretation of intellectual tools that served nationalists to 
implement and justify their cultural – hence historical – predominance, particularity 
or unity. According to him:  
“[a] fairly typical version of how the ideology of  nationalism gives rise to 
independence movements […] posits three stages in the process of creating 
these imagined communities. They include, first, the study of the language, 
culture, and history of a subject people by a small group of ‘awakened’ 
intellectuals; second, the transmission of the scholars’ ideas by a group of 
‘patriots’ who disseminate them throughout society; finally the stage at which 
the national movement reaches its mass apogee. With minor variations, this 
process can be traced from Germany in the eighteenth century across much of 
the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian empires in the nineteenth century, and 
ultimately, to colonial and postcolonial Asia, Africa, and the Americas in the 
twentieth century.”112  
Indeed, the methods and attitudes for national construction described by Geary have 
been replicated in different times and places. Partha Chatterjee describes a similar 
process in the development of nationalist historiography in India:  
“Reviewing the development of historiography in Bengal in the nineteenth 
century, Guha shows how the call sent out by Bankimchandra – ‘We have no 
history! We must have a history!’- implied in effect an exhortation to launch the 
struggle for power, because in this mode of recalling the past, the power to 
represent oneself is nothing other than political power itself. […] What 
[Bakimchandra] meant by true history was also clear: it was the memory of the 
glorious deeds of one’s ancestors.”113 
                                                 
109 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 69. 
110 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 70. 
111 Patrick J. Geary, The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2002, p. 13. 
112 Geary, The Myth of Nations, pp. 17-18.  
113 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993, p.76. 
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The exhortation to launch a struggle for power sounds very familiar. Such a view of 
the past provides the political motivation for a nationalistic history and is, in this 
way, very similar to Renan’s famous poetical description of the glorious deeds of the 
forefathers.114 As the rewriting of history has legitimised the power of sovereign 
states in Europe, it is naturally believed that it is the logical path to follow in order to 
achieve the same national sovereignty. Chatterjee also adds that: “[…] a primary 
sign of the nationalist consciousness [is] that it will not find its own voice in 
histories written by foreign rulers and that it will set out to write for itself the 
account of its own past.”115 This example provided by Chatterjee additionally 
stresses the obvious link between nationalism and history – in other words, that 
nationalism is very much concerned with history. While people may not accept a 
history written by scholars other than those considered or claiming to be their own, 
Indian scholars embraced the principles of European nationalist historiography.116 
Geary, in his criticism of the nationalist approach to history, describes and explains 
the link between nineteenth century European scholarship and nationalism. Looking 
at nationalism from the view point of a medievalist, his analysis proves very useful: 
“Any historian who has spent much of is career studying [an] earlier period of 
ethnic formation and migration can only look upon the development of 
nationalism and racism with apprehension and disdain, particularly when these 
ideologies appropriate and pervert history as their justification. This pseudo-
history assumes, first, that the peoples of Europe are distinct, stable and 
objectively identifiable social and cultural units, and that they are distinguished 
by language, religion, custom, and national character, which are unambiguous 
and immutable. […] Second, ethnic claims demand the political autonomy of 
all persons belonging to a particular ethnic group and at the same time the right 
of that people to govern its historic territory, usually defined in terms of early 
medieval settlements or kingdoms, regardless of who may now live in.” 117  
The strength of Geary’s analysis resides in his firm criticism of disciplines, ideas, 
tools, and methods – ‘sciences’ – that have created the contemporary scholarly world 
and contributed to rendering the nationalist ideology even less subject to critical 
examination. Through his criticism, Geary highlights the issue of the link between 
tradition and the past. Concerning the discipline of history, the formal, ‘disciplinary’ 
                                                 
114 Ernest Renan, “'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?' Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882”, e-text, 
Bibliothèque Municipale de Lisieux, 1997, <http://www.bmlisieux.com/archives/nation01.htm> [last 
accessed 25.03.2010], see Chapter 3. 
115 Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, p. 77.  
116 Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, p.88. 
117 Geary, The Myth of Nations, pp. 11-12. 
 CHAPTER 1 – PART 2 57 
link between writing history in the nineteenth century and writing history at the 
beginning of the twenty-first is not sufficient to uncritically support what had been 
written and thought before.118 There is a similar correlation with nationalism: while 
there is a geographical link between the Gaul provinces and the French Republic, or 
between the area occupied by Germanic tribes and the Weimar Republic, it is only 
by awkward connections that we can assume any other link. Even more so in 
modern times: do people in France today really share the same identity – or 
processes of identification – with their presumed ancestors in 1789? Did the 
components of French society (or any other society) remained unchanged, 
‘unspoiled’, untouched by the passing of time, of people, and social meaning? The 
answer of nationalist historiography is indeed disciplinary. Intimately intermingled 
with positivism, which dominated nineteenth century scholarship and beyond, 
nationalist historiography continuously reifies and reduces social realities 
disentangling them from those whose actions have produced them.119  
One of the examples Geary analyses is the construction of German nationalism. 
Philology was a major science used by nationalists to set up a community based on 
language and to define a German past and claim it as inherently German, while 
Germany was by then little more than an idea.120 Philology also created links with 
achievements from the past by mapping out the genealogy of contemporary 
languages to show in an apparently very rational way how a text, written for instance 
in the tenth century in a vernacular language was naturally the achievement of the 
                                                 
118 “The very tools of analysis by which we pretend to practice scientific history were invented and 
perfected within a wider climate of nationalism and nationalist preoccupation.” Geary, The Myth 
of Nations. p.16. 
119 Positivism (or classical positivism) was the centre of heated debates in the second half of the 
twentieth century. As a traditional theory, has also been criticised on grounds of social and 
political conservatism. See Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, New York, Herder and Herder, 
1972. 
120 Geary, The Myth of Nations,, p.28. 
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same people, as they shared the same ‘language’.121 And it is to the methods of 
German nationalist philology and historiography that Geary traces the origins of the 
'transnational' formation of nationalist scholarly toolbox:  
“These twin tools of German nationalism – texts and philological analysis – not 
only created German history, but by implication, all history. They were a 
readily exportable package, easily applied to any corpus of texts in any 
language. Moreover, since German standards of ‘scientific’ historical 
scholarship increasingly dominated nineteenth century universities in Europe 
and even America, foreign historians trained in the German seminar method 
and text-critical scholarship served as ambassadors of nationalistic analysis 
when they returned to their own countries. […] Historical scholarship and 
nationalism became one.” 
To the “historicised national language and culture”122 Geary adds the practice of 
archaeology that also reinforced the tendency to consider territories in 
correspondence with peoples and cultures, independently from the passing of time 
and consequent changes. Language provided scholars with a localisation of a 
people,123 while archaeology would provide “the physical evidence of the cultural 
specificities of that people.”124 
                                                 
121 “Language became the vehicle for teaching the national history of the ‘people’ whose language 
this was and whose political aspirations the language expressed. However, the new philology 
allowed nationalist educators and ideologues to go further: it made possible the creation of a 
national, ‘scientific’ history that projected both national language and national ideology into a 
distant past. […] The rules of linguistics made it possible for scholars to claim linear descent 
form [ancient vernacular texts] to modern versions of national languages. […] Philologists 
provided nationalists with a means of projecting their nations into a distant [past]. […] They 
claimed that textual evidence, or lacking that, the historical philology, proved the existence of 
discrete ‘linguistic communities’ sharing the same vision of life, the same social and religious 
values, the same political systems.” Geary, The Myth of Nations,, pp. 32-33. 
122 Geary, The Myth of Nations, p.30. 
123 The principle of the incarnation of the nation in its language can be traced back to theologist 
Johann Gottfried Herder in 1777, himself inspired by James MacPherson's collection of Gaelic 
legends published in 1760 and 1761, famously and wrongly attributed to Ossian. This is the 
origin of a trend of collecting popular chants that will inform and form the national imaginaries 
across Europe. See Thiesse, La création des identités nationales, chapters 1 and 2.  
124 Geary, The Myth of Nations, pp.34-35; Chris Wickham offered a witty example showing the 
limits of positivism in archaeology: “a man or a woman with a Lombard-style brooch is no more 
necessarily a Lombard than a family in Bradford with a Toyota is Japanese; artifacts are no 
secure guide to ethnicity” in Early Medieval Italy: Central Power and Local Society 400-1000, 
Totowa, NJ, 1981, p.68, quoted in Geary, The Myth of Nations, p.38. Naturally, archaeologists 
have since come to see ethnicity differently, as “a more fluid and complex phenomenon”; 
Catherine Hills, The Origins of the English, Gerald Duckworth and Co., London, 2003, p.71. 
Such a critique of scholarship was already implied in Renan's lecture when he argued for 
ethnography to bear no application in politics. In spite of a number of ambiguities towards 
nationalism, Renan's lecture can be considered as both a historical document on nationalist 
thought and the beginning of the critical examination of nationalism. Renan, “Qu'est-ce qu'une 
nation?”, see Chapter 2, Part 1 of present work. 
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By the end of the nineteenth century academic history had predominantly come to 
mean national history, and national history came to surpass the realm of academia. 
The conception of what constituted a nation became much more dense and precise, 
discursively speaking, than what it had been a century before:  
“[T]he concept of the nation became much broader, comprising a human 
grouping which had developed through community of material and spiritual 
interests, and of morals, customs and traditions; hence it represents a sort of 
‘community of destiny,’ which holds within itself the laws of its particular 
life.”125  
From an exclusive and political definition linked to the idea of the modern sovereign 
state to which belonging was based on class,126 the nation subsequently referred not 
only to a state and its territory, but also to a given people, with its genealogy, 
language and culture. It referred to a past that was clearly outlined as the object of 
academic inquiry. This historical path was not only traced in the nation's past: it was 
the present ground and the direction for the nation's future.  
The linear imaginings of the nationalist historical approach are symptomatic of the 
inherent determinism of nationalism. These imaginings ideally set the nation-state, 
with its immutable memory, symbols and identity, to be the ultimate achievement of 
the particular history of nations and establishes this process as universal.127 Such an 
approach is embedded in a time when positivism prevailed in most disciplines and 
belief in progress dominated all others. Rocker notes what has come to be an evident 
link between the 'positive' belief in nationalism and the general approach then 
adopted in the discipline of history: 
“it has often been asserted that the development of the social structure in 
Europe in the direction of the national state has been along the line of progress. 
                                                 
125 Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, p. 260. 
126 The ideal class here being the cosmopolitan bourgeois liberal, which means certain cultural 
aspects cannot be put aside.  Citizenship in the young American and French republics of the late 
eighteenth century was solely for men and did not encompass the poor and labouring classes, the 
indigenous people and the slaves. And citizenship was frequently granted to illustrious 
'foreigners', as in the famous case of Tadeusz Kościuszko, both an American and Polish national 
hero. See Andrzej Zwoliński, Wprowadzenie o rozważań o narodzie, Cracow, Wydawnictwo 
WAN, 2005, p. 128. 
127 In relation to this historical uniqueness, the naming of the nation follows a similar logic, which 
is exemplified in the Macedonian question: It is “a universal code for the naming of particulars.” 
Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 73.   
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It is, significantly, the protagonists of ‘historical materialism’ who have most 
emphatically defended this concept.”128 
The founder and most renowned theorist of historical materialism is Karl Marx, but 
Rocker does not direct his criticism to Marx, but to the many Marxists who, in 
keeping with Marx, have set up a deterministic approach to history, which Rocker 
describes as fatalism.129 Philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis has proposed a critique 
of the determinism of historical materialism which led him to a more generalised 
critique of deterministic theories as being closed theories:  
“une théorie achevée prétend apporter des réponses à ce qui ne peut être résolu, 
s’il peut l’être, que par la praxis historique. Elle ne peut donc fermer son 
système qu’en pré-asservissant les hommes à ses schémas, en les soumettant à 
ses catégories, en ignorant la création historique, lors même qu’elle la glorifie 
en paroles. […] l’idée même d’une théorie achevée et définitive est chimérique 
et mystificatrice.”130 
In the case of nationalism, which is a historical (or cultural) determinism, and 
despite the fact that there may not a be a single original thinker of nationalism as 
there is for historical materialism, nationalism's general principles can be derived 
from its various manifestations, whether they are buildings or books. Being 
deterministic, nationalism is indeed a closed ideology which institutes atrophied 
social imaginaries. The common ground between the analysis of Rocker and 
Castoriadis is found in their identification of a contradiction between the pretences 
of an ideology or a theory to understand and control social realities on the one hand 
and the daily praxis on the other. It usually results in a self-deception and a confused 
                                                 
128 Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, p. 115. 
129 On historical fatalism, see Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, pp. 27-28. The question of the 
determinism and positivism of Marx's (and Engel's) theory of historical materialism has been 
subject to debate. While is beyond doubt that Marx was influenced by positivism, the extent to 
which his theory can be considered to be an example of positivism is less certain. Marxism, as 
an ideological and academic school of thought, was indeed dominated by a deterministic and 
atrophied interpretation of Marx's theory long into the twentieth century. Later, other 
interpretations and critiques put Marx's theory into a more complex perspective. See Leszek 
Kołakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, the Golden Age, the Breakdown, trans. 
P. S. Falla, New York/London, W. W. Norton and Co., 2005 [1976]; John Holloway, Change the 
World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today, Pluto Press, London, 2002.   
130 “An complete theory claims to provide answers to that which can only, if ever, be resolved by 
historical praxis. Thus, it can only close its sytem by pre-enslaving human beings to its schemes, 
subjugating them to its categories, and ignoring historical creation, even as it glorifies such 
creation in speech […] The very idea of a complete and definite theory is a chimera and a 
mystification.” Cornelius Castoriadis, L’institution imaginaire de la société, Editions du Seuil, 
Paris, 1975, pp. 94, 97. For his critique of Marxism, see chapters 1 and 2.  
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view of reality which Rocker writes is “in conflict with the daily experiences of 
life.”131  
3. Every-day Nationalism  
Rocker's work was published in 1936, and his experience of National Socialism in 
Germany certainly influenced his critical examination of nationalism. But Rocker, 
who emigrated to the United-States after Hitler's accession to power, does not reduce 
the question of nationalism to that of Nazi Germany or fascism. He analyses it in the 
longue durée, and the development of fascism, of state authoritarianism is set in the 
complex web of meanings beyond the restrictive notion of culture as the arts. 
Indeed, Nationalism and Culture is the result of an inquiry that began before the first 
World War when nationalism was already an every-day phenomenon and disruption 
in Rocker's daily life, as well as the lives of the majority of people in Europe as well 
as across the 'rest' of the colonial world.  
Rocker examines conflicts of interests between the various classes and social 
conditions which compose the so-called nation. Far from forming a uniform whole, 
the national society is a social “magma”, with certain dominating features, although 
it cannot be reduced to these features. Rocker's understanding of nationalism 
prefigures Howard Zinn's account of how national (or patriotic) and military fervour 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century America united the different social 
classes “creating a safety valve for explosive class conflict.”132 There is no reason 
for such a discourse not to have functioned elsewhere for similar purposes, 
particularity in other capitalist countries. In this light, the question that arises is how 
did nationalism captivate and divert the focus of people engaged in class struggle, or 
more generally in power struggles for political representation and better living 
conditions? Leaving aside the role capitalism played in uniting or pacifying 
imaginaries, nationalism, when naturalised, was a very strong incentive to not revolt. 
Billig uses the term 'banal nationalism' to describe the reproduction of the national 
imaginary in established nation-states, which contrary to Renan's “daily plebiscite” 
(as a conscious and wilful act), is the unmindful recognition of the nation-state by its 
                                                 
131 Rocker, Nationalism and Culture, p. 260. 
132 Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United-States: 1942 – Present, [3rd Ed.], Pearson 
Education Ltd., Harlow, 2003 [1980], p. 363. 
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members. Billig's precise aim is to decipher the “ideological means by which nation-
states are reproduced”: 
“To stretch the term ‘nationalism’ indiscriminately would invite confusion […]. 
For this reason, the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the 
ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be 
reproduced.[…] Daily, the nation is indicated, or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its 
citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established 
nation-states, is the endemic condition.”133 [emphasis in original] 
The phenomenon of banal nationalism, as described by Billig, makes the 
indisciminate use of the term 'nationalism' confusing. The common use of the term 
nationalism refers to marginal phenomena: “[i]t always seems to locate nationalism 
on the periphery.”134 And it could be argued that the often self-declared nationalism 
of those 'nationalist' movements or parties is precisely a means to render their 
ideological stances 'banal'. But more significantly, this confusion shows the 
relationship mainstream, 'central' nationalism establishes with the ‘margins’: 
pointing a finger at the nationalism of 'others' is part of what makes 'ours' 
unnoticed.135. Consequently, it is easier to define 'their' nationalism simply as 
'nationalism'. In this sense, the accepted definition stands for a reactionary, racist and 
xenophobic political agenda, usually associated with far-right political groups. Billig 
describes this popular use of nationalism (which stands for the reactionary, racist and 
xenophobic political agendas) as 'hot' in contrast with the unnoticed banal form(s)136  
One could argue that Billig’s categories of 'banal' versus 'hot' nationalism follow the 
pattern of civic/ethnic categorisation. But while the relationship between the former 
categories may be confusing if related to the civic/ethnic contrast, banal does not 
mean 'cold' nationalism. Billig does not focus on particular components of 
nationalism, on the 'selection' previously mentioned, but rather on how it is 
performed. Consequently, it is not only what is meant that makes something 
nationalist, but also and maybe more significantly how. The “unwaved” flags on 
institutional buildings, quality labels on food products, the division between 'home' 
and 'international' news, the syntactic habits and omissions in vocabulary (or the 
lack of it), stereotypes and amalgamates, all these are discursive means through 
                                                 
133 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 6.  
134 Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 6. 
135 Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 5-6. 
136 Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 43-46. 
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which central nationalism is naturalised and forgotten. In fact, Billig even suggests 
that in certain instances, the more banal practices of national commemoration are, 
the more internalised their meanings are, and the more they are accepted leading to a 
pacification of symbolic (or psychological) struggles.137 Language plays a particular 
role in this reproduction. Both public discourses and private conversations speak 
within the frame of nationalism. From pronouns to adjectives and nouns, language is 
probably the most undetected mode of the nation's reproduction. The deixis thus 
created invariably directs the meaning to the direction of the national imaginary.138 
The nation is not only narrated in 'History', it is also narrated in most texts. In 
relation to the aforementioned toolbox for national history described by Geary, even 
contemporary academic works often do not escape the nation. Ulrick Beck uses the 
expression 'methodological nationalism' to describe the uncritical attachment of 
conventional social sciences to what have come to be assumed as sociological 
certainties. This academic reproduction of nationalism takes the traditional 
sociological categories, such as nation or class, for granted. The conventional 
sociological approaches are thus caught in the circular argument of what Beck calls 
“Max Weber's 'Iron cage'”: “they take for granted what they actually try to 
demonstrate; that we still live, act and die in the normal world of nation-state 
modernity.”139 
But talking outside the nationalist framework demands an effort which is probably 
still beyond the contemporary linguistic possibilities. Nationalism is, in this sense, 
the most effective modern ideology. Through such an internalisation, it can maintain 
itself despite contradictions and competing interpretations. To what extent then, one 
may ask, does Rocker's assertion about nationalism being in conflict with the daily 
experiences of life apply in established nation-states if it has reached such an 
banality? First of all, nationalism and related themes continue to be instrumentalised 
for the purposes of liberal political agendas along with questions of immigration. 
The disruption of every-day life experienced by Rocker may now be less palpable 
than it was in the 1930's, especially from a 'central' point of view. But the margins 
                                                 
137 Billig himself refers to the position of Robert Coles on the significance of saluting the flag by 
school children in the USA, in The Political Life of Children, Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 
1986, p. 60. Billig, Banal Nationalism, p. 51. 
138 See Billig, Banal Nationalism, pp. 105-109. 
139 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, Cambridge, Polity, 1999, p. 133.  
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have not disappeared, and class struggle is still covered with the national question, 
although not always with a rallying fervour. 
 – Chapter 2 – 
Ariadne's Thread 
 
“When one dreams alone, it is only a dream. When many people 
dream together, it is the beginning of a new reality.”140  
                                                 
140 Friedrich Stowasser (aka Friedensreich Hundertwasser). 
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– Part 1 – 
The Narration of Reality 
 
1. Discursive Formations 
The concept of discursive formation which Calhoun uses to describe nationalism 
relates to Michel Foucault's conceptualisation of 'discourse'.141 Discourse in this 
sense should not be reduced to speeches, but should be conceived as an overarching 
term for a group of statements which function according to a common set of rules, 
even when these statements are part of different fields.142 These rules are composed 
of linguistic and formal rules (such as rhetoric), and also of visual and material 
representations, of spatial and temporal positioning, and so on. On the highest or 
fullest level, a discourse can be equated with the social imaginary of a given period, 
as all the discourses it contains will follow its normative rules regarding what is 
normal and what is not, what is included and what is excluded.143 As such, it is an 
order which sets the organisation of a society through mechanisms which produce 
the correspondent knowledge and practices. In his works, Foucault described the 
transformation of modern discourses by examining the conditions which allowed the 
emergence of those discourses.144 These discourses in turn support and reproduce 
sets of social practices, or create and enforce them. These processes are mirrored in 
the concept of social imaginary elaborated by Cornelius Castoriadis. Respectively, 
                                                 
141 Calhoun, Nationalism, p. 4. 
142 See Judith Revel, Le vocabulaire de Foucault, Paris, Editions Ellipses, 2009, pp. 36-39. 
143 Foucault himself does not make use of the term of social imaginary, preferring the more 
restrictive concept of episteme, which he defines as the phenomena of relations between 
scientific discourses. See e.g. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, Colin Gordon [Ed.], Pantheon Books, New York, 1980, especially “The 
Confession of the Flesh” pp. 194-228. 
144 Famously, in History of Madness (Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique, in Michel Foucault, Dits 
et Écrits, vol. I, Paris, Gallimard, 2001) Foucault describes discourses related to madness and 
unreason in relation to the treatment and representation of the sick and “mentally deranged”, 
questioning in fine the general approach 'we' have to the 'norm'. 
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Castoriadis's “instituted imaginary” and “instituting imaginary” function in a similar 
way in respect to the formation and reproduction of social meanings.145   
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault presents how discourses are unified 
through the dispersion of their composing elements. A discourse consequently 
involves an inherent discontinuity.146 Foucault composes a theoretical analysis of the 
rules of discontinuity according to which discursive statements are ordered. This in 
turn, is labelled a discursive formation. The reason for the labelling usually derives 
from the ambivalences of the term “discourse”, which follow a similar dispersion: 
“I wonder whether I have not changed direction on the way; whether I have not 
replaced my first quest with another… instead of gradually reducing the rather 
fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe I have in fact added to its 
meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualized group of statements, and sometimes as a 
regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements.”147 
Foucault here provides three definitions which depend on the linguistic or semantic 
use of the term. By the turn of phrase in the preceding quotation, Foucault expresses 
the difference between discourse and what he calls “natural language”, i.e. linguistic 
language.148 This dislocation introduces the demonstration of how language and 
“statement” (which he refers to in all three definitions of discourse) operate on 
different “level[s] of existence.”149 This is the first step in the clarification of what 
“the atom of discourse” is.150 This epistemological shift from a unit-based logic to a 
process-based approach will consequently provide elements for understanding 
discourse.  
                                                 
145 Castoriadis also provides a third category, namely the 'radical imaginary', which denotes the 
process of creation of social significations. See below, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
146 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, A.M. Sheridan Smith [Trans.], London, Routledge, 
1989 [1972], pp. 36-37. 
147 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 90. 
148 The French term for natural language is langue. It is different from langage which defines all 
means of expression. 
149 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 96. For the demonstration, see pp. 89-98. 
150 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 90. 
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To avoid reframing Foucault's entire poetics, and to further clarify the notions of 
“discourse” or “statement”, turning once again to a different paradigmatic attempt to 
elucidate social significations will prove enlightening. 
In The Imaginary Institution of Society, Castoriadis describes this unit-based logic as 
“ensemblist-identitary” (ensembliste-identitaire) and opposes to the notion of 
magma. The imaginary is thus defined as a magma of significations, including the 
unit-based ontology dependent on processes of social and historical change (the 
imaginary's historicity). A magma cannot consequently be reduced to an ensemble of 
units.151 In a similar vein, Foucault's “statements” cannot be reduced to sentences, 
propositions or speech-acts which are all parts of unit-based structures. Yet 
statements involve or include propositions and linguistic units, or as Foucault puts it, 
are “caught up […] in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus.”152  
This essentially leads to a relational differentiation between units and the functions 
of units; a different logic for approaching the historicised and necessarily social 
formation of meaning. For Foucault, the function of statements is enunciation. This 
means that the relation between signs and statements is a form of a fluctuating 
tension between representation and signification. A representation is fictitiously 
fixed, and can potentially refer to indeterminate significations. But the contextual 
signification a representation refers to will be determined by a sliding which 
involves the situation in which the sign is being performed. Consequently a 
particular sign can refer to a series of possible statements – simultaneously or 
independently of each other –, and statements can be determined by different signs 
or series of signs. The Monuments erected to commemorate a historical event can be 
interpreted accordingly. If one particular monument is considered as a unit (a series 
of signs), a certain number of significations can be apprehended.  
The realms of memory discussed in the first chapter can be characterised in such a 
way. Monuments commemorating soldiers of the Great War are the first examples of 
the institutionalised commemoration through monuments dispersed on a national 
                                                 
151 Castoriadis, L'institution imaginaire, p. 497. 
152 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 97. 
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scale.153 From an aesthetic point of view, each of these monuments reflects a similar 
artistic and historically determined style – despite certain marginal variations. The 
military commemoration consists in names of local soldiers killed during the First 
World War inscribed on one side or panel of the monument. Above the list of names, 
there reads a dedication or a shibboleth glorifying the nation which is intended to 
give a sense to the sacrifices. “To the children of Loivre who died for France” (Aux 
enfants de Loivre morts pour la France) is a typical example of such an inscription. 
The strength of its signification consists in uniting the locality with the nation, 
placing it within the larger referent in respect to the sacrifice. The locality – in this 
case the village of Loivre in the Marne département in the North-East of France – is 
recognised as having suffered a terrible loss (its children) for no reason other than 
for France, hence granting it a space within the nation and identifying it as a part of 
the nation. Furthermore, the signification gives what it considers to be the most 
meaningful reason for such a sacrifice. The village is personified through to the 
names inscribed beneath the dedication, hence representing people behind the 
names; people with ties to the locality but no longer able to express them. The 
inscriptions are also accompanied by various national symbols in the form of statues 
and bas-reliefs.154 
This brief analysis provides a demonstration of how a discursive formation operates. 
The signification of the monument in Loivre is a composition of signs which direct, 
on different levels, the overall signification of the monument as a national 
commemoration and a glorification of the locality. In spite of the relatively simple 
association of its elements, the depth of its signification cannot be grasped if it is not 
placed within the space it was intended for: the national space. Each commune in 
                                                 
153 In France alone, more than 35,000 monuments were erected between 1919 and 1925, reflecting 
the number of the smallest administrative districts in France (communes). For pictures of the 
Loivre monument: <http://www.crdp-reims.fr/memoire/lieux/communaux/loivre.htm> [last accessed 
05.11.2010]  
154 The prevailing symbols are at least one soldier in uniform and Republican symbols such as  
flags, Marianne (the female personification of Liberty and the Republic) and the rooster, which 
in the case of the monument in Loivre, is on top of a column. 
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France has its own monument bearing the same signification for the locality.155 As 
the monuments are so widespread, a sliding shift to a new level of signification takes 
place as each of these monuments becomes a sign and their dispersion becomes the 
new statement. The signification in the resulting perspective is the unity of the 
nation in its loss and endeavours. Yearly state celebrations of Armistice day on the 
11th of November reproduce and “re-signify” these monuments and their 
signification. 
“A series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something 
else' […], a specific relation that concerns itself – and not its cause, or its 
elements.”156 This “something else”, again, is present – on a different level – in the 
explanation Castoriadis gives of what a signification is:  
“an indefinite skein of interminable referrals to something other than (than 
what would appear to be stated directly). These other things can be both 
significations and non-significations – that to which significations relate or 
refer. The lexicon of the significations of a language does not revolve around 
itself, is not closed in upon itself, as has flatly been stated. What is closed in 
upon itself, fictively, is the code, the lexicon of ensemblist-identitary signifieds, 
each of which can take on one or more sufficient definitions. But the lexicon of 
significations is always open; for the full signification of a word is everything 
that can be socially stated, thought, represented or done on the basis of this 
word.”157 
The case of the monuments presented above, which through an oversimplification 
presents the indefinite skein of referrals, fits the analysis of Foucault and Castoriadis 
of statements and significations. As a represented whole, they form a discourse 
                                                 
155 A certain number of monuments erected for the commemoration of the dead do not follow the 
pattern described here. Although marginal, they usually leave the national referent out to focus 
only on the loss, usually with a pacifist symbolism focusing on the realities of war. Statues 
representing a crying woman, or another with her children probably awaiting the return of their 
husband and father, with inscriptions such as the simple “To our dead” (“A nos morts”) or “curse 
be the war” (“que maudite soit la guerre”) are rare, but while they locally operate in a similar 
way, their signification follows a different thread.  
156 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 100. 
157 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Kathleen Blamey [trans.], Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 1997 [1975], pp. 243.  
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which, if one continued to follow its complex interlaced thread, is a fragment of the 
discursive formation of nationalism.158 
2. Essentialist Short-cuts  
The process of such discursive formations leads to an internalisation – mostly 
unconscious – of their significations. These, in turn, appear natural and immediate 
(literally, not mediated). This habitus159 of frames of references and interpretations is 
made up of stories or narratives, such as the one told by the World War One 
commemorative monuments. In the aforementioned illustration, the narrative could 
be summed up as follows: our husbands, fathers and sons, and our ancestors – 
children of the land we live on – have sacrificed their lives for the nation, which our 
land is part of, hence ultimately for us. 
These frames provide the grid of preconceptions which make a certain sense out of 
the social world. The simplest form of these preconceptions are stereotypes, also 
know as prejudices, literally pre-judgements. A stereotype was defined as the 
unaltered reproduction of an image in the nineteenth century as it was originally a 
method of reproducing images on metal plates. The word was later defined in 
sociology as the simplified conception of a phenomenon based on prejudice as 
opposed to observation. Walter Lippman attributes an effort economy function to 
stereotypes; in order to avoid reflecting on the observation of social phenomena, 
these spaces are filled in, or the questions are “gullibly” answered with readily 
                                                 
158 The ideas of 'sliding' or of 'referral', of 'something other', which is central to the definition of 
signification and to the way discourse and the imaginary function, calls Jacques Derrida's 
designation of 'différance' to mind: “[...] the signified concept is never present in and of itself, in 
a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is 
inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by 
means of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, différance, [...] will designate [...] the 
movement according to which language, or any code, any system of referral in general, is 
constituted “historically” as a weave of differences. in Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass 
[trans.], Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1972], pp. 11-12. 
159 “[...] the habitus could be considered as a subjective but not individual system of internalized 
structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same 
group or class and constituting the precondition for all objectification and apperception […]. 
Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice. Richard Nice [trans.], Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press,  1977 [1972], p. 86 
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available stereotypes.160 These stereotypes and prejudices are part of the stories told 
and retold in the reproductions of social frames of reference and interpretation.161 
These stories, about “ourselves” and about “others” are also part of the discursive 
formation of nationalism. National stereotypes, and national self-images and images 
of others (sometimes both at the same time) act as differentiating processes between 
one imaginary and another. They are part of the social construction of reality: 
“The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by ordinary 
members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a 
world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by 
these.”162 
Stereotypes are here broadly defined as the oversimplified prejudices and 
representations, not only what is commonly described as stereotypes. Stereotyping 
involves a more general process of viewing the world, which explains both their 
“stubborn resistance to change” and why they are “demonstrations of ignorance.”163 
Both representations of one's own society as well as representations of otherness are 
based on essentialist discursive practices. In general, they preconceive one feature as 
essential in order to make sense of it. In the case of national self-images, they are 
usually considered as relatively permanent and functioning “as self-reinforcing 
devices, acting like filters that structure incoming information to make it fit with 
fundamental beliefs.”164 In the case of nationalism, stereotypes buttress the sense of 
a national identity in the form of constant reminders of the characteristics of the 
nation often contrasted to those of “others”, preferably other nations, although the 
“other within” is another recurrent theme. In this approach, stereotypes are not 
                                                 
160 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion, NuVision Publications, LLC [digital publishing], 2007 [1921], 
pp. 54-55. 
161 Jan Berting and Christiane Villain-Gandossi, “The role and significance of national stereotypes 
in international relations: an interdisciplinary approach”, in Teresa Walas [ed.], Stereotypes and 
Nations, International Cultural Centre, Cracow, 1995, pp. 13-27. p. 13.  
162 P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, New York, Routledge, 1967, pp. 19-20. 
163 Berger and Luckmann, “The role and significance of national stereotypes in international 
relations”, p. 17.  
164 Bo Petersson, “National Self-Images among Russian Regional Politicians: Comparing a Pilot 
Study on Perm and the Case of St. Petersburg”, CFE Working paper series no. 1, 1998, p. 10. 
Available online: <http://edit.info.lu.se/upload/LUPDF/CentrumforEuropaforskning/cfewp01.pdf> 
[last accessed 10.09.2010]  
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necessarily negative as is usually considered. There are positive stereotypes.165 
National self-images are not always negative ones by virtue of the fact they aim for 
the reproduction of national identification. One notorious stereotype about Britain – 
in France and indeed worldwide – concerns food. It is generally believed that British 
food tastes bad. While some dishes indeed may taste bad to some people, it is hard 
to define British food, and consequently inappropriate to generalise about food in 
Britain (as opposed to “British food”).166 People may be misinformed and may never 
have tasted or acquired the taste for a well done Sunday roast, while themselves not 
being aware of the non-uniform and indeed subjective appreciation of food in 
France. In the city of Lyon for instance, which promotes itself as a gastronomic 
capital, one finds examples of the finest cuisine of renowned chef Paul Bocuse 
alongside a local cuisine which many people in France would dismiss, with dishes 
served in restaurants called “bouchons” often featuring tripe. Somebody without the 
acquired taste for tripe may only focus on this to define food in Lyon and would thus 
be forming a negative stereotype. Yet, such a negative stereotype would risk 
contradicting the logic by which if British food tastes bad, French food tastes good 
in comparison, which is France's worldwide positive stereotype. But any dish judged 
to be bad in French food wouldn't necessarily turn this belief around: it is acceptable 
because it is defined as a “speciality”.  
National-self images are contained in stereotypes and images about others. In a 
similar way, stated self-images will give the nation a status that is unique, preventing 
other nations from becoming equals in one way or another. In respect to food and 
cuisine, a curious row or discursive competition took place in early 2009 which is 
symptomatic of the importance of the “ownership” of particular national self-
images. On 23 February 2008, during his inaugural speech at the international 
                                                 
165 See Bo Petersson, Stories About Strangers, Swedish Media Constructions of Socio-Cultural Risk, 
Oxford, University Press of America, 2006. 
166 It has also become and national negative self-image in Britain, which is symptomatic in 
publications such as Joanna Blythman's book Bad Food Britain: How a Nation Ruined it's 
Appetite, London, Fourth Estate, 2006.  
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agricultural show in Paris,167 French president Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 
gastronomy was “an essential feature” of French heritage.168 As a consequence, he 
promised to lobby for France to become the first country to apply to UNESCO to 
have its gastronomy listed as an “Intangible Cultural Heritage”.169 The recognition 
of a national essential feature is based on a worldwide – or rather inter-national – 
recognition of the list of these features.170 But the particularity and primacy of 
French gastronomy was considered relatively overrated in the mind of the Italian 
Prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, who declared Italian gastronomy should in fact be 
the first to place such bid. But instead of avoiding such a nationalistic definitions of 
gastronomy, many more states have since embarked on similar bids they regard they 
national cuisines to be as unique as any other, if not better.171 Britain --despite 
having a “de-territorialised” national dish in“Chicken Tikka Massala” according to 
                                                 
167 The Salon international de l'agriculture (usually referred to without its international 
qualification) is an annual fair which has been held under its current name since 1964. It 
includes the Concours général agricole (general agricultural competition), first held in 1870, 
which gives awards for the best agricultural productions in various categories.  
168 “La cuisine française, bientôt patrimoine de l'Unesco?”, L'Express.fr, 25 February 2008, 
retrieved 26.10.2009: <http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/la-cuisine-francaise-bientot-
patrimoine-de-l-unesco_470495.html>  
169  A similar demand by the state of Mexico was dismissed in 2005. The idea for UNESCO to 
promote the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage in a similar way it has been doing for 
tangible heritage originates in the 'International Consultation on New Perspectives for 
UNESCO’s Programme' which took place on 16 and 17 June 1993. After agreeing on a 
definition,  the 'Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage' was adopted on 
17 October 2003. For reports on meetings of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Commission, see:  
<http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00015> [last accessed 15.09.2010]. 
170 The result of the lobbying by the French government was the inscription in NovemBER 2010 on 
the Unesco intangible heritage list of the French “repas gastronomique” (gastronomic meal), 
which , according to Unesco experts, refers a “social customary practice which celebrates the 
most important moments in social and individual fife.” “Le "repas gastronomique des Français" 
inscrit au patrimoine de l'humanité”, Le Monde, 16.10.2010. 
171 Government officials of Spain, Greece and Morocco have announced joining the Italian bid due 
to their common 'Mediterranean quality'. See Henry Samuel, “French cuisine 'not a world 
treasure', says UN”, Telegraph.co.uk, 6 July 2008, retrieved 23.08.2010: <http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/2257965/French-cuisine-not-a-world-treasure-sa 
ys-UN.html> 
 76 CHAPTER 2 – PART 1 
the British foreign secretary Robin Cook in 2001 – is not yet likely to place such a 
bid given the coercion of established stereotypes.172 
It may first appear as surprising that such a trivial issue could create a debate that 
made the headlines. It could have become a political plea against the globalised food 
industry and multinational food chains, and it is maybe misunderstood and 
ideologically promoted in this way. For the current purpose, it demonstrates that 
stereotypes in a world of nation-states are important: they are corollary 
representations of these nation-states in the same way flags are. Given their 
simplicity, they allow a simple demarcation of what are otherwise seemingly 
equivalent entities. Visual artist Yanko Tsvetkov is the author of a series of maps of 
Europe on which each country's name is replaced by a stereotype according to a 
particular point of view. The project “Mapping Stereotypes: The Geography of 
Prejudice” started in 2009 and has been attracting a lot of attention on the World 
Wide Web as well as inspiring many “amateur” versions.173 
Leaving aside the artistic quality of these graphic representations, they are 
interesting on the level of the world-view they convey in a simple and yet comical 
and self-reflexive way (the first of the series is entitled “Where I live”). They portray 
the practical use of stereotypes, a sense that 'we' know something about the world 
we live in. National stereotypes are self-evident and inherent to the 'national' world-
view. As such, no one can entirely escape these simplified representations. 
Nonetheless, if they are considered as a primary instead of the definite step for 
acquiring knowledge of the complexity of the social-historical world, the process of 
acquiring this knowledge eventually involves the breaking of these inherited images. 
Pushed to their limits, stereotypes usually break fall on their own sword, showing 
what the core of the problem of essentialism is: covering the complexity of social 
reality. As social realities are complex, simplified approaches are certainly necessary 
                                                 
172 In a speech to the Social Market Foundation in London in April 2001, foreign secretary Robin 
Cook endorsed Chicken Tikka Massala  as “a true British national dish”. Robin Cook, “Robin 
Cook's chicken tikka masala speech” [extracts], Guardian.co.uk, 19.04.2001, retrieved 
14.06.2009:  <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/apr/19/race.britishidentity> 
173 See Annex 3 for three Yanko Tsvetkov's maps and Annex 4 for an anonymous amateur 
adaptation: “Europe according to Poles”. 
 CHAPTER 2 – PART 1 77 
as means of accessing these realities. But essentialist associations such as 
stereotypes or national images are meant as first and last instance fixities, or in other 
words, identities. The nationalist essentialist approach reduces the complex fabric of 
reality in an exclusionary fashion.  
The case of the “Polish plumber” is symptomatic of these processes. During the 
debates in France in 2005 preceding the referendum on the treaty establishing a 
constitution for Europe, the “Polish plumber” became the symbol, indeed the 
bogeyman, of cheap labour in relation to the “Directive on services in the internal 
market”.174 No other nationality was so closely associated to plumbing as Poles, 
although “Estonian architects” or “Czech IT specialists” were less prominently part 
of the picture. The origins of the “Polish plumber” are unclear, but its legacy is the 
subsequent association of plumbing to Poland, and some might even argue that a 
Polish electrician would have been even more significant as a symbol.175 But this 
has not prevented the subsequent association of plumbing with Poland. The random 
association forms a new contextualised symbol. The “Polish plumber” was later re-
appropriated by the Polish tourist board in its 2005 summer campaign. This included 
posters of a young male model dressed as a plumber and posing in a suggestive 
manner with a collage of Polish tourist attractions in the background. A caption read: 
“I am staying in Poland – do come over” (Je reste en Pologne – venez nombreux).176 
This was the first of many reproductions of what can now be called the myth of the 
                                                 
174 Commonly referred to as the “Bolkenstein directive”, named after Frederik Bolkenstein, 
member of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. 
175 In reference to Lech Wałęsa, one of the leaders of the  trade union “Solidarność” and the first 
elected president of the third Republic of Poland.   
176 See Annex 5. Translation from Stephen Mulvey, “Poland bids for EU Mr Fixit role ”, BBC News 
website, retrieved 03.02.2007: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4627111.stm>. Another poster 
of the same promotional campaign depicted a nurse with the following caption (this time in 
English as well): “Poland: I'm awaiting you” (sic). 
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Polish plumber.177 The strength of both the stereotyped image and the response by 
the Polish tourist board lies in their formal simplicity.178 But their significations 
reach beyond their forms. In a sense, they are metaphors for a series of significations 
which generate meaning and stimulate reaction (such as amusement). 
3. Unitas Multiplex 
These images function on two levels of analysis in the same way as myths do in 
Roland Barthes' analysis. In his seminal work Mythologies, Barthes presents a 
structuralist explanation of how myths function on two levels: the semiotic level and 
the social level.179 Myths are not simply considered as the mythological stories of 
ancient times, but as “a system of communication, a message.”180 As “a mode of 
signification”, Barthes first analyses the myth's semiotic form (or linguistic 
structure) making use of the linguistic structuralist approach established by Fernand 
de Saussure. On the first level analysis ('linguistic'), a sign is the correlation of a 
signifier and a signified. But this is insufficient to understand the mode of 
                                                 
177 The myth has spread very quickly indeed. In the years following the political formulation of the 
stereotype, and having been extensively used in media discourse, it has sunk into popular culture 
to the extent that one can find references to it in everyday conversations ans in popular culture in 
general. British comedian Omad Djalili, in a sketch entitled “Foreign accent syndrome”, creates 
a pun explaining how it not necessary anymore to switch between social accents to obtain a fair 
price from a plumber: one simply needs to speak Polish (The Omid Djalili Show – Series 1, BBC 
One, 2007). In the 2010 comedy film L'arnacœur (Heartbreaker) by Pascal Chaumeil, one of the 
secondary characters played by François Damien pretends to be a plumber, by affecting an 
Eastern European accent. When failing to repair the broken air conditioning, he tells the story of 
the family he needs to support back home in Poland. Such evidence suggests that the myth has 
integrated contemporary imaginaries, and more particularly the European imaginary.  
178 It could be argued that the use of the stereotype in promotional tourist campaign would render 
stereotypes less problematic. Stereotypes play a central role in comedy. Whether they are 
overcome, broken up or reproduced depends on the intention of the comedian. For example, 
many jokes are built in a way which involves three characters from three different nationalities. 
The punch line usually involves a blunder or abuse action from the character whose nationality 
is associated with backwardness: the Irishman from a British point of view or a Belgian from a 
French point of view. These can be described as nationalistic jokes. On the other hand, a certain 
number of comedians aim at breaking stereotypes up, eventually showing the absurdity of these 
simplified representations. In response to the expression “axis of evil” which U.S. President 
George W. Bush re-assigned to Iraq, Iran and North Korea in his 'State of the Union Address' on 
29 January 2002, a group of American comedians of Middle-Eastern background decide to set 
up an 'Axis of Evil Comedy Tour'. Their open objective was the breaking up of simplistic images 
and negative associations of the Middle-East promoted in political discourse. 
179 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1957. 
180 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 181. 
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signification of myths as this first level analysis is too basic: one would need a 
second level analysis ('mythological') which Barthes describes as a “secondary 
semiological system” (“un système sémiologique second”).181 In this second level 
analysis, the linguistic sign becomes the signifier and is associated to an added 
signified to produce the mythological sign. In the case of a national stereotype, such 
as the “Polish plumber”, the linguistic level produces no added meaning: it is simply 
the association of two first level signs. Yet, within the context of a political discourse 
on the liberalisation of services within the European Union – and more precisely in a 
speech by a ultra-conservative political figure opposing the said liberalisation,182 
shortly after Poland along with nine other central and east European states had 
joined the European Union – the association becomes a sign of the second level; the 
mythological level of signification. Barthes, although basing his critical approach to 
what he calls 'media myths' on structuralist linguistics, moves away from 
structuralism as he establishes a “semiological chain”.183 And yet, in keeping the 
framework of structural linguistics, Barhes only moves half-way by simplifying the 
game of social and historical significations which conspire in defining the 
signification of the myth (the signified elements). As such, his chain should be 
repeated over and over: myths engender other myths. The “plumber” of the Polish 
tourist board can be considered as a sort of third level signification which involves 
the first hand myth as well as other contextual significations: if it had not been 
produced by the Polish tourist board, the posters would convey the simple 
reproduction of the first-hand signification with an alternative signifier (then 
probably losing its seemingly benign humour).  
Such consideration leads to a revision of the logic of semiotic analysis, which 
despite being a useful tool, is basically flawed. It considers the sign as a totality of 
associated concept and image (“total associatif d'un concept et d'une image”), the 
                                                 
181 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 187. 
182 Philippe de Villiers, an ultra-conservative French politician, was one of the promoters of the 
“Polish plumber”. E.g. "La grande triche du oui", Interview, Le Figaro, 15 March 2005.  
183 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 187. 
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concept being the signified and the image, the signifier.184 In the formation of myths, 
Barthes theory uses a static linguistic framework on a dynamic, shifting 
phenomenon of myths. This chronological and progressive approach does not 
consider the possibility of retro-active alteration of meaning. Once a myth is formed 
and is being referred to in other myths, the linguistic sign does not remain unspoiled. 
The first-hand sign is indeed affected by these mythical formations. In other words, 
before coining the expression the “Polish plumber”, the composing signs of this 
myth were already part of a complex nexus of significations in which, as linguistic 
signs, their neutral or descriptive, dictionary significations were irrelevant. A 
Hungarian electrician would have done the job just as well: as associating any 
central or eastern European quality to a working class profession would have done 
the trick.  
One possible reason for the efficiency of such association is to be found in the 
discourse on immigration which has developed alongside the consolidation of 
nation-states. For example, the principles of French immigration policy were first 
institutionalised  in the 1930s These principles present the parameters of the 
discourse on immigration in what came to be the myth of the foreign worker, like the 
case of the Polish plumber which is the latest invention of the sort. In 1938, Philippe 
Serre was appointed State Undersecretary, responsible for immigration and 
foreigners on behalf of the Council Presidency (sous-secrétaire d'Etat, chargé des 
services de l'immigration et des étrangers auprès de la présidence du Conseil). His 
policy, which would prove crucial devising France's Republican model, 
differentiated between “useful” immigration and “harmful” immigration, on the 
basis of class division.185 The policy identified a lack of industrial and farm workers 
and an excess of liberal, trade and artisan professionals. In practice, it promoted the 
institutionalisation and pseudo-rationalisation of a phenomenon already in place 
which involved “placing” foreign workers in places where the capital needed the 
cheapest labour; places deemed unfit for the developing and demanding middle 
                                                 
184 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 187. 
185 Patricke Weil, La France et ses étrangers: L'aventure d'une politique de l'immigration de 1938 à 
nos jours, Paris, Editions Calmann-Lévy, 1991, pp. 42-48. 
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classes. The majority of foreigners were given access to industrial, agricultural or 
mining work, contributing to the visibility of the representation of foreigners as 
manual labourers. As a consequence, the immigrant came to be associated with 
working class professions rather than middle or upper class professions. 
Additionally, in developed capitalist countries such as France or Britain, the 
populations of emigration countries were judged according to the capitalist, 
industrial or consumerist developments of their respective countries of origins. The 
utility of these foreign workers was known only to the industry that employed them. 
Beyond that, they were represented more as masses of “swamping beggars” likened 
to waste rather than an industrial asset.186 
The fact that the “Estonian architect” which Philippe de Villiers mentions alongside 
the “Polish plumber” did not become a similar myth confirms the ongoing 
association of immigration with the working class.187 Beyond the contextual 
elements, the “Polish plumber” refers to discursive practices already well 
established.188 What does this say about language in the social formation of 
meaning? Firstly, it shows that although it is basically not structured and fixed as 
assumed by Saussure or Barthes, neither it is random. Signs may appear to arise in 
random associations but their significations are formed through a dynamics of 
constant referrals, bringing about a reduction of meaning which in turn, through an 
ever present opening, joins in the game of significations. Whether it is taken up in 
the further formation or reproduction of social signification is certainly dependent 
                                                 
186 In Troubadours, Trumpeters, troubled Makers: Lyricism, Nationalism, and Hybridity in China 
and its Others, Dorham, NCA, Duke University Press, 1996, Gregory B. Lee shows how the 
American 'Republican Model' had been functioning in a similar way and in correlation with 
discourses of national integration from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century regarding 
cheap Chinese labour: “the pragmatism of a minority of American capitalists” was easily 
conciliated with the generalised representations of dangerous “floods” of Chinese immigrants 
through a racist national policy of integration which was devised to select those fit to eventually 
become Americans (see pp. 182-199). This policy shows the ambivalence, if not the hypocrisy, 
of 'liberalised' capitalism which perceives workers simply as disembodied “productive 
resources” turning away from their workers in the face of what was obviously considered a valid 
nationalist and racist political agenda of social engineering.     
187 Villiers, "La grande triche du oui", Interview, Le Figaro, 15 March 2005.  
188 The facts that France had been a regular destination for Polish workers throughout the twentieth 
century, and that Poland is also a much larger country (in terms of population and territory) than 
Estonia, must have played a role in the different fates of the two expressions. 
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on ideological intention and/or its potential for such social significance. Secondly, 
the process of the formation of myths also means that the system of such formation 
is neither an inclusive nor an exclusive system (this being a formal contradiction in 
ensemblist-identitary logic), but a dynamic system which functions simultaneously 
through selection and reproduction.  
In order to make sense of the complexity of the social world, of the social formation 
of meaning, closed conceptions seem insufficient. Structuralist semiology used by 
Barthes in his analysis of myths is partly based on closed objects and leads to a one-
way linear causality between the different levels of meaning. To avoid this, the 
system of the social production of meaning should be conceived as an open, 
dynamic system. French philosopher Edgar Morin argues for a paradigmatic change, 
from a paradigm of simplification which dissociates the subject from the object (a 
conception mirrored in the semiotic categories of 'signified' and 'signifier') to a 
paradigm encompassing the complex fabric of the natural and social world: 
“[...] au paradigme de disjonction/réduction/unidimensionnalisation, il faudrait 
substituer un paradigme de distinction/conjonction qui permette de distinguer 
sans disjoindre, d'associer sans identifier ou réduire. Ce paradigme 
comporterait un principe dialogique et translogique, qui intégrerait la logique 
classique tout en tenant compte de ses limites de facto (problèmes de 
contradictions) et de jure (limites du formalisme). Il porterait en lui le principe 
de l'Unitas multiplex, qui échappe à l'Unité abstraite du haut (holisme) et du 
bas (réductionnisme).”189 
Morin suggests that the first point of articulation of such a substitution can be found 
in the concept of the open system, the details of were sketched out in the critical 
appraisal of structuralist semiotics. One could argue this approach leads to a new 
holism in the sense that there is no isolation between the represented units 
                                                 
189 “[...] the paradigm of disjunction/reduction/unidimensionalisation should be replaced by a 
paradigm of distinction/conjunction which allows distinction without disjunction, and  
association without identification or reduction. This paradigm would include a dialogical and 
translogical principle which would integrate classical logic while taking into account its de facto 
(problems of contradictions) and de jure (limitations of formalism) limitations. It would 
incorporate the principle of the Unitas multiplex, which escapes abstract Unity, whether high 
(holism) or low (reductionism).” Edgar Morin, Introduction à la pensée complexe, Paris, 
Editions du Seuil, 2005 [1990], p. 23.  
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composing the system.190 Yet this would be a misconception or an inadequate 
qualification of the 'validity' of an open system as the system's validity is confirmed 
by its “paradigmatological value”:  
“[….] [C]oncevoir tout objet et entité comme clos entraîne une vision du 
monde classificationnelle, analytique, réductionniste, une causalité unilinéaire. 
C'est bien cette vision qui fait excellence dans la physique du XVIIe au XIXe 
siècle, mais aui aujourd'hui, avec les approfondissements et les avancées vers la 
complexité, fait eau de toute part. Il s'agit en fait d'opérer un renversement 
épistémologique à partir de la notion de système ouvert.”191   
Common figures of speech such as metaphors seem to present such an open system 
as they transfer the meaning of a name or a sentence to an object or a group of 
objects. It bears no semiotic sign of the process of analogy or substitution, as 
comparisons do for instance.192 But most importantly, although certain metaphors 
have become worn out, the full process of the “metaphoricity of metaphors” 
corresponds to the creation of social meaning. In his seminal work The Rule of 
Metaphor, Paul Ricœur shows how meaning is produced and reproduced across 
levels and categories of discourse through the living power of the metaphor as “the 
conjunction of fiction and redescription”.193 The fictional aspect of metaphors relates 
to the way human beings experience reality: as this reality is elusive, fictional 
                                                 
190 This relates to aspects of theory-laden scientific observation. See Karl Popper, The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, New York, Basic Books, 1959.  
191 “Conceiving all objects and entities as closed leads to a vision of the world which is 
classificatory, analytical, reductionist and to a unilinear causality. This vision founded the 
success of physics from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, but today, as increased depths 
are reached and progress moves towards complexity, it is bursting at the seams. It is a question 
of performing an epistemological overhaul with the notion of open system as a starting point.” 
Morin, Introduction à la pensée complexe, p. 33. 
192 Other common figures of speech, such as the metonymy or synecdoche, operate a transfer either 
from a whole entity to one of its attributes (as in metonymy; 'the blue' standing for 'the sky') or 
from part of it to the whole and vice versa, as in synecdoches. Synecdoches are numerous in 
political and media discourses: names of states regularly appear instead of the names of 
governments, political representatives or sports teams. Conversely, the names of capital cities 
often replace the names of government representatives, or if considered a metonymy, this figure 
of speech transfers the meaning of a political or economic institution situated in the city to the 
name of the city itself.   
193 Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, Robert Czerny et al. 
[trans.], London, Routledge, 2003 [1975], p. 291.  
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elements are necessary to organise it in the form of narratives.194 Redescription 
refines the notion of identity: a metaphor is not simply the copy of what it refers to; 
it is a transfer of the same to the other (in time, in form, etc.).    
Applying these considerations to a structuralist model, one would need to align all 
the possible levels of discourse and set them in a layered, parallel and relational 
network. What would appear in fact is a structural complexity and not a system 
making sense of complexity. The complexity of such a network would at least 
amount to the square number of each unit of discourse multiplied by the different 
layers. A tremendous piece of engineering would be required to achieve such a 
complex model, but even if this were possible, it would fail to constitute an open 
system. To understand why, the fabric of the social imaginary can usefully be 
compared to the functioning of self-similarity in mathematics. If one considers the 
social meaning of “identity” and applies to it the same function again and again, the 
“thing” which is created through this cycle bears a self or auto-reference and a 
hetero-reference without contradiction: with the same function it leads to different 
formulations. This is what Ricœur presents as the “fragility of identity”: maintaining 
oneself though time is a “complex game” played between “identity idem” (the same) 
and “identity ipse” (the self). In other words it is the recurrent transfer of a 
represented “sameness” though the passing of time acting on “selfness”.195  The 
social formation of identity is an act involving such a level of complexity that no 
structural system is able to sustain or program in itself what could be called the 
inputs and outputs and how these inputs and outputs function.  
In this way, a more visual way of representing this complexity is precisely as a 
fabric which is continuously woven by social interaction. The French expression 
tisser des liens, suggests exactly this process as it translates literally as “to weave 
links”, while it is an extended metaphor which means to create ties between people . 
                                                 
194 Ricœur argues that language is in fact part of the process of experiencing human reality because 
of what he terms the expressibility of experience: “To bring [experience] into language is not to 
change it into something else, but, in articulating and developing it, to make it become itself.” 
Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Science, John B. Thompson [ed. and trans.], Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 115. 
195 Ricœur, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2000, p. 98.  
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In this way the expression tisser des liens point to the way social meaning is 
produced and reproduced. A particular social signification or set of significations, 
such as the national imaginary, is continually being socially ravelled and unravelled, 
according to a particular modus operandi of weaving the strands of imaginary 
significations.196 This mode is what includes or allows certain associations and 
excludes or hides others. In this mode, the means of production and the product are 
intimately related, changing roles and functions, and so on. In order to reproduce 
itself, the pattern of a given social signification has to make sense. It can only make 
sense if it is corroborated by the way other strands are woven. As a consequence 
there is a self-similarity, or a self-reference as part of the process in the reproduction 
of social meaning in such a way that strands are composed into a pattern. In respect 
to the hegemony of certain social significations, such as the national imaginary, 
these dominant significations are not only reproduced within themselves; if they 
were, they would “die out” for lack of resources.  
In addition to the self-referential process, there is a process of supplying strands 
which is in fact a correlate to the self-referential process. The supply of strands is the 
social recognition of the validity of the weaving pattern and its consequent 
reproduction. To a certain extent, the fabric of social significations appears as an 
open self-regulatory system, an “auto-eco-system” consisting of the nexus, skeins 
and threads of significations; a fabric experiencing the social world to reality. 
                                                 
196 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Castoriadis, L'institution imaginaire.  
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– Part 2 – 
The Imaginary Space 
 
1. Dimensions of Culture 
The metaphor of the social formation of meaning as the weaving of threads 
understands society itself – meaning any human community – as the density of 
actual processes of weaving. The system of the imaginary associates the threads and 
strings, the designs as well as the designers, the craftsmen as well as the end user, 
dynamically spiralling out, forming and informing each other. In other words, “the 
social imaginary is […] the creation of significations and the creation of the images 
and figures that support these significations.”197 The complex formation of meaning 
in language is representative of this dynamics: 
“Language is in and through two indissociable dimensions or components. 
Language is langue to the extent that is signifies, that is to say, to the extent 
that it refers to a magma of significations. Language is a code to the extent that 
it organizes and organizes itself in an identitary manner, that is to say, to the 
extent that it is a system of ensembles (or of ensemblizable relations) [...]”198   
It follows that the foundations of all meaning are multidimensional as became 
apparent in the earlier discussion of the relational association of the dimensions of 
language. This relates to the concept of symbolling used in anthropology to define 
“culture” which consists in the act of giving or adding meaning (i.e. a symbol) to 
things.199 Putting these different terminologies in parallel presents the social world – 
the world according to human beings – as the relation of its composing 
                                                 
197 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, p. 238. 
198 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, p. 238. 
199 Castoriadis argues that “[t]he relation between a signification and its supports (images or 
figures) is the only precise sense that can be attached to the term 'symbolic' […].” The Imaginary 
Institution, p. 238. 
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dimensions.200 As Leslie White defines it, culture is to a certain extent the totality of 
symbolling phenomena:   
"[...] '[C]ulture' is the name of a distinct order, or class, of phenomena, namely 
things and events that are dependent upon the exercise of a mental ability, 
peculiar to the human species, that we have termed 'symbolling.' To be more 
specific, culture consists of material objects-tools, utensils, ornaments, amulets, 
etc. – acts, beliefs, and attitudes that function in contexts characterized by 
symbolling. It is an elaborate mechanism, an organization of exosomatic ways 
and means employed by a particular animal species, man, in the struggle for 
existence or survival"201 
The important part of White’s approach is the central involvement of human beings 
which, although sometimes insinuated, is usually left out in conceptual elaborations 
related to the study of the social-historical world. Culture and society are not entities 
within themselves; they are entirely dependent on their elaboration by and through 
the social world.202 Conscious of this, White defines the nature of culture in 
evolutionary terms but assigns culture only to the human world, dissociating it from 
the natural world.203 Multiple influences have shaped White's conceptualisation of 
culture, of which two are apparent here.204 The first is the distinction between object 
and subject which has informed his opposition between nature and culture. The 
second is a form of social Darwinism, which posits culture as the nature of human 
                                                 
200 This once more reminds us of the properties of self-similarity as they appear in fractal geometry, 
each aspect appearing as an approximate copy (as Ricoeur's “redescription” in metaphors would 
have it) of the other, the scale of geometry corresponding to the dimensions presented here. See 
the ground breaking study of mathematician Benoît B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of 
Nature, New York, W. H. Freeman, 1982.   
201 Leslie White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization, New York, Farrar, Straus, 
1949, p. 363. 
202 See e.g. John H. Moore, “The Culture Concept as Ideology”, in American Ethnologist, Vol. 1, 
No. 3, 1974, pp. 537-549.  
203 Certain notions in contemporary anthropology lead to a less distinctive separation between 
culture as symbolling and nature through the notion, for instance, of “iconicity”. See Robert 
Bednarik, “The Origins of Symbolling”, working paper presented at the virtual symposium “The 
Criteria of Symbolicity”, Open  Semiotics Ressource Centre,  <http://www.semioticon.com/ 
virtuals/symbolicity/origins.html> [last accessed 07.10.2010] 
204 On a critical presentation of White's anthropology, see Richard A. Barrett, “The Paradoxical 
Anthropology of Leslie White”, in American Anthropologist, no. 91, 1989, pp. 986-999. 
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survival.205 It shows the crystallisation of certain ideas entrenched in anthropology 
but also in the general view on the organisation of the social world.206  
If one refers to definitions of the 'jungle concept' of culture of the late nineteenth 
century, at the time when scholarly disciplines of the study of the human world 
where being rationalised, the natural element of culture is not directly apparent: 
“Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad, ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”207  
Edward Tylor's definition is often described as one of the oldest definitions of 
culture.208 It presents itself as a totality, encompassing all aspects of the social world. 
However, Tylor primarily applies this definition to primitive cultures which are only 
distantly related in space or time to modern European civilisation. That does not 
mean Tylor does not draw parallels between primitive cultures and his own culture 
which he does inscribe in the totality, assumed as universal. But he limits the 
possibility of applying the anthropological methodology which stems from his 
definition of culture to the advanced capitalist industrial society. This allows Tylor's 
culture to remain in fact anthropologically distinct and superior. Tylor consequently 
adopts a notion of evolution into his methodology as he represents advanced 
societies as mature while describing the attributes of primitive cultures as child-like 
(despite acknowledging the equal intelligence of their respective members). Tylor's 
own methodology was embedded in a universalistic approach which although 
cautious, renders his conception of culture better applicable to what he perceived as 
simple holistic cultures.209  
                                                 
205 Despite bearing Charles Darwin's name, social Darwinism diverges from Darwin's own analysis 
of the limits if applying his evolutionary theory of natural selection to the social world. As an 
essentialist adaptation of natural selection, social darwinism ignores Darwin's introduction of the 
notion of  sympathy in The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, [2nd ed.], London, 
John Murray, 1982.    
206 The correlation of nation in culture with race in biology, which is one of the dominant 
association of ideas in the history of modern ideas, follows a similar train of thought.  
207 Edward Tylor, Primitive Culture, New York, J.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920 [1871], p. 1.  
208 Ziauddin Sardar, and Boris van Loon [Eds.], Cultural Studies for Beginners, Cambridge, Icon 
Books,  1997, p. 4. 
209 See Robert H. Lowie, “Edward Tylor: Obituary”,  in American Anthropologist,  New Series Vol. 
19, No. 2, 1917, pp. 262-268. Available online at the  American Ethnography Quasiweekly 
website: <http://www.americanethnography.com/article.php?id=9> [last accessed 19.09.2010]. 
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The above two descriptions of culture as complex wholes more easily account for 
'other' cultures as their complexity is considered less so compared to 'our' culture (in 
the singular form). Explanatory elements for this dissociation do not appear at first 
glance in the conscious and cautious conceptual frameworks of anthropologists 
which to a certain extent succeed in making sense of the inherent aporia of cultural 
definitions. Nevertheless, some traces hint toward ideological presuppositions of the 
dominant self-representations of advanced capitalist societies. The most obvious is 
the distinction between nature and culture, in the sense that culture is considered to 
be what differentiates human beings from other terrestrial beings. Culture, as the 
ability of symbolling, is considered to be the privilege of humankind. This is not 
simply a statement of quality: it is associated with the idea that ('our') culture is 
superior to nature. In short, the advanced technological, industrial and scientific 
techniques embody the idea of progress from 'participatory' and 'primitive' cultures 
(in the sense that these cultures perceive themselves as a part of the world) to a 
culture of domination of the forces of nature. This in turn is embedded in a 
cosmology which establishes the superior quality of culture in general and of its 
Western capitalist and modernist form in particular. It is in its ideological relation to 
nature that the superiority of the said culture expresses – in part – its particularity. 210    
The terms which describe and rationalise cultures in Tylor's and White's definitions 
do not include the fundamental ideas, beliefs, habits and customs which are defined 
in modern societies as politics and economy. White's definition is even less 
comprehensive than Tylor's in this respect. Politics and economy, alongside culture 
are two of the three main fields of the rationalisation of modern western societies. 
Culture is hence disengaged from its all-encompassing attributes leaving a space for 
politics and economy which, in anthropological discourse, appear to be reserved for 
“advanced societies”.211 The corollary of this is that politics and economy become 
the rational, progressive fields of modern western societies which, against the 
                                                 
210 This does not mean that only capitalist culture has developed a sense of superiority. In fact, as 
Castoriadis contends, it is the general tendency to perceive one's culture as superior and unique. 
See Castoriadis “Réflexions sur le racisme”, in Le monde morcelé : Les carrefours du labyrinthe 
3, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1990, pp. 29-46. 
211 See e.g. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, “Frederick Engels and Leslie White: The Symbol versus the 
Role of Labor in the Origin of Humanity”, in Dialectical Anthropology Vol.11, No. 1, 1986, pp. 
119-126. 
 CHAPTER 2 – PART 2 91 
“complex whole” (or should one say messy?), are the arrangements of reason and 
order, believed to be the unique prerogatives of civilisation.212    
The term culture, recontextualised in its relation to politics and economy no longer 
describes an universal complex whole. Rather, it describes everything which is not 
considered part of the two other fields. It is defined through other notions such as 
“education” or “the arts” or when considered alongside habits or customs, it is 
linked to distinct, reduced or refined social groups, as in “national”, “ethnic”, 
“religious” or “class” culture. At first, this shift does not exclude the anthropological 
understanding of the term. It establishes a distance which could be represented by 
the reduction of the scope of the meaning of culture as if the meaning of culture had 
shifted through a discursive funnel. As it is distanced from evolutionary holistic 
conceptions – which despite their aporias, should be credited with situating culture 
in the longue durée and suggesting a historical relativity of social meanings – culture 
loses its radical potential. The production and transformation of social meaning is 
also funnelled away from the complex space of culture to the rationalised fields of 
politics and economy. The modern imaginary therefore appears impermeable to its 
perception as a sort of ecosystem of significations which are being constantly 
negotiated. The gradual institutionalisation of nationalist significations in the late 
modern period emanates from this reified world-view, which it in turn reproduces. 
These fixed representations, of which commemorative monuments are material 
tokens, hide away the process of their conscious formation, limiting the potential for 
negotiating their meaning, given that the possibility for negotiating their meaning 
exists only a posteriori. Although national, these meanings have rarely been 
                                                 
212 Although the term civilisation may be considered equivalent to that of culture, it usually denotes 
an 'advanced' culture. Rather that being described as primitive, civilisations are more honourably 
described as ancient whe contrasting them with modern Western civilisation. With evolutionary 
theories, civilisation has come to describe the highest form the evolution of social societies. 
Moreover, at a time when colonisation was in full swing, one of its central ideological 
justifications was precisely the civilising mission. The prerogatives of the modern Western 
civilisation are indeed that of being the only civilisation. Under the somewhat distorted influence 
of cultural relativism in the late twentieth century, a different view was being popularised 
through the phrase “the clash of civilisations”. Its most prominent advocate was Samuel P. 
Huntington with his book The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of the World Order,  New 
York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. In contrast to Fukuyama's thesis on the end of history, 
Huntington argued for a culturalist reading of international relations in the post-Cold war world. 
The term did not gain in complexity, but acquired a simplified dominant religious connotation, 
symptomatic of the increased religious tone in political discourse since the late 1980's.  
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negotiated outside state institutions: a large amount of the people supposedly 
concerned or recognised by national representations seldom contribute to the 
decision of institutionalising such representations. Consequently, such 
representations do not gain a first hand shared legitimacy based on their actual social 
significance, but through a state-legitimised institutionalisation. Their social 
recognition is therefore only successful when their significations are themselves 
taken up as internalised terms for further negotiations or recognition of social 
meaning. The density of the invention of national traditions and institutions in the 
second half of the nineteenth century reflects the nationalist motivations of the elites. 
It is only later that those traditions became actual traditions as suggested by 
Hobsbawm.213  
2. The Institution of Ideology 
Figuring the Forms of Ideology 
Negotiations of social meanings lead to the question of the role or rather the 
functioning of ideology within what can be termed for now as the reproduction of 
social significations. Raymond Williams breaks the use of the term ideology into 
two separate levels: 
“(a) the formal and conscious beliefs of a class or other social group – as in the 
common usage of 'ideological' to indicate general principles or theoretical 
positions or, as often unfavourably, dogmas; or (b) the characteristic world-
view or general perspective of a class or other social group, which will include 
formal and conscious beliefs but also less conscious, less formulated attitudes, 
habits and feelings, or even unconscious assumptions, bearings and 
commitments.”214 
According to Williams, it is the first definition that is the most prevalent in 
sociological discourse. The second definition does not exactly operate on a different 
                                                 
213 Hobsbawm points out that these new traditions occupied a “much smaller space” than the space 
occupied by what could be termed private and sub-cultural traditions. See Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, p. 11. In addition, Eugen Weber, in his inquiry on the forging 
of national unity in France also shows how a large portion of French citizens were only starting 
to accept their French citizenship at the end of the nineteenth century. The French national 
imaginary was only beginning to become national around 1900. Eugen Weber, Peasants into 
Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1976, see pp. 113-114; 493. 
214 Raymond Williams, The Sociology of Culture, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995 
[1981], p. 26. 
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level, as it includes the first definition. It is this wider and inclusive definition that 
Williams applies to his sociology of culture, and, by correlation, the one he uses to 
define culture. Such a definition of culture through ideology is characteristic of a 
certain Marxist trend in the social sciences.215 Antonio Gramsci notably defined 
ideology and culture in such a relation, moving away from the then traditional 
Marxist approach.216 Gramsci first defines ideology in the following way: 
“a scientific hypothesis which has a dynamic educational character and is 
verified and criticized by the actual development of history” 217 
Gramsci focused on the question of how the ruling class maintained its ideological 
hegemony and consequently the means available to the proletariat to overthrow the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie.218 In this perspective, Gramsci's definition of ideology 
moves away from the restricted sense to reach the “highest sense” which is clearly 
echoed in William's general definition: 
“One might say 'ideology' here, but on condition that the word is used in its 
highest sense of a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in 
law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective 
life.” 219  
                                                 
215 There are also two definitions of ideology one can find in Karl Marx's own writings. In earlier 
texts, it is defined as false consciousness or the false self conceptions. In a sense, it is a restricted 
meaning. See e.g. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Christopher John 
Arthur [ed.], New York, International Publishers, 1970. In later works, ideology is defined in a 
more general way, denoting the forms of social consciousness, and the set of dominant ideas 
which correspond to the dominant class. See e.g. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, S.W. Ryazanskaya [trans.], Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977. See also 
Taras, Ideology in a Socialist State, p. 4. 
216 This traditional approach considered the infrastructure or base (meaning the modes, forces and 
relations of productions) as determining the superstructure or ideological level. Gramsci 
suggests a co-determinant relation between the two. 
217 Antonio  Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, David Forgacs and G. Nowell Smith [eds.], 
William Boelhower [trans], London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1985 p. 124. 
218 Hegemony can be briefly defined as the organising principle which permeates throughout a 
given society and is based on the combination of the use of force by the ruling class and consent 
of the subordinate And yet, according to Gramsci, hegemony is neither culture nor ideology in a 
restricted sense, but rather the mode through which the domination of a class or group functions 
in society in connecting culture and ideology. See Gramsci, Selection from Prison Notebooks, 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith [eds. and trans.], New York: International Publishers, 
1971, pp. 57-58, p. 80 and p. 195. Also, Raymond Williams devoted a chapter to 'hegemony' in 
Marxism and Literature, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 108-114. 
219 Gramsci, “From the Prison Notebooks”,  p. 63, in Stephen Duncombe [ed.], Cultural Resistance 
Reader, London, Verso 2002, pp. 58-66. Extracts taken from Gramsci, Selection from Prison 
Notebooks. 
 94 CHAPTER 2 – PART 2 
Similarly to Williams' definitions, Gramsci's are also distinguished by the element of 
formality or consciousness, even if Gramsci does not separate his definitions the 
way Williams does. A scientific hypothesis would be based on formal and conscious 
representations – and therefore would correspond better to the first definitions – 
whereas the highest sense of ideology denotes culture or the social whole. 220 
It is worth noting that the most popular understanding of ideology usually holds a 
negative connotation. As Clifford Geertz contends in The Sociology of Culture, it is 
probably because the term itself has been “ideologised.”221 Such negative 
connotations, both in popular understanding and academic definitions, tend to 
benefit the viewpoint of the observer, who considers his or her perspective as 
objective and hence devoid of any ideology.222 This echoes the presentation in the 
first chapter of methodological nationalism. Geertz turns this preconception on its 
head formulating a famous “parodic paradigm”: "I have a social philosophy; you 
have political opinions; he has an ideology."223  
Regardless of these distinctions and independently of which set of definitions is 
used, the problem of the relation between ideology (in its restricted sense) and 
culture remains to be clarified, or as Gramsci put it, it is the “problem […] of 
preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves 
to cement and unify.”224 The complex whole of culture includes both definitions of 
ideology according to the level of formality and consciousness; that is to say: the 
complex whole includes all potential levels of formality and consciousness. The 
relation between ideology and culture can thus be represented in the form of a funnel 
in which the highest outer brim would be the cultural level and the lowest would be 
                                                 
220 The notion of consciousness will not be elaborated here as the enlarged psychological 
framework which would be needed is beyond the capacities of the present author. 
221 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays, New York, Basic Books, 1973, 
p. 87. 
222 This negative or 'critical' connotation can be traced back to two trends, namely Marxism with its 
critique of dominant ideology and the “end of ideology” thesis associated to Daniel Bell which 
defines ideology primarily under the auspices of totalitarianism. Concerning Marxism and 
ideology see Stuart Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees" in Journal of 
Communication Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1986, pp. 28–44.  
223 Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, p. 88. 
224 Gramsci, “From the Prison Notebooks”,  p. 63, in Stephen Duncombe [ed.], Cultural Resistance 
Reader, London, Verso 2002, pp. 58-66. Extracts taken from Gramsci, Selection from Prison 
Notebooks. 
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that of the formal ideology (Figure 1, see below). The funnelled tube running 
between culture and formal ideology thus represents the gradual broadening (or 
narrowing) of the potential for formality and consciousness within what can be 
defined as general ideology. The top down perspective of the funnel (Figure 2) gives 
a wider perspective showing the pattern of inclusion/exclusion from the most 
inclusive and least formal cultural space to the least inclusive and most formal space 
of formal ideology (Figure 2). The in-between space of the general ideology defines 
the relation between culture and ideology in terms of the spiralling dynamics of the 
weaving and unravelling of social representations and significations. This dynamics 
is here represented by a spiralled grey line and can be thought of Castoridadis's 
“radical imaginary” which operates from a space beyond consciousness and 
formality (ex nihilo, out of nothing or nowhere) to express a new form and 
signification.225 
      
Figure 1                                                                              Figure 2                 
Castoriadis elaborates his concept of the social imaginary in relation to the creation 
of new forms and new significations. It is this creation that he terms the radical 
imaginary, and according to Castoriadis, it is this radical imaginary which defines 
what the imaginary or imagination primarily is: 
                                                 
225 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, p. 359. 
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 “[…] l'imagination  c'est ce qui nous permet de créer un monde, soit de nous 
présenter quelque chose de laquelle, sans l'imagination, nous ne saurions rien, 
nous ne pourrions rien dire.”226 
We can see that the radical imaginary, or rather the full potential of the imaginary 
occurs on the margins: it is where the process of creation or production takes place. 
But for Castoriadis this is only the first step of the imaginary institution of society 
which Castoriadis further elucidates.227 To become formalised, the new thing created 
by the radical imaginary needs to become instituted through the process of the 
“instituting imaginary.” The new creation is finally instituted if socially recognised 
as bearing signification. The “instituted imaginary” is thus constituted of recognised 
forms and significations which can then be reproduced or inherited through a similar 
but less extensive dynamics.228 
It is clear that there are correlations and echoes between the different concepts and 
theories of culture, ideology and imaginary which have been reflected upon. The 
spherical representation of the relation between ideology and culture could also 
represent the different levels of discourse, the metaphoricity of metaphors or the 
imaginary institution of society, even though they each operate in different contexts. 
The two figures suggest that the analysis of formal elements can direct us to the 
significations they express by including general or contextual elements in which the 
dynamic relation occurs. Ideally, they should also direct us to their radical state. The 
figures also suggest that formal ideology is an ideological reduction of culture, or to 
put it otherwise, that the formulation of culture means the reduction of culture. But 
even if culture is reduced, the term culture remains a particularly ambivalent and 
meaningful word.  
                                                 
226  “[…] imagination is what allows us to create for a world – or to present to ourselves something 
of which, without the imagination, we would know nothing and we could say nothing” 
Castoriadis, La montée de l'insignifiance: Les carrefours du labyrinthe 4, Paris, Editions du 
Seuil, 1996, p. 111. Translation adapted from the anonymous translation: Castoriadis, The Rising 
Tide of Insignificancy, e-book, 2003, p. 187. Available online: <http://www.notbored.org/RTI.html> 
[retrieved 25.10.2006] 
227 The term “institution” is here thought of in its widest and indeed most radical sense, meaning all 
the “norms, values, languages, tools, procedures and methods of facing things and of making 
things, as well as, naturally, the individual.” Castoriadis, Domaines de l'homme: Les carrefours 
du labyrinthe 2, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1986, p. 223. 
228 The usual understanding of the terms “imaginary” and “imagination” does not traditionally 
conceive the process of creation as their primary sense, and when it does mention it, it is usually 
restricted to the arts. See Castoriadis, Domaines de l'homme, p. 277.  
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The Reduction of Culture 
Anthropological definitions, such as the ones presented in the previous section, tend 
to view culture as the complex whole which defines a particular group of people. 
But the political institutions which formally represent culture in a majority of 
established nation-states reproduce and promote a different, much less radical 
understanding which covers the social spaces formally left out from the fields of 
politics and economy.229 In France, for instance, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
(Ministère des Affaires Culturelles) has been in charge of such “affairs” since its 
creation in 1959. In Britain, a State Secretary for Culture, Arts, Media and Sports 
was created in 1992. And in Poland, a Ministry of Culture and the Arts 
(Ministerstwo Kultury i Sztuki) appeared as early as 1944, before being reformed and 
in 2000 and 2005 by conservative governments under the name of Ministry of 
Culture and National Heritage (Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego).230 
For the sake of clarity, it will be assumed that all these three national institutions 
formulate culture in a similar way but only the case of the French ministry will be 
considered.231 
The following extract from the original mission statement of the Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs presents the scope of its responsibilities:  
                                                 
229 In fact, the first such ministry in modern nation-states was created in Nazi Germany in 1933, 
under the name of the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (Reichsministerium 
für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda) and was duplicated in 1943 by the Ministry for Popular 
Culture (Ministro della Cultura Popolare) of the Italian Social Republic, a short lived puppet 
state of Nazi Germany.In the USSR, the first Ministry of Culture (Министерство культуры) 
formally came into being in 1946. Despite certain common features, the aim of the ministries in 
fascist and totalitarian regimes was to have total control of the education, information and 
cultural practices of the peoples concerned. Contrary to the trend since World War 2 in liberal 
states, these 'original' ministries certainly defined culture as less equivocal, with a entire design 
of enclosed significations.  
230 In July 1944, a Department of Culture and the Arts was part of the Polish committee of National 
Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN), a provisional governmental body 
supervised by the USSR which opposed the government of the Second Republic of Poland in 
exile in London at the time. It was instituted as a ministry in December 1944  
231 The British case would have seemed more coherent, but the postponed institutionalisation of a 
department of culture would have weakened the comparative analysis. Furthermore, a reading of 
the mission presentations on the official websites of the British department and the Polish 
ministry actually confirms the similarities and the transnational political behaviour in this matter. 
See Department for Culture, Media and Sport,official website: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/ 
about_us/default.aspx> [accessed 05.11.2010]; and Ministerstwo Kultury i Dzedzictwa 
Narodowego, official website, <http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/pages/strona-glowna/ministerstwo/prawo.php> 
[accessed 5.11.2010] 
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"Le ministère chargé des affaires culturelles a pour mission de rendre 
accessibles les œuvres capitales de l'humanité, et d'abord de la France, au plus 
grand nombre possible de français, d'assurer la plus vaste audience à notre 
patrimoine culturel, et de favoriser la création des œuvres de l'art et de l'esprit 
qui l'enrichissent."232  
The first observation that can be made is the reduced definition of culture as “the 
works of art and of the mind”. It still suggest a complexity but not to the high degree 
as the complex whole of anthropological definitions. The ministry definition also 
reproduces the culture/nature dichotomy, where the former is solely the works of 
“humanity”. The cultural space the ministry manages excludes all the conditions 
related to the production of these works, or even the conditions of any other type of 
work such as industrial works. The ministry definition also aims, more humbly, at 
policing the access and the spread of inherited works and promoting the 
contemporary production of potentially similar works. Since 1997,  the ministry was 
renamed in the Ministry of Culture and Communication (Ministère de la Culture et 
de la Communication, and its mission was slightly altered. In 2010, the official 
website presentation reads as follows:233 
“La culture est un service public. Elle est aussi un choix personnel pour chacun 
d'entre nous. L'Etat doit veiller à la protection d'un patrimoine architectural et 
artistique qui appartient à tous les français. Il convient de le rendre accessible 
au plus grand nombre dans les meilleures conditions. Il lui revient d'encourager 
la création sous toutes ses formes, d'en préserver la diversité, particulièrement 
dans un monde qui tend à s'uniformiser sous la pression d'intérêts économiques 
de plus en plus contraignants.”234 
The definition of culture, as it is expressed in this introductory paragraph, 
reproduces an annotated and broken-up definition of the original mission statement. 
                                                 
232 “The goal of the ministry in charge of cultural affairs is to provide access for the greatest number 
of French people to the major works of humanity, and first and foremost those of France. The 
goal is also to ensure the greatest audience for our cultural heritage, and to promote the creation 
of the works of art and mind which enrich that heritage.” Official website of the Ministère de la 
culture et de la communication, <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/historique/index.htm> 
[retrieved 05.11.2010]. 
233 All the subesquent extracts are taken from the official website of the Ministère de la Culture et 
de la Communication: <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/historique/index.htm> [retrieved 
05.11.2010] 
234 “Culture is a public service. It is also a personal choice for each of us. The state must keep watch 
over an architectural and artistic heritage which belongs to all French people. It should be made 
accessible to the largest number of people in the best conditions. The state's role is also to 
encourage all forms of creation to preserve its diversity, especially in a world which tends to 
become uniform under the pressure of increasingly restrictive economic interests.” 
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The “mind” has formally disappeared, replaced by the “architectural heritage”, 
which is much less ambivalent and wide-ranging. It also suggests that architecture is 
not considered an art proper. This leaving out of “mind” already reduces both 
architecture and art; the former because it is no longer art and the latter because it no 
longer encompasses architecture. The understanding therefore further reduces the 
formal definition of culture, and reduces its signification. The “works of humanity” 
have also been left out, as well as the suggestion of access for non nationals. The 
Ministry is now formally and solely devoted to managing the relation between the 
nationals and their heritage. This slight nuance further reduces the scope of culture 
compared to the first ministry definition. In addition, with the association of 
personal choice, culture obtains a new qualification as both a national and a private 
property.235 The last sentence is particularly problematic as it creates a confusion 
with what follows:  
“La création est le lieu privilégié de l'expression de la liberté. L'économie de la 
culture ne saurait être exclusivement soumise aux lois de l'économie. Sa 
politique, loin de tout esprit partisan, doit s'inspirer de la conviction que la 
culture est non seulement une source d'épanouissement personnel mais aussi un 
moyen privilégié pour renforcer la cohésion sociale en donnant à chacun le 
sens du dialogue et la conscience de partager avec autrui les valeurs 
fondamentales.”236 
The confusion appears when the statement on the challenge faced by the ministry is 
contrasted with the demand that state policy should not be partisan policy. By saying 
what the ministry should take into account, the statement on culture is adopting a 
partisan position and the “pressure of increasingly restrictive economic interests” is 
rhetorically expressed as de facto common-sense. Indeed there is a more glaringly 
                                                 
235 In this sense, the question of the “privatisation of culture” often discusses it in economic terms, 
which is certainly important but as it is still blind to this “symbolic” privatisation which is based 
on the reduction of power relations, and through their specialisation often reproduce this reduced 
signification. See e.g., Peter B. Boorsma, Annemoon van Hemel, Niki van der Wielen [eds.], 
Privatization of Culture: Experiences in the Arts, Heritage and Cultural Industries in Europe, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1998.   
236 “The realm of creation favours the expression of liberty. The economy of culture cannot be 
exclusively subjected to the laws of economy. Its [the state] policy, far from any partisan spirit, 
must draw its inspiration  from the conviction that culture is not only a source of personal 
fulfilment, but is also a privileged means for reinforcing social cohesion giving every individual 
the sense of dialogue and the awareness of sharing fundamental values with others.” 
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confusing formulation between an “economy of culture” which does not follow the 
“laws of economy”.237  
Despite the verbose definition, the formal ideology greatly reduces culture as it 
embeds and ravels it in economic terms. For instance, the relativist and reductive 
idea of property is promoted through both the elements of “personal fulfilment” and 
“social cohesion”. The so-called “conviction” expresses the intended effects of this 
“economy of culture”: the fundamental value is the fulfilment of each individual in 
their liberty to express how relative their creative potential is and to share this value 
in the celebration of the established “creations” of the nation.  
This short extract is rich in significations, which cannot all be analysed here. Indeed, 
despite the reduction in the significance of culture, the general complexity of 
significations has not disappeared. All the same, the game between (dis)integrating 
and (dis)integrated elements – “architecture” instead of “mind” for instance, or the 
elements brought in from an economic discourse –  grids the confusion and moves 
away from potential significations. But although culture is reduced, another 
complexity is suggested, which combines elements of the dominant ideology with 
elements of its criticism.238 For example, the idea that creation should be free from 
any constraints is hardly a contestable idea in a liberal society, but if one sets 
restrictive prerequisites for such creation to be recognised, one in fact expresses a 
fundamental contradiction which can only be resolved if it is hidden with additional 
formulations, the way it is in the Ministry's description. Firstly, the notion of 
“creation” only applies to the productions expressed by the reduced definition of 
culture. Secondly, this private, individual space is suggested as the best of all places 
for expressing freedom. Finally, the economic constraints are introduced as common 
sense in the first part of the text. As a consequence, it comes as no surprise that the 
discourse of economy is so prominent in the text. 
                                                 
237 The Ministry's website devotes one webpage to the “economy of culture”, where it is explained 
how culture is “considered as a true economic activity”, <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/historique/> 
[accessed 05.10.2010] 
238 In Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello show how the “spirit” of 
capitalism has been reinvigorated since the 1960s-70s by the integration of elements of what the 
authors call the “artist criticism” (critique artiste). This capacity of integrating and thus 
disintegrating its criticisms is representative of hegemonic ideologies and dominant imaginaries. 
See Luc Bolatanski and Eve Chiapello, Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme, Paris, Editions 
Gallimard, 1999, pp.287-290. 
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Nevertheless, it still follows that the production of artistic commodities is free to 
adjust itself to economic value.239 And such an adjustment means precisely that 
creation is restricted by the laws of economy. Moreover, it points to a social 
imaginary which is itself constrained, ruled one might say, by economic institutions. 
Between the formulation of culture as a complex whole in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the political institutionalisation of culture in the twentieth 
century, there has been an ideological reduction of its signification. It is not simply 
the matter of formulation and the marginalisation of something as potentially 
radical, such as an all inclusive definition of culture. This reduction is cultural in the 
Foucaldian sense, as exclusion, as it confines its significations through numerous 
and yet limiting associations.240 
3. The Design of Patterns 
The analysis of the formulations of culture provides a definition of the dynamics of 
the imaginary in terms of the integration and disintegration of threads of 
signification, and the association and disassociation between was is actual and was is 
potential. This (un)ravelling of threads of significations is made sense of in the case 
of the radical imaginary through the formulation or reformulation of hidden, 
inherited significations. The imaginary can consequently be represented as the space 
which comprehends this dynamics in its totality. This space is construed by the self-
organisation of the open system of social significations, and consequently cannot be 
ideally delimited in accountable terms. 
But the formula of a self-organising system (or “auto-eco-system”) needs to be 
clarified on two accounts. Firstly, it is based on a formal paradox: if such a system is 
considered as an entity which can be singled out, it means that it is organised in and 
by itself, leaving no space for the open qualification of its system. Secondly, it 
formulates a tautology: the conception of the open system as defined above has been 
                                                 
239 This merchandising of culture is already represented in the nineteenth century in what is, 
according to Jeremy Rifkin, the oldest cultural industry. Tourism, with Thomas Cook becomes 
the first industry selling cultural experiences, beyond the price of the means which actually 
allowed people to travel. See Jeremy Rifkin, The Age of Acces: The New Culture of 
Hypercapitalism Where All of Life is a Paid-for Experience, Jeremy P. Hatcher/G.P. Putnam's 
and Sons, New York, 2000. 
240 On culture defined as discursive processes exclusion see Foucault, L'ordre du discourse: Leçon 
inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970, Paris, Gallimard, 1971.  
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interpreted as an “eco-system”, which is precisely defined as a self-organising 
principle. Yet, it would be an error to dismiss these two accounts as mutual 
exclusive. Indeed, not only are they both correct as far as the present elucidation is 
concerned, but they are mutually supportive in that they resolve one another. The 
first paradox expresses the signification of the self in the tautology, and 
concurrently, the second disentangles the formal paradox. In other words, the “auto” 
and “eco” of the system inform and form each other.  
For further clarification, this conceptualisation of the formation of social 
significations as an open system of (un)ravelling threads of signification, needs to be 
delimited into a logical section. Despite the axiomatic paradox, the delineation will 
partly shed light on the complexity of the process. It will also attempt to make sense 
of the relations between the various concepts which have so far contributed to the 
elucidation of the imaginary space. In the perspective of establishing the imaginary 
as a space of inquiry, the subsequent section will form the basis for analytic 
strategies for a further inquiry into nationalism. It should nonetheless be noted that 
these delimitations are rationalisations, and as such are fictitious, although they 
remain didactic or rather deictic, as they indicate or point to what they represent.241  
In reality, inquiries are always taken up in medias res. As a result, a primary 
limitation is created by the postulation of a tabula rasa as the beginning of the 
process of forming social significations. As social significations are indeed social, a 
secondary is then created through the postulation of at least two indivisible social 
entities able to be put in relation to one another. These entities, which are considered 
to be individual human beings, operate as “acting powers” of the weaving of social 
significations.242 As acting powers, entities in the social world exist and act in power 
relations relative to their history. Consequently, and in correlation to the first two 
postulates, a third limitation comes from the postulation of the social entities as 
primarily equal and fully conscious. Each entity will thus project and represent one 
unique and indivisible thread, meaning they are not socially significant before being 
                                                 
241 Castoriadis explains how the social imaginary “is not categorizable by means of grammatical 
categories (and behind these, logical and ontological categories).” Yet, words (or categories) can 
still aim at expressing the “not categorizable.” The Imaginary Institution, p.369.  
242 This concept, “puissances d'agir”, is translated and borrowed from Frédéric Lordon, Capitalisme 
et servitude: Marx et Spinoza, Paris, La Fabrique éditions, 2010, p. 19. 
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woven with other threads and reproduced in a way that forms a social tie. While 
aiming at expressing social complexity, the fourth limitation comes from the 
postulate of the simplicity of the social ideology: all entities will produce the 
simplest possible patterns and will directly be tied to two other entities at most. To 
further this rationalisation, a fifth and final limitation is introduced through the 
consideration that there is only one way for these threads to intersect, which limits 
the patterns in which they can actually be woven by the social entities. 
Considering only two entities, 1 and 2, the process appears very simple as there is 
only one possible pattern: the pattern of the social signification the social 
signification (Figure 3). If one entity produces A and the other B, and the pattern can 
only be AB (or BA), then the thread of the social signification would simply be its 
reproduction.  
Figure 3 
When a third entity (3), which produces the thread C, is added, the complexity 
grows exponentially (Figure 4). In order to have the simplest social fabric with three 
entities, the third entity should connect only to one of the two others (C to B in 
Figure 4). This means that all other possible patterns become potential patterns in 
contrast to the ones already being woven. If C is only woven with B, the actual 
weaving patterns (or formal ideology) are BABC for entity 2, AB for 1 and CB for 
3. The social signification (or general ideology) is then expressed as the 
reproduction of BABC. The dominance of B, which is woven both with A and C, 
makes B the integrating element of the social fabric. Other significations that would 
undermine the dominance of B are excluded. All acting powers having applied the 
paradigm of simplicity, the actual patterns are only a part of the potential patterns 
which the present configuration would allow. The social signification, in contrast to 
the first situation where there were only two entities, does not express the full 
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potential of the social significations (the imaginary), which also comprises AC, 
ABAC and CACB, as well as the most equal relation between all significations as in 
ABC.  
Figure 4 
Following the same parameters, if a fourth entity is added (4), expressing D, and is 
only tied to A, the weaving patterns are as follows: ABAD for 1, BABC for 2, CD 
for 3 and DA for 4 (Figure 5). The thread of the social signification would thus 
become ABADABCB. In this configuration, neither the simple BC, AD or CD are 
expressed, nor any other in which C or D would be the integrating elements. The 
potential of the radical imaginary has increased as well as the complexity of the 
general and formal ideologies. B is no longer the only integrating element as it does 
not integrate D, as A does in the social signification of Figure 5. Consequently, the 
significant association AB becomes the dominant or integrating signification of this 
social group. Between Figure 4 and Figure 5, social integration has shifted from an 
integrating element (B) to the level of an integrating signification (the association of 
A and B). The social imaginary of the group in Figure 5 would allow five other such 
configurations. Put differently, with the same number of elements, six different 
“societies” are possible while sharing the same minimalistic imaginary.   
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Figure 5 
If the limitations stipulated before these models were set out are removed, a 
historicity would have to be included which would in itself tear down the possibility 
for any other limitations and prohibit a rationalisation of a social fabric, as was 
attempted above. The impossibility in itself highlights the cultural irrationality 
anchored in all social beings.243 Nevertheless, this exercise enables different 
elements of the framework to be situated. If the paradigm of simplicity is considered 
to be a restricted ideology, ideology then functions as the lever which reduces and 
expands the aperture of the system, defining the extent to which an individual 
consciously weaves, the extent to which that individual is 'open minded' to use a 
common phrase, or further still, the extent to which the self is autonomous.244 But 
the case of an entirely open aperture would mean an overexposure leading to the 
disintegration of the system into social disorder. The fact that most potential 
significations are unconsciously woven safeguards the consciousness of individuals 
from such disorders. The French expression garde-fou – translating a “safeguard” – 
would be particularly suitable here. By correlation, social alienation, in the Marxist 
conception, should be considered as the opposite of disorder: a constrained 
                                                 
243 Edward T. Hall, Au-delà de la culture, Marie-Hélène Hatchuel [trans.], Paris, Editions du Seuil, 
1979 [1976], p. 214, 
244 If approached in terms of a network, this would simply be a measure of how much an individual 
is connected. As far as social autonomy is concerned, it is rather in terms of the consciousness of 
social significations than in connections that autonomy is expressed.  
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underexposure which limits the autonomy of the self.245 As social relations are 
relations of power, they are rarely equitable relations. An ideology can be considered 
one's own, but can be limited in a number of ways which are not determined by the 
individual self. Inherited significations, patterns of thought promoted by institutions, 
such as education or commemoration, or patterns imposed by more powerful acting 
powers tend to limit the less powerful to consensual reproduction. This results in 
alienating the self from a more autonomous production of social significations, even 
if such production is a self-integrated, interpreted reproduction. 
All of these processes ultimately take place in the space of individual social entities. 
The only such objective and subjective entities in the socio-historical world are 
individual human beings or individual beings in general. They are individual auto-
eco-systems, which are conjunctively acting powers in the physical and imaginary 
spaces. In general terms, they are producers and reproducers of social significations, 
senders and recipients of social representations. In more metaphorical terms, they 
are the weavers (auto), the suppliers (eco) and the weaving looms (system) of the 
entire dynamics of the social fabric.  
In this conceptualisation, a sign makes sense only if it is shared in the social-
historical world, meaning if it is recognised or reproduced by more than one acting 
power. The sense which is produced in this way is the impetus for the dynamics 
which is directed to a signification. It becomes a full sense when it completes the 
cycle by supplying the acting powers with social signification. A signification is 
therefore an association of at least two senses. A dominant or autonomous 
signification is in that respect a socially instituted association (which means it is 
socially recognised) which attracts senses and therefore supplies more signification 
than was formulated. It is a strip of the social fabric dense enough to become a focal 
point. This puts the dominant or autonomous signification at the heart of the process 
of integration and disintegration of social imaginary significations enabling it to be 
continuously reproduced in the game of significations.  
                                                 
245 On Marx's own conception of alienation see e.g. Marx, Capital, David McLellan [ed.], Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 383-386; Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of 
Man in Capitalist Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.  
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In this conceptualisation, ideology is considered as the potential 
formality/consciousness of the patterns involved, the extent of which determine the 
amount of power or control the whole process is subjected to.  Control will therefore 
be defined through the notion of autonomy as the radius of formal ideology, as it is 
represented in the funnel diagrams in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Control is further 
exercised in the original production or wilful reproduction and reception of patterns 
and their (re)presentations. In contrast, heteronomy is the coercion or the pressure 
exercised on the individual by institutionalised and promoted patterns. The radical 
imaginary originates from the liminal spaces between autonomous and 
heteronomous spaces of ideology.246 In other words, radicality starts by peering in 
from behind instituted significations of the social fabric. As nationalism is a late 
modern social imaginary, it also means that the negotiations which have formed the 
nationalist grid of significations originated in associations of instituted significations 
with radical significations. Once these radical significations were instituted, they 
have formed focal points which autonomy reproduces nationalism as a social 
imaginary. In the next chapters, we will investigate formulations which point to such 
focal points of articulation. 
                                                 
246 This echoes the concept of “third space theory” which originated in literary studies. See Henry 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space, N. Donaldson-Smith [trans.], Oxford, Blackwell, 1991 
[1974]; Homi K. Bhabba, The Location of Culture, London, Routledge, 1994. See Chapter 4, 
Part 3.1 of the present work. 
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– Aperture – 
De Ligaturis 
 
In the modernist trend of nationalism studies, it has become habitual to date the 
emergence of nationalism in Europe and beyond, to some time between the late 
eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century.247 The central event which has 
become the paramount example of the formation of nation-states is the French 
Revolution. The decades around it most certainly show a dense set of radical 
significations for French history, but also on a global scale and beyond nationalism. 
A certain number of those significations had matured for centuries and were by the 
end of the eighteenth century, ripe enough to contest instituted power relations – 
which is the case of the significations bore by the republican imaginary, both liberal 
and authoritarian. Some significations from the Ancien Régimes were disintegrated 
in the revolutionary breach, while others, conjoint or contingent to radical 
significations, were reintegrated in the nebula of the age of revolutions.248  
As formal ideology has been set at the centre of our strategic approach, the word 
“nation” appears as valid analytical origin. It is nevertheless important to bear in 
mind that it is simply an analytical starting point and not the historical origin of 
nationalism.  
“There was no first nationalist. Neither there was any single moment at which 
people who previously had no idea of nation and no political aspirations or 
ideological preferences for their own country suddenly began to think in 
nationalist terms. Rather, several different threads of historical change came 
together to produce nationalism.”249 
Although Calhoun does not develop the metaphor, we can see how his approach 
supports an analytical strategy based on the metaphor of the social fabric.  
In consequence, the premises in the following chapter are premises on two levels: 
contextual and analytical. The contextual premises are those of the illustrations 
                                                 
247 Calhoun, Nationalism, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 9. 
248 In reference to Eric J. Hobsbawm's The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848, New York, Vintage 
Books, 1996 [1962] 
249 Calhoun, Nationalism, p. 9.  
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which are associated with Britain, France and Poland. The analytical premises 
denote the levels of penetration within this larger space in which Britain, France and 
Poland make sense from a nationalistic point of view. 
The aim is to elucidate the socio-historical moments, or the conjunctures which have 
in a transcultural manner, allowed the ravelling of nationalist imaginaries. The 
negotiations of social meanings, which involve the (un)ravelling of threads and the 
(dis)integration of social ties, set up evolving grids of significations. Once these 
grids seem to be set, their historical longevity or impression depends on how tight 
the ties which capture their significations are and how much contextual signification 
is constructed around these ties. From a prospective point of view, the latter 
significations can be perceived as the content of the paradigmatic grid.  
The term nation (naród in Polish) derives from the Latin notion of birth (nationem, 
“that which is born” or natus, “be born”).250 An overview of the etymological 
dictionaries in the three vernacular languages to which our illustrations relate 
(English, French and Polish) presents us with similar definitions prior to the 
nineteenth century.251 The different definitions are significantly unrelated to suggest 
an unrefined use compared to the later and contemporary singular density attributed 
to the “nation”.252  
In the early modern period, prior to the age of revolution, “nation” was a general and 
polysemic term used in political discourse in reference to a group of citizens under a 
common law or to an entire population which could be united by a common 
government, a territory, a language or any one of these attributes.253 In comparison 
with the non comprehensive “features of the rhetoric of nation” elaborated by 
Calhoun, which lists ten complex bullet points, these various uses of the term appear 
                                                 
250 Online Etymology Dictionary, <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=nation&searchmode=none> 
[accessed 14.12.2010] 
251 Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010; 
Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, [4th Edition], 1762, The ARTFL Project, “Dictionnaires 
d'autrefois”, University of Chicago, <http://artflx.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl? 
strippedhw=nation> [accessed 02.09.2010]; Wiesław Boraś, Słownik etymologiczny języka polskiego 
[Etymological Dictionary of the Polish language], Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2005, p. 352. 
252 In the Bible, the word nation could refer to the pagan populations; in relation to university life, 
the nation denoted the various associations of students which were based on their common 
vernacular languages, etc. 
253 See Chapter 3, Part 1.3 of the present work. 
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quite feeble.254 British historian Norman Davies, who has produced the most 
insightful singular history of Poland to date, writes: 
“In the old Republic [of Poland-Lithuania], prior to 1795, Polish nationality 
could indeed be defined in terms of loyalty to the state. The 'Polish Nation' was 
usually reserved as an appellation for those inhabitants who enjoyed full civil 
and political rights, and thus for the nobility alone.”255 
We will see in the first part of the third chapter how this applies to Britain and 
France before presenting elements of the construction of the content of the 
nationalist formation of nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
political nation of the preceding period, as is suggested by Davies, did not apply to 
the late modern conceptualisation of political legitimacy vested in the people. The 
English term of people, the French term of peuple and the Polish terms of lud, and 
their variants, were used (and still are at times) in distinction to the citizens proper, 
i.e. the upper orders of society from the lower orders. The notion of people did not 
win its spurs, or as the French expression goes, did not “acquire its nobility” 
(acquérir ses lettres de noblesse) as a power legitimating symbol before the late 
eighteenth century. Without this essential signification which tilted the political 
cosmology of the early modern period in favour of the modern republican cosmos 
(as opposed to the monarchic or dynastic), nationalism, considered as the imaginary 
function of making peoples congruent with states, could not have borne the social-
historical signification it has acquired since the end of the eighteenth century. 
                                                 
254 Calhoun, Nationalism, pp. 4-5. 
255 Norman Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland. Volume II: 1795 to the Present, 
[Revised Edition],  Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 9. 
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“As a woman, I have no country.”256
                                                 
256 Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas.  
 
 CHAPTER 3 – PART 1 115 
– Part 1 – 
Disjunctions: Premises of National Plots  
 
1. Empire of Many Nations 
The early significations which in time set the grid for the components of nationalism 
in Britain, or “Britishness”, can be traced back to the early modern period. All those 
significations had evolved in interdependence and came into formation in relation to 
historical conditions – a conjuncture – particular to the geopolitical area we now call 
the British Isles. The most obvious of these conditions is their relative isolation from 
mainland Europe. Concerning what would become Great Britain, three strands of 
significations stand out: the monarchy, in its enlightened and absolute forms, the 
reformation and the empire. These three strands rely on each other and one often 
helps in making the others' significations explicit. The reformation in the Kingdom 
of England257 was a process which originated under the rule of king Henry VIII, who 
was instituted supreme head of the newly formed Church of England, effectively – 
but not entirely dogmatically – separating it from the Holy Roman Catholic Church 
by a series of Parliamentary acts in the 1530s.258 The Protestant reformation which 
was gaining momentum in mainland Europe influenced the English reformation, but 
it was not until Elizabeth I's accession to the throne that protestant dogmas became 
                                                 
257 Wales has been annexed to the crown of England since the Statutes of Wales in 1284. But it is 
through the Laws in Wales Acts of 1535 and 1542 that Wales became legally a integral part of 
the Kingdom of England. In 1736, after the Act of Union with Scotland (1707), the Parliament 
of the newly formed Great Britain passed the Wales and Berwick Act which made explicit the 
implicit reference to Wales in the denomination “England”. From the entry "Wales" in the 
Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite, Chicago, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010. 
258 Colin Pendrill, The English Reformation: Crown Power and Religious Change 1485-1558, 
Oxford, Heinemann Educational Publishers, 2000, pp. 88-94. For a social history of the English 
reformation, see Norman Jones, The English Reformation: Religious and Cultural Adaptation, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 2002.  
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dominant. The most noteworthy strand that needs to be picked up here is related to 
the cosmological change which the reformation induced.259  
The theological principle of the sola scriptura (“by scripture alone”) was the 
ultimate principle in protestant theology vindicated in the Reformation. It is a formal 
principle260 which establishes the Bible as the only source of legitimate authority.261 
One of the main consequences is the depreciation of the other sources of power: the 
clergy and tradition. The cosmos which was promoted through the Reformation was 
radically different from the then traditional order which established the Holy See as 
a central authority in medieval Europe.262 In consequence, papal power and its 
signification diminished in pace with the spread of the Reformation throughout 
Europe. The new order was finally settled in 1648 with the signing of the Peace of 
Westphalia treaties, which put an end to the religious violence and wars which had 
torn Europe during the many preceding decades. The relevant detail in regards to the 
Peace of Westphalia is that it established the recognition of state sovereignty 
residing based on a new definition of sovereignty. The recognition of the absolute 
sovereignty of states, de facto and de jure, effectively disintegrated the significance 
                                                 
259 See Roman Szporluk,  Communism and Nationalism, Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 86. There were other radical innuendos of imaginary change 
in the catholic space, notably in the cosmopolitanism and humanism of theologians and scholars 
such as Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus (1466-1536) and 
Thomas More (1478-1535), which were the first “beams” of the Enlightenment period and 
constitute the beginning of what is called the “Republic of Letters”.  
260 The second general category in Christian theology being tradition, or “material principles”.   
261 Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, p. 59. 
262 In continuity of the already authoritative symbol of the city of Rome. The conversion of 
Frankish king Clovis in the fifth century A.D. effectively established the medieval power 
association between Rome and European states carried out through the clergy which answered 
both to their respective monarchs and to the Pope. This association was further expressed in the 
papal recognitions of kingship which can be assimilated to the symbolic act of incarnation, 
establishing the “divine right” of the kings. The first such explicit recognition took place on 
behalf of Frankish king Pippin in 757. At the same time, the king also decreed the first legal 
settlement of the question of the temporal power of the Papacy. See Magne Sæbø [ed.], Hebrew 
Bible/Old Testament: The History of its Interpretation, 1. The Middle Ages, Göttingen, 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2000, p. 44.  
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of the papal power of recognition of kingship in favour of power of the kings and 
princes of Europe.263 
But this was no sudden change. This power had already been severely hampered in 
the century which separated the early stages of the Reformation and the Peace of 
Westphalia. The well established divine right of kings was one of the elements 
which would justify the instituting of King Henry VIII as supreme head of the 
Church of England. This signified that the king was recognised as being invested 
with kingly power directly by God.264 By the time the Peace of Westphalia was 
signed, this signification had informed all the European heads of state.265  
The first consequence was the emergence of absolute monarchies, in protestant and 
catholic states alike, which signifies that the future legal definition of state 
sovereignty was being integrated in both imaginaries in conflating the state with the 
monarch.266 In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, this notion of state 
sovereignty would be redefined in favour of the liberal ideology, whose cosmology 
focuses more radically and collectively on individuals.267 The associated notion of 
people would be informed by the modern notion of state sovereignty, opening the 
breach for yet another potential signification in the late modern imaginary: the 
association of modern states with a new discourse of legitimacy based on, at first, a 
relatively abstract notion of people. It primarily made sense as a challenging 
signification to the divine order. It would subsequently become the finest pattern of 
nationalism, and its weaving would indeed be embodied in the identifying of 
                                                 
263 See Benjamin Straumann, “The Peace of Westphalia (1648) as a Secular Constitution”, 
Constellations, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 173-188; Keith Suter, “Globalization and the New 
World Order”, Contemporary Review, 2006, pp.420−429, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m2242/is_1683_288/ai_n18791396/?tag=content;col1>  [Last accessed 21.03.2010]. 
264 This was also supported by the notions of kinship and blood which had been of particular 
significance to the nobles of Europe since long before.   
265 Arnaud Blin, 1648, La Paix de Westphalie: ou la naissance de l'Europe politique moderne, Paris, 
Editions Complexe, 2006, p. 56. 
266 The most prominent example being of such absolute monarchs being Louis XIV of France 
(1643-1715), although most enlightened monarchs already bore the seed of absolutism as the 
Tudor dynasty in England already illustrates.  
267 Liberalism, even if somewhat related to democratic ideas, is fundamentally aristocratic. 
Aristocracy literally meaning “rule of the best”. It is the signification of “best” that differentiates 
the liberal aristocracy from the early modern nobiliary aristocracy based on birth privileges and 
not on merit.     
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particular peoples with particular states by filling the imaginary gaps between the 
two.  
The founding significations of particular nations vary in accordance with the 
geopolitical and historical conditions. In the case of Britain, the monarchy and the 
colonial enterprise would successively provide elemental threads for what would 
become the pattern of Britishness in the nineteenth century. The first such significant 
thread resulted from the inheritance conjuncture between the royal houses of 
England and Scotland leading to the first unification of the crowns in 1603 when 
James VI Stuart, king of Scots became James I of England. The two kingdoms were 
eventually legally united in the Acts of Union of 1707 under the denomination of the 
Kingdom of England and Scotland.   
The symbolic and legal unification of power fostered the rapprochement between the 
English and Scottish elites, not least in the concentration of authority in London at 
the expense of Edinburgh.268 It would further bolster economic ties, and particularly 
after the unification in the form of the colonial ventures. But in the decades prior to 
the unification, Scottish merchants and ships could not access English colonial 
markets.269 This was just the most direct consequence of the financial mania and the 
trade wars which had defined the rise of mercantile capitalism in Europe.270 The 
belief that colonial markets would boost the economy and solve the kingdom's 
financial problems led the Scottish elite to seek their own empire. The most patent of 
the Scottish colonial attempts of the 1690s was the Darién scheme,271 which 
resolved itself in what is often referred to and imagined as Scotland's greatest 
financial disaster.272      
                                                 
268 According to Christopher A. Whatley in The Scots and the Union, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006, p. 5, the process had already started by the late 1680s.  
269 Douglas Watt, The Price of Scotland: From Darien to the Wealth of Nations, Edinburgh, Luath 
Press, 2007, p. 20. 
270 Watt, The Price of Scotland, p. 80. 
271 Its aim was to establish of a colony in the Isthmus of Panama. Watt, The Price of Scotland, p. 
221. 
272 Failure in local trading, diseases and the violent opposition of the Spanish empire all played in 
disfavour of the Scottish venture. See Watt, The Price of Scotland, p. 248. 
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In a short time, the Scottish economic and political elites would thus welcome a 
union and the new state that granted them protection based on English power as well 
as full access to the imperial enterprise.273 As famous Scottish nationalist and 
university professor, Andrew Dewar Gibb, already noted in 1937: “The existence of 
the Empire has been the most important factor in securing the relationship of 
Scotland and England in the last three centuries.”274 
Nevertheless, the union was unpopular among the majority of the layers of Scottish 
society. Their reasons were largely religious and historical,275 but neither their 
significations nor the different sectors of the society were associated enough to 
denote a form of nationalism. The formation of a Scottish national imaginary only 
started to emerge in the late nineteenth century – as in most other cases in Europe –, 
expressed in the conversion of legitimating of power from divine right and kinship 
to the liberal and nationalist significations of people and self-determination.276 This 
change is best represented by the growing promotion in the late nineteenth century 
of “home rule” by the Scottish elites, forming into as a political movement for an 
autonomous Scottish assembly within the British state.277  
Effectively, the colonial enterprise had sustained an imaginary woven primarily with 
class and mercantile interests rather than the enlarged kinship of the nationalist 
signification of nation. The empire would continue to play a central role in the 
                                                 
273 David Powell, Nationhood and Identity: The British State since 1800, London, I.B. Tauris, 2002, 
p.16. This shift to a relocalised nationalism would eventually be increasingly informed by the 
collapse of the empire throughout the twentieth century 
274 Andrew Dewar Gibb, Scottish Empire, London, A. Maclehose & Co, 1937, p. 311. Further on 
the retreat of British Empire and the concurrent rise of Scottish nationalism see T.M. Devine, 
“The Break-Up of Britain? Scotland and the Empire”, Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, Vol. 16, 2006, pp. 163–180. 
275 Finlay, Richard J., “Keeping the Covenant: Scottish National Identity”, T.M. Devine and J.R. 
Young [eds.], Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives, East Linton, Tuckwell Press, 
1999, pp.122-144. See also Jeffrey Stephen, Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707, 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007. 
276 The development of industry in Scotland in the nineteenth century had certainly favoured this 
movement. The economic argument is still today central to the Scottish nationalist discourse. 
See the Scottish National Party's “Manifesto 2007”, BBC News, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/12_04_07_snpmanifesto.pdf> [retrieved 03.05.2010], p. 7.   
277 Jack Brand, The National Movement in Scotland, London, Routledge and Kegan, 1978, p. 171. 
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British nationalist imaginary but would not only to serve the interests of the elites, 
but that of the nation.  
2. Republican Risings 
The evolution from the early eighteenth to late nineteenth century dominant 
ideology among the Scottish upper classes suggests that at a certain point, the 
legitimacy of the Act of Union and the interests that prompted them into the joint-
venture of the British state started to be undermined by a competing thread of 
significations.  
A certain number of events which took place in the seventeenth century had 
informed such a thread. The major element is to be found in the rise of republican 
ideas which originated in the Renaissance and whose doctrine was based on the 
rejection of monarchy as the best form of government.278 In the seventeenth century, 
republican ideas had spread to the whole of Europe. This is not the place to make 
full sense of what republicanism was, particularly in view of scholarly opinions 
which suggest that a simple synthesis of what republicanism meant in the early 
modern period may prove impossible.279 A working definition is nevertheless in 
order. In modern political theory, republicanism is often considered to hold the 
middle ground between liberalism and communitarianism. Republicanism in the 
early modern period can be considerer to be primarily based on the opposition to the 
rule of monarchy – taking different forms in accordance with the various 
interpretation of “liberty” with which republicans were juggling, ranging from 
liberal interpretations (e.g. individualist and equal liberty) to communitarian ones 
(e.g. political equality).280 Before modern ideologies started to appear in more 
                                                 
278 Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner [eds.], Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage. 
Volume 1: Republicanism and Consitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.1-2.  
279 Dario Castiglione, “Republicanism and its Legacy”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 
4, No. 4, London, Sage, 2005, pp. 453-465, p. 460.   
280 See Castioglione, “Republicanism and its Legacy”, p. 462. Montesquieu himself described  the 
different types of governments which were distinct from monarchy as republican, suggesting 
such a loose signification of republicanism. See Marcel Prélot and Georges Lescuyer, Histoire 
des idées politiques, [13th ed.], Paris, Dalloz, 1997, pp. 329-332.  
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synthetic forms in the late eighteenth century, republicanism could be considered to 
be one of the epistemological bases of the early modern radical imaginary.      
In England, two significant series of events were prodded by such republican ideas: 
the two English revolutions. Significantly, the first series of events, the English Civil 
Wars (1642-1646 and 1649-1651) and the period of the Commonwealth of England 
(1649-1660) were dominantly influenced by communitarian trends of republicanism 
in contrast to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.281 This second revolution established 
a constitutional monarchy. The Kingdom of England rose as a more commercial and 
religiously tolerant state. The successes of the liberal trends of republicanism were 
also the first steps in the synthesis of a pattern of liberalism. The rapprochement 
between the English and Scottish elites which lead to the reunion of their interests 
was significantly informed by their respective liberal grids of significations.  
In the Kingdom of France, republican ideas would remain marginal for another 
century. Notwithstanding the obvious different geopolitical conditions, most of the 
early imaginary conditions which held it at bay were dominated and instituted by the 
religious wars which were more frequent and violent than in England. When they 
were eventually settled in 1598 by the Edict of Nantes which established a form of 
religious tolerance, other kinds of revolt followed in reaction to the liberal economic 
measures which established the state's fiscal policy in favour of towns and their 
markets over the rest.282  
                                                 
281 The first series of events were termed “English Revolution” in the mid twentieth century by 
Marxist historians, see e.g. Christopher Hill, The English Revolution 1640,  Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1940, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/hill-christopher/english-revolution/ 
index.htm> [accessed 19.07.2010]. For a sociological study on the revolution of 1688, see 
Edward Vallance, The Glorious Revolution: 1688 - Britain's Fight for Liberty, Little, Brown & 
Co., 2006.  
282 These popular rural revolts are called the “jacqueries des croquants” and occurred long into the 
nineteenth century. They are considered reactionary as most of them did not question the social 
order but demanded the abolishing of fiscal law or certain Bourgeois class privileges. At the 
same time, it would be too simple to encapsulate them under the reactionary banner, as they also 
were the expression of the demands for social balance. For a comprehensive history, see Yves-
Marie Bercé, Croquants et nu-pieds : les soulèvements paysans en France du XVIème au 
XIXème siècle, Paris, Gallimard, 1991 [1974]. One other revolt is worth putting forward to 
express the extent to which the state's fiscal policy was at some point contested. The series of 
events referred to as “la Fronde” (1648-1653) were the reaction from of nobles against the rise 
of absolutism in the form of taxation.  
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The religious divide was often secondary. When the revolts ceased for a longer 
period of time in the late sixteenth century, a Catholic counter reform was under way 
from the 1660s onwards, under the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715).283 In 1685, the 
Edict of Nantes was revoked and persecutions called the “dragonnades” against the 
Huguenots, the French Protestants, followed and were carried out even after the 
king's death. The long reign of Louis XV which followed (1715-1774) was more 
consensual from the start, first under a cautious regency until 1723, and then under 
the somewhat timorous and generally flexible rule of the new king.284 In conjunction 
with the gradually growing unpopularity of the king, the republican imaginary 
quickly started gaining space and momentum. Emergences of republicanism had 
taken place throughout Europe and the ranks of the “Republic of Letters” were 
growing, particularly in relation to the kingdom of France.285  
When the radical significations of those philosophies had spread enough, the 
revolutionary period which ensued saw the conflation of a variety of trends of 
republicanism, all the more structured than during the English revolutions.286 The 
physical and political violence of the revolution were expressions of this conflation, 
as well as the flourishing of a vast array of radical and often conflicting political 
doctrines which would inform all late modern ideologies.287 These radical uprisings 
had been canalised in a short period of time now called the French Revolution, but 
more importantly it points to two parameters of the conjuncture of the momentum: 
                                                 
283 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime: A History of France, 1610-1774, Mark 
Greengrass [trans.], Oxford, Blackwell, 1996 [1991], pp. 184-185. 
284 Roy Ladurie, The Ancient Régime, p. 280.  
285 Some of the most recognised philosophers of the period are Montesquieu (1689-1755), Voltaire 
(1694-1778), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and Denis Diderot (1713-1784). For an 
inquiry into the far reaches of the enlightened age, see Michel Onfray, Les Ultras des Lumières: 
Contre-histoire de la philosphie, tome 4, Paris, Grasset & Fasquelle, 2007. 
286 It is considered that the revolutionary period in France exceeded the traditional series of events 
coined under the name of the French revolution, from the elite reactionary policies in the 1780s 
to the coup instituting the Consulate in 1799 establishing a lasting authoritarian rule. See René 
Rémond, Introduction à l'histoire de notre temps: tome 1: l'Ancien Régime et la Révolution, 
Paris, Editions du Seuil, 2002 [1974].  French historian Max Gallo, who can be considered a 
French nationalist historian, points to economic problems and the ensuing fiscal policy since 
1774 as the origins of the Revolution. See Max Gallo, La Revolution Française. Tome 1 : le 
peuple et le Roi, Paris, XO Editions, 2009. 
287 For a historical analysis of the transhistorical significations of the French revolution: François 
Furet, Penser la Révolution française, Paris, Gallimard, 1978.  
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the various ideologies had expanded in social signification more or less 
simultaneously and were pointing, among other significations, to a same 
paradigmatic change. The French Revolution can be considered a success beyond 
French history as it would become a transcultural signification. Its becoming the 
French Revolution was significantly constructed throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries through social-historical moments across the globe by 
legitimating or contesting its political symbolism.288 In this sense – and accounting 
for its ongoing thread – the French Revolution can be considered the social-
historical moment which tilted the balance of power in favour of modern radical 
significations. The Revolution was itself the result of the skeins of radical social 
institutions which had consistently been contesting, across borders of all kinds, the 
instituted imaginary of divine order, royalty and nobility.289  
From a perspective in the contemporary socio-historical moment, the French 
Revolution, imagined as a founding event, can appear as a fixed star in the modern 
imaginary cosmology, shining in accordance to one's ideological perspective. But 
this is a representation, i.e. an optical illusion, which can now be perceived as the 
expression of the becoming hegemonic of late modern significations. From the 
historical point of view of the imaginary, or socio-historically, the events of the 
French Revolution have a signification that transcends the events, and consequently, 
it is but a part of the drag on the movements of constellations.  
From this perspective, the French Revolution is only a relative success, not only 
because it comprises the different symbolical recognitions of the French Revolution, 
but because of certain parts of its imaginary and their transcultural significations. 
The associations they socially and historically include have proven they can be at 
least as authoritarian as tyranny and extensively more violent than the Inquisition.  
                                                 
288 The importance of the French Revolution for Marx, and the subsequent Marxist schools of 
thought is obvious. The contestation was much less prominent in the twentieth century but was 
dominantly a royalist reaction in Europe during the nineteenth century.  
289 On the relation between the continuities and discontinuities of the French Revolution see Furet, 
Penser la Révolution française, pp. 127-130.  
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One of the core significations which had crystallised in the late eighteenth century 
was the signification of “people” as the symbol of the contestation of the instituted 
cosmology of power. In short, it was the “right of the people” versus the “law of 
God”. In practice, it meant contention on various occasions and on various levels of 
the power of the Anciens Régimes across Europe.  
3. Nation of Many Estates 
The Pyramids of Injustice  
A major point around which the contestation of the instituted cosmology of power 
was articulated was the incarnation of what legitimised power (and more 
particularly, political power). We already comprehend some of the shifting 
significations from what represented power in the old systems of government in 
Europe to what legitimised the rising republican or mixed forms of government. As 
the representation of “God” had consistently been relegated to the level of personal 
conscience, the imaginary space thus left vacant in the legitimation of political 
power could be invested with the representation of “the people”.290 The expression 
of nationalism followed the same course.291 In the historical moment of the French 
Revolution, the pamphlet Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état? by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès 
stands out as a decisive twist.292 The twist which this text signifies is the tie between 
“one people” and “one state” which is the constitution of the fundamental 
association in ideological nationalism. In order to decrypt the sense of the twist, we 
first need to get a sense of the localised imaginary significance of the pamphlet. 
                                                 
290 One of the most recognised formulations of the representation of “the people” as legitimising 
power, is found in the American constitutions of 1776 in which “We the People” was addressed 
to the government of the British Empire and not to the peoples of the colonies, signifying the 
loss of legitimacy of the Empire over its then former colonies. In this respect, the success of the 
institution of the American constitution also confirmed the success of the liberal English 
revolution in the form of a mixed government as the radical republicans had left Britain for the 
colonies.   
291 For a presentation of the premises of nationalism in philosophical and political thinking, see 
Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, pp. 79-95. 
292 The title translates into “What is the Third estate?” and was first published in 1789 and inspired 
political theory throughout the nineteenth century.  Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le 
Tiers état?, e-book, Editions du Boucher, 2002, <http://www.leboucher.com/pdf/sieyes/tiers.pdf> 
[accessed 17.01.2010].    
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In early 1789, Sieyès, who was a bourgeois church representative, wrote a series of 
pamphlets which gave him a certain notoriety. Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état? is 
certainly the one which brought the most attention to Sieyès before the revolution 
and up until today. Along with many other agitators,293 Sieyès was pleading in 
favour of an assembly of the General Estates (les Etats Généraux) which had been 
promised by the king, who was the only one who could summon such an 
assembly.294 The assembly was eventually summoned on the 6th of July and through 
a series of upheavals became the first French Constituting National Assembly 
(Assemblée nationale constituante).295  Sieyès who had ealier been elected a 
representative of the Third estate, played a major role in this transformation, putting 
into practice what he had laid out in his pamphlet. His plan was the constitution of 
the three estates in one, which called for the institution of one estate order under a 
common law. The formation of the National assembly led to the abolishing of the 
feudal system just a month after.296 Starting from there, Pierre-Henry Travaillot, a 
French historian of Liberal philosophy, considers the pamphlet as instituting the 
“rhetoric of the Revolution”.297 
Formally, the text appears as a typical pamphlet in its length (about 30,000 words) 
and in its presentation. The title, in form and content, makes us wonder to whom it is 
                                                 
293 In the wake of the revolution, political pamphlets and brochures had become the most popular 
form for expressing and promoting political opinions. The trend would be confirmed in the 
following century.  A recent critical publication of some of the pamphlets from the period 
suggests the range of the topics and opinions which were subjects of debates. “Les Enfants de 
Sodome à l'Assemblée Nationale [1790]”, Les Cahiers QuestionDeGenre no. 57, Pierre Cardon 
[ed.], Lille, GayKitschCamp, 2005, presents how gender relations were also debated along the 
lines of what we would today call gays and lesbians against heterosexuals.  
294 They were the expectational assemblies Kings of France summoned beginning in 1302, usually 
to solve a political crisis.  
295 The official website of the contemporary National Assembly of the French Republic offers a 
more detailed history of its formation: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/histoire-
1789.asp> [last accessed 14.11.2010] 
296 Sieyès remained very active in the following drafting of the Declaration des droits de l'homme 
et du citoyen and the early French constitutions. He would lay low under the regime of Terror 
(1793-94) to eventually participate in closing up the period of instability he had partly instigated 
in 1789 by supporting Napoléon Bonaparte in 1799. See Pierre-Henry Travaillot, “Les querelles 
philosophiques de le Révolution française”, lecture, les Rencontres de Cannes, Arte-Philosphia, 
2005. <http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xfxvef_les-querelles-philosophiques-de-la-revolution-francaise_webcam> 
[last accessed 11.11.2010] 
297 Travaillot, “Les querelles philosophiques de le Révolution française”. 
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addressed. Another pamphlet which had been published shortly before plainly 
addressed “the people of the provinces” to convince them to recognise the Third 
estate and act in its favour.298 This in turn suggests that Sieyès’s text is taking up and 
elaborating the general opinions of the bourgeoisie and addresses his pamphlet to the 
estates, i.e. the representatives of the orders.  
The short, lapidary, introduction not only serves as a rationale, but stands also 
between a rhetorical demonstration and the table of contents. The first three chapters 
are announced with a subsidiary question followed by a synthetic and hypothetical 
answer. It announces that the core of the text will be the demonstration of the 
validity of the claims: 
“1. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? Tout. 
  2. Qu’a-t-il  été  jusqu’à  présent  dans  l’ordre  politique? Rien. 
  3. Que demande-t-il? A être quelque chose.”299 
The three other chapters form a second part where Sieyès presents the political 
means for the recognition of those claims. Chapters four and five focus on the 
unsuccessful or insufficient propositions made by the state and members of the other 
estates – the nobility and the clergy. Finally, the conclusive chapter clearly expresses 
the institutional demands which run throughout the text and are formally made in the 
name of the Third estate. These demands are centred around the question of the 
voting system which was then based on the orders.300 Sieyès defends a voting 
                                                 
298 This shows how the definition of the Third estate was indeed a major issue, if not the main one, 
for the proponents of a republican order. The text of Sieyès appears as the elaboration of 
elements which Jean-Paul Rabat (also known as Rabat Saint-Etienne) a protestant priest whose 
notoriety was close to that of Sieyès's, in his pamphletConsiderations très-importantes sur les 
intérêts du tiers-état, adressées au peuple des provinces, par l'auteur de l'Avis important sur le 
ministere & sur l'Assemblée prochaine des États-généraux, 1788, e-book [original scan], 
<http://books.google.fr/ebooks?id=RfehAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader> 
[accessed 7.09.2010]. Two sections of the pamphlet (6 and 7) are devoted to “What the Third 
estate is” (Ce que c'est que le Tiers état), where the arguments are very similar to the ones Sieyès 
further elaborates. 
299 “What is the Third Estate? Everything./2. What has it been in the political order? Nothing./ 3. 
What is it asking for? To become something in this order.”  Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, 
p. 1. For a copy of the entire first page and a translation, see annexe 6.  
300 Effectively, it meant that each order, as one body, had one vote. The core of Sieyès's argument is 
that the nobility and the clergy would join their vote against the Third estate while representing 
less than 5% of the population of the kingdom.  
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system per head instead of per order. The first three chapters stand as the frame in 
which such a claim is justified.  
We have seen the form of the success of these demands in the establishment of a 
National assembly and some of the political developments which followed. In effect, 
the pamphlet appears as the performative trigger of what will constitute – co-
institute – the Revolution. To follow up on this metaphor, the text, considered as a 
sign, can be read as the preamble for the constitution of an imaginary framework, 
which will turn out to be the fundamental expression of nationalism.  
Looking at the number of occurrences of the term “nation” in more detail (without 
its derivatives), the term is employed close to 180 times, which is more or less the 
same count for “Tiers état” (or simply “Tiers”). This does only signify their 
comparable formal importance. What is more interesting is the way they are 
distributed in the text and the relation between them and a number of other terms, 
notably the legitimating term of “peuple” (which is employed less than half as 
frequently as each of the preceding terms). While “Tiers état” is used more or less 
consistently throughout the text, the term “nation” is comparatively clearly dominant 
in the last three chapters. But focusing on these chapters could prove misleading in 
the perspective of elucidating the signification of nationalism the text expresses. The 
relation between the different terms of “Tiers état”, “nation” and “peuple”, among 
others, is laid out in the first three chapters. This cosmology prescribes their use in 
the remainder of the text.  In the first chapter, Sieyès defines “nation” on a legal and 
liberal basis:  
“Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Un corps d'associés vivant sous une loi commune et 
représentés par la même legislature, etc.”301  
                                                 
301 “What is a nation? A body of associates living under a common law and represented by the same 
legislature, etc.” Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 5. A comparison with the terms used in 
contemporary dictionaries in the definitions of “nation”, the idea of common law is secondary, 
just like the idea of common language. The Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 1762 and the 
Dictionaire critique de la langue française, 1787-88 define “nation” primarily as “the 
inhabitants of one state”. The ARTFL Project, “Dictionaires d'autrefois”, University of Chicago, 
<http://artflx.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl?strippedhw=nation> [accessed 02.09.2010] 
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Based on the idea of a common law, the first chapter consistently presents how the 
nobility, given its privileges, constitutes in Sieyès's eyes, a different “people” within 
the “greater nation”.302 In legal terms, Sieyès presents the law (or reality) as it is (de 
lege lata), establishing how the privileges of the noble orders prevent the nation 
from being united under one common law (de lege ferenda, how the law should be 
applied). He concludes the first chapter with a classic legal syllogism:  
“Le Tiers embrasse donc tout ce qui appartient à la nation; et tout ce qui n'est 
pas le Tiers ne peut se regarder comme étant de la nation. Qu'est-ce que le 
Tiers? Tout.”303 
Conversely, “everything” means “the nation”, here defined as a body of legally 
equal citizens, which can be put in relation to the so called political or civic 
definition of the nation.304  
The liberal take in redefining the nation from a vague community to a community 
bound by a contract of mutual recognition of civil rights is not a French particularity. 
The same year as Sieyès's pamphlet was published, Richard Price, a British 
clergyman, delivered a speech in commemoration of “the Revolution in Great 
Britain”, where “the country” is defined in nearly the exact same way as “the nation” 
by Sieyès: 
“by our country is meant, in this case, not the soil or the spot of earth on which 
we happen to have been born; not the forests and fields, but that community of 
which we are members; or that body of companions and friends and kindred 
who are associated with us under the same constitution of government, 
                                                 
302 “un peuple à part dans la grande nation.” Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 5. Sieyès also 
uses the term “cast” to describe the noble order (p. 4) and suggests it is a “class of outsiders” 
(“une classe […] étrangère à la nation”, p. 5). 
303 “The Third estate embraces everything which belongs to the nation; and everything which is not 
part of the Third estate cannot consider itself as a part of the nation. What is the Third estate? 
Everything.” Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 5.  
304 Sieyès writes later that in his mind, the “Tiers” is always confounded with the nation, Sieyès, 
Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 10. On civic nationalism see Chapter 1, Part 1.2 of the present 
work. 
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protected by the same laws, and bound together by the same civil polity.” 
[emphasis added]305 
From an ideological point of view, the relation between these echoing definitions of 
nation and country are tokens of the cosmopolitanism of the liberal elites. On the 
level of the imaginary, this account is only partial. It presents us with the 
transcultural modus operandi of significations of power.306  
The Œcumene of Barbarians 
In the second chapter of Qu'est-ce le Tiers état?, Sieyès refines his prosecution. 
Having established how civil and political rights distinguish the nobles from the 
Tiers and consequently of the nation defined in terms of common equal rights, he 
pursues in establishing how the injustice towards the Tiers had been justified. This is 
a critical point for our study of nationalism. The first chapter set out to define the 
nation in political terms. The second chapter will disintegrate the power legitimating 
narrative of the nobility, seemingly leaving this space vacant. We will see how this 
rhetoric in fact presents us with the finest expression of nationalism as a social 
signification.   
To describe the elements which legitimised the traditional order, Sieyès refers to a 
counter discourse which appears to have been widely shared among the bourgeois 
revolutionaries. Jean-Paul Rabat, the often quoted pamphleteer, was an elected 
representative of the Third estate in the first years of the Revolution. His most 
famous quote is “our history is not our code” (notre histoire n'est pas notre code). 
Speaking about how the antiquity of a law does not grant it justice, he writes: 
“On s'appuie sur l'histoire ; mais l'histoire n'est pas notre code. Nous devons 
nous défier de la manie de prouver ce qui doit se faire, par ce qui s'est fait ; car 
c'est précisément de ce qui s'est fait que nous nous plaignons. Cette histoire 
                                                 
305 Richard Price, A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, delivered on Nov. 4, 1789, at the 
Meeting-House in the Old Jewry, to the Society for Commemorating the Revolution in Britain. 
With an Appendix, [2nd edition], London, T. Cadell, 1789. E-Book, The Online library of Liberty, 
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=368&chapter=95
623&layout=html&Itemid=27> [accessed 14.11.2010] 
306 Presently of such republican significations. The expression “republican significations” may seem 
problematic, but in the imaginary framework we have laid out it is the least problematic way of 
comprehending the variants of nationalism usually termed civic and liberal. 
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même, que nous nous gardons bien d'alléguer comme une loi, et que nous 
n'employons que contre ceux qui la citent, l'histoire témoignerait contre eux ; 
car en prouvant qu'on a changé jadis, elle les forcerait à conclure qu'on peut 
changé aujourd'hui.”307 
Sieyès does indeed employ this “history” against the nobility. The point he decides 
to unravel is what he calls the “rights of conquest” (droits de conquête),308 which 
grant to the noble orders (and more precisely the higher rungs in these orders) their 
position of power, their aristocracy. As Sieyès explains, these rights date back to the 
conquest of Gaul by Germanic tribes, notably the Francs.309 The original nobility has 
either disappeared or joined in with the Frankish nobility. As a consequence, the 
“true” nobility of the nation is working against it. Secondly, a new nobility has 
emerged from the Third estate, which although equal in rights, is not considered as 
equal by the “ancient nobility”. Sieyès suggests that these “true” and “new” nobles 
“return” to the nation, just as much as “the race of the conquerors” whose blood is 
not so blue anymore. He then shows how these rights, based on their antiquity, are 
beyond obsolete: they are absurd. In a sophisticated series a syllogisms, he 
demonstrates how the legitimacy of history/ancestry would benefit the Third estate, 
i.e. “the people”, “the nation”. It would be enough to go back to the “the year 
preceding the conquest”310 to see that the ancestries of the people are at least worth 
as much as that of the long gone conquerors:311 The twist which gives this rhetoric a 
sense of dominance is the comprehension (or inclusion), historically and 
ontologically, of the claims of the nobles. The grid of the frame remains the same, 
but it is widened: 
                                                 
307 The spelling has been modernised. “We draw on history; but our history is not our code. As our 
complaint is precisely about what has been done, we must defy the habit of proving what needs 
to be done by what has been done. This history, which we are careful not to invoke as a law, and 
which we will only use against those that invoke it thus, this history would bear witness against 
them. By proving that one has changed in the past, it would force them to conclude that one can 
change today”, Rabat, Considerations très-importantes sur les intérêts du tiers-état, p.9. 
308 Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 8. 
309 Sieyès himself does not provide any dates. The Frankish conquest is considered to have taken 
place between the fifth and ninth centuries A.D..  
310 “l’année qui a précédé la conquête”, Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 8 
311 Rabat professes that the original Frankish nobles were depleted after the crusades and that in 
consequence, new nobles were “created”. Rabat, Considerations très-importantes sur les intérêts 
du tiers-état, p. 19. 
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“Pourquoi ne renverrait-il pas dans les forêts de la Franconie toutes ces familles 
qui conservent la folle prétention d’être issues de la race des conquérants et 
d’avoir succédé à des droits de conquête ? La nation, alors épurée, pourra se 
consoler, je pense, d’être réduite à ne se plus croire composée que des 
descendants des Gaulois et des Romains. En vérité, si l’on tient à vouloir 
distinguer naissance et naissance, ne pourrait-on pas révéler à nos pauvres 
concitoyens que celle  qu’on tire des Gaulois et des Romains vaut au moins 
autant que celle qui viendrait des Sicambres, des Welches et autres sauvages 
sortis des bois et des marais de l’ancienne Germanie?”312 pp. 8-9 
This is a particularly important passage as it concludes the reductio ad absurdo of 
the legitimacy claim of the nobles, opening up the space for new historical and 
legitimacy significations to take over. Not simply does Sieyès disintegrate the noble 
narrative of ancestry, he applies this function of history to the nation pointing to a 
sliding of significations from “savages” to the nation's Roman and Gallic descent, 
which are more obviously portrayed as positive claims. Nevertheless, he does not 
simply reject the Franks and other “savage” origins, but relativises their importance 
within the enlarged space thus opened. This posture towards the signification of 
history is a position of dominance in a philosophical struggle, a rhetorical device of 
the new paradigm whose sense is primarily the disintegration of the imaginary 
whose hegemony it contests. It would be wrong to assume it prevents the 
institutionalisation of different or new sets of ties, although the signification remains 
structurally the same. Behind the seemingly neutral legal discourse of a political 
representative, the content of what “the people” are by birth needs to be “revealed”, 
or in the usual nationalist jargon, awoken. In a later chapter, as Sieyès presents how 
the nation is the basis of modern political structures, the lack of content of what the 
nation is beyond political structures calls for the nationalists revelations which were 
already in motion: 
                                                 
312 “Why wouldn't we send back into the forests of Franconia all those families which hold the 
foolish pretension of being descendants of the race of conquerors and having succeeded to rights 
of conquest? The nation, thus purified, would find consolation, I think, in being brought down 
(reduced) to believing it is made up of descendants of Gauls and Romans. In truth, if one insists 
in distinguishing one origin (birth) from another, shouldn't we reveal to our poor fellow citizens 
that what we gain from the Gauls and the Romans is worth at least as much as what would come 
from the Sicambri, the Welches and the other savages who came out of the woods and marshes 
of ancient Germania?” Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, pp. 8-9. 
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“[...] toutes les parties du gouvernement se répondent et dépendent en dernière 
analyse de la nation. Nous n'offrons ici qu'une idée fugitive, mais elle est 
excate.”313 
4. Republic of Many Nations: Avant-garde?  
The application the principles of the Ancien Régime cosmology to the cosmology 
centred on “the people” may appear as the particularity of France. But both 
cosmologies are cosmologies of power, which suggests they follow – at least in part 
– similar patterns. Moreover, just as with other republican significations, this 
transfer of power also denotes the transcultural processes of the instituting 
republican imaginary.  
Republican ideas had been spreading across Europe for many centuries before the 
turmoil triggered by the French Revolution. The variety of phenomena can be best 
appreciated by moving away from the traditional centres of attention, two of which 
have been presented in this chapter: Britain and France. In Eastern and Central 
Europe, republican ideas had gained ground, although the differing conjunctures led 
to different phenomena.  
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth314 established in 1569 was a political union 
between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It echoes the 
many similar unions between feudal states in the late medieval to early modern 
period. The union between the Kingdoms of England and Scotland in 1707, but also 
the union between the Kingdom of France and the Duchy of Brittany in 1532 all 
correspond to the same power struggles. These unions follow a similar pattern of 
power transition which is typical of the feudal system. In all cases, the more or less 
wilful and usually unequal rapprochement between the ruling elites of two states 
were processed into political unions with one entity remaining dominant. The 
comprehensive pattern of the consolidation of monarchic or noble power is thus 
evidently a pattern of power relations in the late medieval and early modern 
European systems.  
                                                 
313 “All parts of government answer to each other and depend in the last instance on the nation. We 
offer here but a fugitive idea, but this idea is exact.” Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?, p. 53. 
314 Also termed the Polish-Lithuanian Union, or the Commonwealth of the Two Nations.  
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One of the first elements which distinguish the Polish-Lithuanian Republic 
(Rzeczpospolita) was the success of the Roman Catholic counter-reformation.315 
Another important element is the supremacy of the noble estate in the social order, 
often supported by the Jewish estate, confronted with the other traditional estates but 
even more confronted with the monarchy. Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth 
century, while other monarchies were struggling for absolute power, the kings and 
queens of Poland were making more concessions than gains.316 The balance of 
power was significantly more favourable to the nobility (szlachta) if compared with 
the Kingdom of France or even the United Kingdom.317 This period is sometimes 
referred to as “The Period of Noble Supremacy” (1569-1763), in between “the 
Period of the Estates” (1374-1568) and “the Period of Reforms” (1764-1795) which 
led to the short-lived institution of the first Republic of Poland.318 In 1771-1772, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau who wrote his Considérations sur le gouvernement de 
Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée intended for Polish reformers, provides us 
with a contemporary account of the social order of the Republic. Already suggesting 
an integrative form of the nation, he writes in a manner which is evidently echoed in 
Sieyès's pamphlet: 
“[...] la nation polonaise est composée de trois ordres: les nobles, qui sont tous; 
les bourgeois qui ne sont rien ; et les paysans qui sont moins que rien.”319  
In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the monarchy lost its grip in confrontation 
with one of the largest nobilities in Europe.320 From the perspective of foreign 
                                                 
315 Although neither Poland nor Lithuania should then be considered as “Catholic countries on the 
monolithic scale of Spain or Italy”. Davies, God's Playground: A History of Poland. Volume I: 
The Origins to 1795, [Revised Edition], Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.154.  
316 Davies, God's Playground, Volume I, p. 156. 
317 The turning point certainly was the death of king Zygmunt August Jagellon (1548-1572) which 
left the state without heir. This gave the already powerful nobility the possibility of an open 
election in the process of which, it would negotiate a further extension of its power. Daniel 
Beauvois, La Pologne: Histoire, société, culture, Paris, Editions de La Martinière, 2004, p.115. 
318 Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 9 in reference to Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Historia ustroju 
Poslki w zarysie, [History of Polish Government in Outline], 1904.   
319 “The Polish nation is made up of three ordres: the nobles, who are everything; the burghers who 
are nothing; and the peasants who are less than nothing.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée, Paris, GF-
Flammarion, 1990 [1782], p.184. 
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historical observers, the government of the Republic was sometimes negatively 
dubbed “anarchy”,321 but in many instances, especially in Polish historiography, the 
term of “noble democracy” appears to be preferred.322 In terms of governance, the 
Republic operated as a form of a decentralised state.323 While often translated as 
“commonwealth”, republican ideas were central to the formation of the dominance 
of the szlachta. Davies consequently suggests that the Republic of Poland-Lithuania 
be considered as a “monarchical republic rather than a republican monarchy”, which 
gives us a general sense of what distinguishes the mixed government of the Republic 
from the traditional western versions.324 
For the study of nationalism, the period of the supremacy of the nobility presents us 
with features that have often been mistaken for nationalism. Indeed, even 
considering the “grossly retarded development” of the state, the culture of the 
szlachta appears to have “an air of striking modernity.”325 The modern political 
aspect which produces this impression is the centrality of the “Golden freedom” in 
the noble imaginary. In practice, the “Golden freedom” of the nobles was based on 
two institutions.326 The first was the so-called Confederation, which was the 
expression of the right to resist. It was a legal procedure that appeared in the late 
fourteenth century, by which any group of individuals could, under oath, take arms 
to fight for their demands and grievances. The second institution, the Liberum veto, 
                                                                                                                                         
320 At the end of the sixteenth century, the nobility accounted for 6.6 per cent of the population of 
the Republic. Up until the eighteenth century, the figure would rise above 9 per cent. Spain and 
Hungary had large nobilities; the figure remained close to 5 per cent. In France and in England, 
the nobles represented 1 and 2 per cent respectively. Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 166, 
386. See also  Andrzej Walicki, Prace Wybrane, Tom 1: Naród, Nacjonalizm, Patriotyzm 
[Selected Works, Volume 1: Nation, Nationalism, Patriotism], Cracow, Universitas, 2009, pp. 
40-41. 
321 A term which was considered synonymous with “chaos” or “terror” in the discourse of the 
Enlightenment. See Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, pp. 246-247. 
322 Walicki, Naród, Nacjonalizm, Patriotyzm, p. 17, 41. 
323 For a detailed diagram of the political system of the Republic, see Davies, God's Playground, 
Volume I, pp. 248-249. 
324 Polish historian of philosophy Andrzej Walicki uses the same terminology, in Naród, 
Nacjonalizm, Patriotyzm, pp. 44-45. Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 281. 
325 Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, pp. 282-283. 
326 All the political assemblies of the Republic were governed by the principle of unanimity which 
was taken very seriously and applied conscientiously. It was “responsible for the two 
constitutional practices” mentioned here. Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 259.  
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was the prerogative of the members of political assemblies. Any member who 
invoked it, expressing his right to dissent, would thus halt the proceedings of the 
parliament until a unanimous consensus could be negotiated.327 These institutions 
were generally, if not exclusively, the rights of the nobles. They were central in the 
establishment of their political supremacy. What gives these institutions their air of 
modernity is the echo their significations have in late modern liberal and democratic 
struggles, as the views they carried all share a “common concern to combat the 
power of the state.”328 But other aspects of the culture of the nobles are often seen in 
a negative light, partly with humour, at other times with harsh criticism: 
“Ni la puissance du roi, ni les conseils de sagesse ne pouvaient vaincre 
l'anarchie et le téméraire entêtement des magnats de la couronne qui, par leur 
légèreté, leur manque absolu de prévoyance, leur amour-propre puéril et leur 
vanité futile avaient fait de la Diète une caricature de gouvernement”329 
Yet, the social order of the Republic flourished in the first centuries before declining 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The cultural ideology which 
accompanied the noble supremacy was based on a narrative of historical ancestry, in 
the same vein as those of the noble estates of the British Isles and of France, 
although their origins were indeed less evident. The geopolitical areas of northern 
central Europe were areas of passage rather than of conquest in periods of migration 
and invasion, prompted by the lack of natural boundaries.330 This situation resulted 
in a less obviously “sectioned” or “layered” history, at least concerning the nobility. 
There were no clear accounts of conquest or fixed boundaries, however fictional 
these usually were. Polish and Lithuanian nobles could not easily trace their origins 
to a “right of conquest” such as that of the Franks or the Normans, nor distinguish 
                                                 
327 Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, pp. 259-260, 264 and 279-280. 
328 Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 283.  
329 “Neither the power of the king, nor the counsels of wisdom could vanquish the anarchy and the 
reckless stubbornness of the magnates of the crown, who, due to their levity, their absolute lack 
of foresight, their puerile self-esteem and their vanity had turned the Diet into a caricatural 
government.” Nicolas Gogol, Taras Boulba, Paris, Flammarion, 2003, pp.205-206, quoted in 
Guy Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais: Société, culture, art, littérature, Paris, L'Harmattan, 
2006, p. 41, 
330 For an original and comprehensive account of the history and heritage of the barbarian invasions 
for the European civilisation, see Karol Modzelewski, Barbarzyńska Europa [Barbarian 
Europe], Warsaw, Iskry, 2004. For a further account on contemporary criticisms by foreign 
observers see Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, pp. 279-281. 
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themselves from a particular host of conquerors, as was the case with the Celtic 
areas on the western margins of Europe. These mythologies which legitimated the 
power of the “races of conquerors” or their opponents, instituting the imaginary of 
the medieval social orders, had to be constructed on frail grounds. When the late 
formed szlachta consolidated its political position in the Republic, its own 
mythology started to appear.331  
The cultural ideology of the nobles, called “Sarmatism” (Sarmatyzm), is the 
historical attempt to clarify the obscure genealogy of the szlachta. The aim of this 
doctrine was twofold: to establish the nobles on a par with their neighbouring 
counterparts and to distinguish themselves from the remainder of the population, 
particularly from the peasantry. The prevailing ideology of the kingdom of Poland 
affiliated its origins to those of the Czechs and Russians. These ancestors were not 
deemed  proud enough and the nobles turned to the Sarmatians, a barbarian tribe 
closely related to the Scythes, who were said to have conquered the plains around 
the Vistula and enslaved the local peoples, legitimating thus their position as a “race 
of lords.”332 The result was a curious mixture of East and West, between medieval 
ideals of chivalry and early modern republican ideals, in a décor mid-way between 
Baroque and Ottoman styles.333 
The Sarmatist class or cast culture does indeed connect to the late modern (i.e. 
nationalist) definition of “nation” in a number of ways, but it differs on two 
significant points: the nationalist doctrine of the late modern period aimed at the 
                                                 
331 This mythology was also embedded in the general view held by the Polish nobles on the role of 
Poland in the European order. As Janusz Tazbir writes, it was based on three “dogmas”: Poland 
as the “breadbasket” (spichrz) of Europe, as the bulwark of Christianity and the perfection of its 
political regime. Thiese lead to the belief that Poland was both necessary to Europe, but also 
under threat from the parliamentary regimes which were gaining momentum. Janusz Tazbir, 
“Stosunek do obcych w dobie baroky” [The relation to others in Baroque times], Z. Stefanowska 
[ed.] Swojskość i cudzoziemczyzna w dziejach kutlury polskiej, [Identity and otherness in Polish 
culture], Warsaw, 1973, p. 73. See also Aleksandra Niewiara, “Inni w oczach “wojowników 
sarmackich” – o stereotypie narodowości w XVII wieku” [Others in the eyes of “Sarmatian 
warriors” – on national stereotypes in the 17th c.], J. Anusiewicz, and J. Bartmińsk, [eds.], Język 
a kultura, vol. 12, “Stereotyp jako przedmiot lingwistyki. Teoria, metodologia, analizy 
empiryczne”, Wrocław 1998, pp. 171-218  
332 Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, p. 42. 
333 Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, p. 42. The attire of the nobles was in particular extensively 
influenced by the Ottoman style. See Annex 7. 
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formation of a common culture across classes and estates of the preceding social 
orders. This tendency towards a national totality is evidently absent in historical 
Sarmatism. The aim of the nobles and the general ideology of the Republic of 
Poland-Lithuania did not aim at changing the social order. It was essentially an 
Ancien Régime in which the different estates had negotiated an original distribution 
of power. The founding element of the hegemonic republican imaginary and 
consequently of nationalism – the legitimacy claim vested in the notion of “the 
people” – appeared at the same time as in France or Britain. The resulting Polish 
nationalism would form its content in the same way as the “West” (albeit in a 
radically different conjuncture as we will see later in this study): by applying the 
principle of noble genealogy to “the people”. 
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Conjunctions: Linear Trajectories 
 
1. National Reverie 
The collapse of the Republic of Poland-Lithuania was marked by its partitioning in 
1773, 1793 and 1795. The neighbouring states, the Hapsburg and Russian Empires 
and the Kingdom of Prussia, slowly deprived the Republic of its territory. The third 
of these partitions effectively lead to the abdication of the last Polish king, 
Stanisław-August Poniatowski, and the disappearance of the state. 
As the revolutionary fervour was flourishing in France, groups of Polish-Lithuanian 
gentry, in alliance with the king, were hoping to reform and restore a form of 
autonomous state while being confronted with the dismembering and frailty of their 
institutions.334 They fed on the radical ideals which had stirred up the social order in 
the Kingdom of France.335 Although their endeavours were never properly put to 
practice, their result, the Constitution of the Third of May (Konstytucja Trzeciego 
Maja) would become one of the most significant symbols in the national history of 
modern Poland.336 Its progressive and radical signification brought it the admiration 
of many since, even Karl Marx's: 
“With all its shortcomings, this constitution appears against the background of 
Russo-Prusso-Austrian barbarity as the only work of freedom which central 
Europe ever produced of its own accord. Moreover, it was created by a 
                                                 
334 This period is referred to as the Four Years Sejm, which was initiated in late 1788 and originally 
invoked to approve the alliance with the Russian Empire against the Turks.  
335 With the formation of the Second Republic of Poland in 1918, the 3rd of May would be adopted 
as the national day. Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 401. The importance of Rousseau 
and his nearly prophetic Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne present us with the 
common genealogy of French and Polish late modern Republicanism. 
336 In theory, “all the harmful practices of the old Republic – the Liberum Veto, the right of 
resistance, the Confederation, the 'free' elections – were to be abolished.” Or in other words, the 
privileges of the dominant social order, which had blocked the political institutions of the old 
Republic. Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 403. 
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privileged class, the gentry. The history of the world knows no other example 
of such generosity by the gentry.”337 
This quotation also suggests the international resonance of the first written European 
constitution. But in spite of its transhistorical importance, this radical attempt to 
reform the “noble democracy” into a modern mixed government was doomed from 
the outset and resolved in the final dismantling of the state. In terms of state 
institutions, the term “Poland” would retain no actual referent until 1918. 
Furthermore, the term of “Pole” would change its meaning. From a political 
definition, referring to the citizenry of the old Republic, it switched to an ethnic 
definition referring to the group of people of Polish language, which were now to be 
distinguished from other imperial minorities. In the contemporary political 
definition, there was in fact no nation anymore. And yet, the idea of an independent 
Polish state now representing a linguistically distinguishable people took its course. 
The formation of the Republic of Poland in 1918 was made possible by the century 
long formation of a nationalist Polish high culture. 
Although a Polish state, in nationalist terms, never did exist,338 the idea of the loss of 
an eternal Poland and its future restoration was fed by nationalism. In the long 
nineteenth century, it would be the driving force of a Polish nationalist culture 
which, even without its political institutions, would thrive just as well as its other 
European equivalents.339 Across Europe, the nineteenth century, torn between 
romantic and rationalist ideals is the century of the formation of national 
consciences, in academic and intellectual discourse as we have seen in the first 
chapter, but also in the arts. The political legitimacy claim of “the people” which had 
laid the foundations of statehood and sovereignty would thus gain a referent. By the 
end of the century, states and political institutions would serve the institution of 
                                                 
337 Karl Marx, quoted in Davies, God's Playground,Volume I, p. 403.  
338 Certain state-like formations were assimilated to an embryonic Polish state, such as the Duchy 
of Warsaw established by Napoleon I as an extension of the First French Empire in 1807, before 
being partitioned in 1815. 
339 Guy Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, is a quite thorough presentation of the density of the 
Polish cultural formation. 
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homogenised cultures within their respective spaces.340 This process of symbolic 
violence is founded on the invention (and not the rediscovery) of a noble-like 
ancestry of peoples, which aggregates – imagines – states, languages and 
populations in a singular and linear fashion. 
The political realisation that the modern legitimacy claim based on the abstract 
notion of people would not hold as such can be traced to the various insurrections 
and revolutions which have punctuated the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Contesting the new European order in formation, they can certainly be considered as 
outgrowths of and reactions to the earlier revolutionary crises.341 The strongest of 
the three revolutionary waves of this period, dated around 1848, is often referred to 
as 'the springtime of peoples'. From the perspective of nationalist elites, it is also 
called the “movement of the nationalities” (le mouvement des nationalités).342 The 
political clout of the various revolutions and insurrections in the 1840s had a clearer 
democratic signification, both in practice and in ideology.343  
The various political elites, in position of power like in Britain and France or 
struggling to establish their independence like in the case of the Polish nationalists, 
was then realising the strength and importance of actual peoples. This is the primary 
effect for the development of the national imaginaries of the springtime of peoples. 
In Polish arts and historiography, this period can be summed up as “the quest for a 
national reconciliation”, often depicted under the banners of a revival or an 
awakening (as is the usually the case in nationalist discourse).344 Guy Amsellem in 
his study of the Polish imaginary dates the realisation of the relevance of the lower 
                                                 
340 In practice, it echoed the growing importance of the state, see René Rémond, Introduction à 
l'histoire de notre temps – 2. Le XIXe siècle 1815-1914, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1974, pp. 104-
113. 
341 Between 1815 and 1848, three revolutionary waves stirred the European order, often beyond its 
geographical sense. The two first wave, around the 1820s, was a generally unsuccessful reaction 
of the republican liberal elites against the reactionary successes of monarchies in the aftermath 
of the Napoleonic wars. The second wave of the 1830s had a similar political motivation but 
resolved itself in the establishment of a relative hegemony of bourgeois liberalism. Rémond, Le 
XIXe siècle, pp. 179-185; Hobsbawm,  The Age of Revolution, pp. 111-112. 
342 Rémond,  Le XIXe siècle, p. 179. 
343 Rémond,  Le XIXe siècle, p. 186. 
344 Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, p. 47. 
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orders for political restoration to the failure of the rising of 1830.345 The following 
extract of the poem “Psalm to Love” (Psalm miłości) written in 1845 by Polish 
romantic poet, Zygmunt Krasiński, expresses this evolution, which resounds like a 
nationalist and indeed national call to arms:  
“Jeden tylko, jeden cud: 
Z Szlachtą polską – polski Lud, 
Jak dwa chóry – jedno pienie! - 
Wszystko inne – złudą złud! 
Wszystko inne – plamą plam! 
I ojczyzna tylko tam! - 
Jeden tylko, jeden cud: 
Z Szlachtą polską – polski Lud, 
Dusza żywa z żywym ciałem, 
Zespojone świętym szałem; 
Z tego ślubu jeden Duch, 
Wielki naród polski sam, 
Jedna wola, jeden ruch, 
O! zbawienie tylko – tam!”346 
As very few institutions in the old territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic had 
retained any form of cultural autonomy and as the Polish high culture was even 
expurgated (apart from the region around Cracow under the jurisdiction of the 
Hapsburg Empire), literature and the arts became the vessels par excellence of the 
frustrated Polish nationalism, especially among the elite of the so-called “Great 
Emigration” (Wielka Emigracja) of the 1830s.347 The hardships and violent failures 
of the Polish revolutionaries inspired a series of mythological symbols. One which is 
also expressed in the “Psalm of Love”, and which has fed Polish nationalisms ever 
since, transfigured the vague idea of the Polish nation into “the Christ of the 
                                                 
345 Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, p. 46. 
346 “Just one, one miracle/ The Polish nobles – with the Polish people/ Like two choirs – one song!/ 
All the rest – the most illusive of illusions /All the rest – the most stained of all stains! /And the 
fatherland only there! /Just one, one miracle /The Polish nobles – with the Polish people /Living 
soul in a living body /United in a holy rage /From this marriage, one spirit /The great Polish 
nation alone /One will, one movement /Oh! Redemption only – there!” Zygmunt Krasiński, 
Psalmy Przyszłości [Psalms of the Future],1850, available at the Virtual Library of Polish 
Literature website, <http://literat.ug.edu.pl/psalmy/index.htm> [accessed 12.12.2010]. 
347 Contrary to the cities and areas controlled by the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia, 
which were undergoing a linguistic russification and a germanisation, the so-called Austrian 
policy was more tolerant allowing the Polish  language to operate in schools, administration and 
universities, which form the basis of the cultural apparatus of the modern state. Amsellem, 
L'imaginaire polonais, pp. 150-151. 
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nations”.348 This messianic or prophetic reading, which goes beyond Polish 
nationalism and across many late modern ideologies, was particularly developed in 
Polish nationalist thought. Two other most renown poets of Polish romanticism, 
considered alongside Krasiński to be the three “Wise Men who guided Polish 
intellectual life across the desert,”349 Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) and Juliusz 
Słowacki (1809-1849), who both took part in the Great Emigration, developed and 
promoted their own messianic versions of Polish nationalism.350 Mickiewicz, who 
emigrated to Paris, did not only write literature which expressed this 'messianism' 
but also taught a class on the history of Poland at one of the most renowned French 
institutions, the Collège de France, which content was imbued in his prophetic 
‘illuminations’: 
“Le dernier résultat tiré de l'histoire des peuples slaves, et plus particulièrement 
marqué par la marche historique de la Pologne, a été d'admettre le 
Messianisme, c'est-à-dire une série de révélations. […] L'âme la mieux 
développée est nécessairement chargée de conduire les hommes qui se trouvent 
sur les degrés inférieurs. […] Chaque nationalité est basée sur une révélation 
particulière. Chacune des grandes nationalités a été fondée par un seul homme, 
par une seule pensée, et elle n'a vécu que pour réaliser cette pensée.”351   
In Mickewicz's thought, as it appears in the preceding paragraphs, the particular 
revelation of the Polish nation (or nationality) is linked to the “main revelation of 
                                                 
348 The expression “the Christ of nations” or “the Christ of the nations” does not appear in 
Krasiński's poem. It refers more particularly to one of the most celebrated Polish poets, Adam 
Mickiewicz, who elaborated the analogy between Jesus Christ and the Polish nation (the 
crucifixion of Poland being the disappearance of the state). See e.g. scene 5 “Cela księdza 
Piotra” in Adam Mickiewicz, Dziady, Część III [Halloween, part 3], Warsaw, Wydanie 
Literackie, 1998 [1832]. 
349 “[...] les mages qui guidèrent le vie intellectuelle polonaise dans la longue traversée du désert.” 
François Bafoil [Ed.], La Pologne, Paris, Fayard/CERI, 2007, p. 49.  
350 For works by Juliusz Słowacki which present messianic elements, see Kordian (1834) and 
Anhelli (1838) available at the Kulturalna Polska website: <http://slowacki.kulturalna.com/g-
1.html> [accessed 22.12.2010]. Słowacki would move away from the analogy of the Polish 
nation with the Passion of the Christ to replace it with an analogy to a Swiss national hero, 
Winkelried, who would have sacrificed himself in battle to breach enemy lines leading to the 
victory of the Swiss confederates against Leopold III of Austria in 1386.  
351 “The latest result of the history of the Slavic peoples, and particularly marked by the historical 
march of Poland, was to acknowledge the Messianism, which is a series of revelations. […] The 
most developed soul is necessarily in charge of leading those whose souls are at  lower levels [of 
development]. […] Every nationality is based on a particular revelation. Each of all the great 
nationalities was founded by a single man, one single thought, and it has lived to realise this 
thought.” Adam Mickewicz, Les Slaves; Cours professé au Collège de France (1842-1844), 
Paris, Musée Adam Mickiewicz, 1914, pp. 9-10. 
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humankind”, namely Christianity. The prophet, the “most developed soul” then 
appears to be none other but Mickiewicz himself, who announces that Poland, just 
like Christ, has to suffer for the other nations, before it is resurrected in a promised 
future.352 
Leaving aside the contextual delusions of grandeur, there are two significations 
which transpire here: the personification of “nations”, as bodies (which echoes the 
legal conceptualisation) and souls, and the “transnational” or rather transcultural 
recognition of the reality of each particular nation. While the formal connection to 
Christianity is a construct of Polish nationalism in particular, representations of 
religiosity appear independently of obvious references to religion.353  
2. Empires of Myths 
The aspect of nineteenth century nationalism, or rather of instituting nationalism – in 
the imaginary sense – goes in conjunction with the idea of the “awakening” of 
nations. These two facets of the instituting imaginary of nationalism form the 
conception of time which is predominant in late modernity: a time line for linear 
chronologies. While the prophetic significations, like the messianism of Polish 
poets, project this line into the future, the traditionally aristocratic conception of 
ancestry re-centred on the notion of “people” projects the line into the distant, 
mythological past. This oversimplification of history is at the heart of power 
legitimating narratives certainly beyond nationalism. Nevertheless, however simple 
the conception, the cultural contents of the political frame of the modern nation are 
not readily available. From the “fugitive idea” expressed by Sieyès, there is still a 
                                                 
352 Throughout the nineteenth century, popular “prophecies” –  pamphlets and poems alike – would 
announce the forthcoming restoration of Poland. Amsellem, L'imaginaire polonais, p. 39.  
353 The relationship between religion and nationalism has often been neglected by most modernists. 
Although it should not be seen as undermining the importance of insights of modernist theories 
of nationalism, it seems it is relevant to rethink this relationship within a modernist-like 
framework. Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, “Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the 
Consequences of a Complex Relationship”, Ethnicities, vol. 3, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 215-242. 
For approaches challenging the modernist frameworks, see e.g. David A. Bell, The Cult of the 
Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800. Cambridge,MA, Harvard University 
Press, 2001; Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
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long way before the 'tools' of nationalist history are themselves refined and the 
national cultures homogenised into one.354 
In France, substantial efforts to define the French people more consistently will lie 
in literally digging out the tokens of the dormant glorious past. The most significant 
myths of this glorious past will be the invention of the Gallic ancestry of the French 
people. As we have seen, Sieyès suggests a less singular ancestry, pointing to 
Roman, Gallic but Germanic roots as well, suggesting an order of preference for the 
two former in the revolutionary opposition to the noble orders. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, French nationalists would select the Gallic ancestry as unique, 
slowly relegating the Roman ancestry to history books and opposing the Germanic 
descent taken up by German nationalism. State institutions, imperial and republican 
alike, thus sought to elaborate a memory-history, or a 'pastness' to use Wallerstein's 
concept, centred on the Gallic line of descent.  
While a certain number of minor literary works already mention the would-be 
national hero, Vercingetorix,355 until the end of 1860s, the Roman greatness, 
symbolised by Julius Caesar, stands out as the dominant power legitimating symbol 
in state discourse.356 . 
Napoleon III had ordered excavations in view of discovering evidence of Caesar and 
his army. As excavations were being pursued, in the years 1861-1865, it was 
suggested that one of the sites was the site of Vercingetorix's last stand against Julius 
Caesar, the battle of Alésia – a fact which has never been confirmed although it is up 
until today promoted as such. Starting from there, the theme of Vercingetorix 
                                                 
354 See Chapter 1, Part 2.1 of the present work. Rousseau was certainly one of the first to combine – 
notably in Considération  le gouvernement de Pologne – cultural features with the political 
framing of the nation, such as it is formally expressed in Sieyès's pamphlet for instance. This 
further informs the correlation between the civic/political and ethnic/cultural conceptions of 
nations usually opposed. See Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, p. 82. 
355 Paul M. Martin traces the first literary references to the 1770s, in Vercingétorix: Le politique, le 
stratège, Paris, Editions Perrin, 2000, p. 229. 
356 This is particularly the case during the First Empire (1804-1814), under, Napoleon Bonaparte, 
and the Second Empire (1852-1870), with Napoleon III, whose political model is called the 
césarisme in reference to the Roman consul. Also, Vercingétorix appears as a minor character in 
the rare Roman sources which mention the Gallic war chief, which in view of his late modern 
fame, presents us with the extent of the mythical construct of the character. Martin, 
Vercingétorix, p. 230. 
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became an additional theme in imperial propaganda, to the point that in 1866, a 
seven metre high statue of Vercingetorix was erected, supposedly under the traits of 
the emperor himself. The caption on the pedestal of the statue reads: 
“'La Gaule unie  
Formant une seule nation  
Animée d'un même esprit  
Peut défier l'univers' 
Vercingétorix aux Gaulois assemblés (César, De Bello Gallico, VII, 29) 
Napoléon III, Empereur des Français, à la mémoire de Vercingétorix”357 
Behind the voice of Caesar,358 Napoleon III addresses the French people, warning 
against voices of dissent and promoting a national unity behind the imperial 
enterprise. As historian Paul M. Martin notes, the French empire was indeed 
“defying the universe” with colonial projects across the globe.359 The internal unity 
justified by the expansion of the empire echoes the centrality of empire in the 
unification of Britain. The main difference between the unifying aspect of the 
empire prior to the nineteenth century is precisely nationalism, i.e. the will to unite 
the entire population, and not simply the elites, behind the imperial enterprise, as it 
                                                 
357 “'The whole of Gaul united/ Forming one nation/ Animated by the same spirit/ Can defy the 
universe'/ Vercingetorix to the gathered Gauls (Caesar,  De Bello Gallico, VII, 29)/ Napoleon III, 
Emperor of the French, to the memory of Vercingetorix.” 
358 Classical translations of the text of Caesar read an indirect speech attributed to Vercingetorix of 
which the meaning is quite different from the quote on the statue, and does not formally contain 
the term “nation”. E.g.: “[he] would create a general unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, 
the union of which not even the whole earth could withstand, and that he had it already almost 
effected.” Caius Julius Caesar, "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries, 7, 29, W. A. 
Macdevitt [trans.], E-Book, Project Guntenberg, 2004 [1915], <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache 
/epub/10657/pg10657.html> [accessed 21.12.2010]  
359 In Crimea against the Ottoman Empire, in far east Asia (China, Cambodia), in the Pacific (New 
Caledonia), in Africa (across Senegal to the Red Sea), in Mexico in support of Emperor 
Maximilian and in support of the Polish insurrection against the Russian Empire. Martin, 
Vercingétorix, pp. 231-232. For an historical account on national imperialisms in the late 
nineteenth century, see Henri Wesseling, Les empires coloniaux européens, 1815-1919, Patrick 
Grilli [trans.], Paris, Gallimard, 2009 [2004], esp. pp. 235-246. 
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is expressed in the adaptation of Caesar's quote by Napoleon III, signed Emperor of 
the French (people).360 
Although the invention of the Second Empire, the myth of Vercingetorix and the 
Gallic ancestry of the French people would become truly national under the Third 
Republic (1870-1940) and the creation of “National Education” curricula 
(l'Education nationale). But while Napoleon III combined the Roman and the Gallic 
themes, propaganda and education in the Third Republic would focus on “our 
ancestors the Gauls” (nos ancêtres les Gaulois),361 a saying of the sole history 
textbook of the French Third and Fourth Republics which would be taught to six 
generations in the Republic and across the French empire.362 
The theme of the savage or barbarian hero representing the core values of the nation 
appears in nearly all nineteenth century nationalisms. When particular national 
histories have a connection to ancient Roman history, these heroic figures are often 
praised for their opposition or resistance to the Roman Empire. Lieux de mémoire as 
statues or textbooks abound to institute their national significations.363 In other cases 
and also in addition, medieval or even more recent figures are erected as national 
heroes. But while the mythologized historical figures represent the people, in many 
cases the state itself is also personified by allegorical figures. These often female 
                                                 
360 The denomination is significant as prior to the constitutional monarchy instituted by the first 
stage of the French Revolution in 1791-1792, the official title of the rulers was “King of France” 
(Roi de France) Louis XVI was the first king to be have the official title constitutionally 
changed to “King of the French” (Roi des Français). King Louis-Philippe (1830-1848) would be 
the second and last King of the French. Napoleon Bonaparte would become the first Empereur 
des Français. 
361 The original text reads “our forefathers, the Gauls” (nos pères, les Gaulois), Ernest Lavisse ; 
Histoire de France, cours élémentaire Paris, Armand Colin, 1913, p. 20. 
362 Martin, Vercingétorix, pp. 236-237. It is also curious to note how after the military defeat of 
Napoleon III at Sedan in 1870 against Bismarck, which in a near misunderstanding allowed the 
proclamation of the Republic, the image of Vercingetorix turns away from the glorious imperial 
image to the image of the resisting hero, ready to sacrifice his life for his fatherland (patrie) with 
depictions suggesting Christ-like analogies. At the same time, the preference of state propaganda 
for the Gallic hero (instead of Joan of Arc or of the Frankish king Clovis) translates the 
anticlericalism of republican institutions. See Martin,  Vercingétorix, pp. 233-237. 
363 Among others, we can mention the Boudica (or Boadicea) in British nationalism, whose statue 
Boadicea and her Daughters created in the late nineteenth century can be found in London not 
far from Westminster, and also Arminius (Armin or Hermann) in German nationalism, who is 
commemorated by the Hermannsdenkmal (the monument of Herman) in the Teutoburg Forest, 
the presumed site of the victory of Germanic tribes over three Roman legions.  
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personifications are less often than historical figures the primary theme in national 
realms of memory. Along with other national symbols – like the cockerel in France, 
the lion in Britain or the eagle in Poland – they often appear as secondary elements 
on commemorative monuments and replace the effigies of traditional rulers, notably 
on coins and stamps.364 The French Marianne is the classic example of such an 
allegorical figure, officially representing the French Republic since the early years 
of the Third Republic. 
The allegory for the British Empire, Britannia, was revived under Queen Victoria 
(1837-1901) and the “new imperialism” of Britain in the late nineteenth century.365 
Historian Paul Ward writes about the allegory of Britain: 
“Britannia is an ambiguous figure, in that she is seen to carry weapons for her 
own defence, but the centrality of a female figure encourages men to her 
defence. On order to love one's country one must assign to that country features 
worth defending; the least problematic way to define the embodiment of the 
nation as its women and children which men can defend.”366 
What Ward elaborates further is the gendered representation of the nation to which 
these female allegories contribute to institute. The different roles attributed to men 
and women in nationalist imaginaries are representative of a traditional social 
conservatism. The services to the nation expected from the citizens – only men at the 
time – can best be summed up in military service, either in defence of the nation or 
to contribute to its expansion.367 Women, for their part, are expected to be obedient 
and to serve those who would readily sacrifice their lives for the glory of the 
nation.368 
                                                 
364 On realms of memory see Chapter 1, Part 2.1 and on commemorative monuments see Chapter 2, 
Part 1.2 of the present work. 
365 Paul Ward, Britishness since 1870, London, Routledge, 2004, p.38. At the time the monarchy 
was also redesigned  for the era of nationalism with an updated notion of “national duty”, Ward, 
Britishness, p. 95. See also F. Harcourt, “Gladstone, monarchism and the “new” imperialism, 
1868-1874”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 14, 1985, pp. 20-51. 
366 Ward, Britishness, p. 38. 
367 In the case of France, see Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 292-302. 
368 Ward, Britishness, pp. 38-42. For a further inquiry in gender and nationalism, see Yuval-Davis, 
Gender and Nation. For an introductory theoretical overview, see Özkirmli, Theories of 
Nationalism, pp. 203-211  
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This gendered demarcation within the nation presents us with the fluctuating aspect 
of the line between citizenship and nationality, embedded in the ambivalence of the 
terms of nationalism. While sovereignty resides in the unifying notion of “people”, 
citizenship (in the sense of political belonging) and nationality (in the sense of 
cultural belonging) have been a line of tension since the formulation of popular 
sovereignty, both for gender and social groups.369 While the integration of women 
within the political nation – as far as European states are concerned – would be a 
long struggle throughout the twentieth century, social pressures for political 
recognition from working classes had increased in the course of the nineteenth 
century. Across the western hemisphere, what was more often termed patriotism was 
increasingly used as “a means of damping down potential conflicts within the urban, 
industrial society.”370  
In the course of the nineteenth century, national  imaginaries had built up to the 
point that nationalist discourses could pacify the domestic fronts by directing the 
attention either to the formation of state institutions or to the expansion of the 
already existing state. Until 1914, this dynamics produced in Europe conflicts of 
borders between imperial and national states (and also would-be nations) which 
nevertheless did not hinder many European states from directing their efforts to the 
colonialist expansion. But on the eve of the Great War, the construction of 
“peoplehood” across Europe, with its systematic calls to arms, and the expansionist 
policies of states, conflated in what could also be conceived as the first major series 
of conflicts which would shape the European order of nations. 
3. Modelled Territories 
Until the nationalist education was put to the test of mass mobilisation in the First 
World War, the dynamics of aligning the construction of nationhood with existing 
(or struggling to exist) state structures was predominantly the source of territorial 
                                                 
369 See the enlightening study by Dominique Colas, Citoyenneté et nationalité, Paris, Gallimard, 
2004 [2000]. 
370 Ward, Britishness, p. 95. Howard Zinn relates the systematic use of the “patriotic card” in 
governmental practices in the United-States. See e.g. Zinn, A People's History of the United-
States, pp. 68, 295, 297, 363. 
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conflicts. For the colonialist nation-states, these conflicts were not extensive to the 
point of preventing their expansion across the globe. The aftermath of the First 
World War saw the collapse of the territorial European empires and is often 
presented in this perspective, focusing on the collapse of the Austrian, Ottoman and 
Russian empires, although the British empire and the French Republic also revisited 
their territorial claims. From the perspective of nationalism, it is concurrently one of 
the most dramatic and prolific periods the creation and consolidation of the order of 
nation-states across Europe. 
In the case of the British Empire, Irish nationalism would formulate the most evident 
contention of Britishness and British territorial claims. The efforts of the Irish 
nationalists would eventually lead to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, a 
self-governing dominion of the British Empire, before becoming the independent 
Republic of Ireland in 1949. But the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1922 also resulted in the 
partition of the island of Ireland, which meant the creation of a unique international 
terrestrial border between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the 
only one to date in the British Isles. The question of Northern Ireland would prove 
much more complicated to solve.371 The partition was perceived as the solution for 
the British state not only to maintain its interests in the region but to preserve the 
rights of its loyal citizens. This idea is symptomatic of the imperialist but also 
nationalist modes of thinking.372 Both sides were considering the practical integrity 
of their national imaginings, or in other words, the territorialisation of their 
respective national ideas and interests. The partition embodies not only the balance 
of material power, but of symbolic power as well, between the two nations. 
Although the Irish claim appears as recognised, the British state relativises its 
                                                 
371 One of the consequences of the treaty was the breaking of the Irish civil war (1922-1923) 
between those who opposed the treaty – defending a integral nationalist agenda – and the forces 
of the new Irish state. Later, the so-called “troubles” in Northern Ireland (1960s – 1990s) would 
have consequences across the British and Irish states. See John McGarry [ed.], Northern Ireland 
and the Divided World: The Northern Ireland conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
372 Britain would later apply the ill-fated formula to British India in 1947, partitioning its colony 
between what would become the independent states of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
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domination, preventing the Irish project of national liberation to reach its ideal 
application. 
For Polish nationalists, all efforts were increasingly directed to the creation of a 
modern Polish state, which entailed a promotion of the various nationalist ideas 
across the Polish-speaking territories and even more the recognition of the validity 
of the Polish claim to sovereignty by the powerful traditional allies of the Polish 
nationalists.373 The opportunity for the Polish national movement also presented 
itself in the turmoil of the First World War. The material and symbolic conjunctures 
had certainly built up throughout the long nineteenth century enough to provide the 
necessary support for the national movement to succeed. But as Davies remarks, the 
Republic of Poland “created itself in the void left by the collapse of three 
partitioning powers.”374 The combination of circumstances resulted in the creation of 
a Polish state different from any of the projects which had been prepared either by 
Polish nationalists or any other of the various constructs projected by the 
neighbouring forces.375 
The newly created state had yet no recognised borders. After the Posnanian War with 
Germany, which was an outgrowth of the world conflict, only provisions for its 
western border with Germany were established by the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919.376 The new Republic faced simultaneous opposition on all other fronts against 
all the other newly established states (Ukraine, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and 
Soviet Russia).377 The conflicts involving Poland for the establishment of borders of 
the new order in Central and Eastern Europe lasted until 1925. The core of these 
dramatic years was certainly in the years of the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921) at 
                                                 
373 Predominantly France, but also Britain. Bafoil, La Pologne, pp. 56-59. 
374 Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 291. 
375 The main Polish project was Dmowski's, who with the National committee in Paris, lobbied the 
Allied governments for the creation of a client state of Russia. The Bolsheviks also had plans to 
construct a “Red Bridge” with revolutionary Germany. There were also various projects for a 
puppet state put forward in the preceding years by pre-Soviet Russia, Germany and Austria.  See 
Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, pp. 291-292. 
376 The conflict around the German-Polish border was not settled until the Silesian Convention of 
1922 in Geneva. 
377 For a detailed account see Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, pp. 292-298. 
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which time the Polish military victory validated the claim for Polish independence, 
both domestically and internationally. The battle of Warsaw in August 1920 would 
later be known as the “Miracle of the Vistula” (Cud nad Wisłą), the symbol of the 
national military successes, granting the leader of the Polish army and leader of the 
provisional government since 1918, Józef Piłsudski, the status of national hero.378 
The liberal-democracies of the West were relieved by the resolution of the Polish-
Soviet war in favour to their ally, which the following quasi-mythological 
formulation by Lord D'Abernon, the contemporary British Ambassador in Berlin, 
sums up :  
“The Battle of Tours saved our ancestors from the Yoke of the Koran; it is 
probable that the Battle of Warsaw saved Central, and parts of Western Europe 
from a more subversive danger – the fanatical tyranny of the Soviet.”379 
With the issue of borders stabilised, the Second Republic of Poland then faced a 
different but equally fundamental problem: the integration, both material and 
symbolic of a large territory which covered the three territorial partitions and their 
respective administrations but also large and numerous ethnic minorities 
(representing nearly one third of the population). Under the rallying call of 
“Polishness” (Polskość), the leading circles of the state were “unashamedly 
nationalist.”380 But despite the radically and even extreme nationalist policies of the 
Republic throughout the inter-war period,381 scarce were the resources, material and 
symbolical to permanently institute these policies. They also faced ideological 
opposition; in particular from Ukrainian nationalists who had seen their project fail 
to the favour of the Polish state. The main factors which provided the conflictual 
                                                 
378 Józef Piłsudski represented one of the alternative formulations to Roman Dmowski's ethnic and 
catholic project of Polish national restoration, which was based on the idea of a “Greater 
Poland” inspired by the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. See Bafoil, La Pologne, pp. 87-93. 
379 Lord D'Abernon, The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of World History, London, 1931, p. 9, quoted in 
Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 297. This also presents us with another reproduction of 
a transcultural myth for the Polish nationalist myth of the “bulwark of Christendom”, which 
dates back to the the political discourse of Polish nobles in the seventeenth century, see J. 
Urwanowicz, “La Pologne, rempart de la chrétienté. Note sur une mentalité dans la deuxième 
moitié du XVII siècle”, Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce, Vol. 29, Warsaw, 1984, pp. 185-199. 
380 Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 298.  
381 The central ideological formulation was called Sanacja (sanation, or healing), which with  
Piłsudski, defined the policies of the Polish state in the primacy of national unity.  
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Polish society a reason for maintaining a form of cohesion, were to be found – as it 
often is – in the political evolution in the neighbouring states. In the 1930s, “the 
repellent prospect of incorporation into Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia gave all 
Polish citizens, irrespective of their differences, a strong sense of common 
interest.”382 These fears would eventually prove to be justified as Poland would 
succumb to both its neighbours in 1939.  
Regarding France, although there is only one disputed international border to the 
east with Germany, the effects of this dispute run from 1870 to 1945 and play a 
substantial role in the ideological evolution both in France and Germany, as well as 
in the major conflicts which would shake the global order. After Napoleon III was 
defeated at Sedan in 1870, the question of Alsace-Lorraine defined the bilateral 
relations, but also their respective national imaginaries. The defeat at Sedan was 
briefly presented as the repetition of the defeat at Alésia in 52 BCE, the Prussians 
having replaced the Romans.383 A passage form the 1944 Instructions for British 
Servicemen in France, aimed at bolstering morale and justifying the reasons behind 
the war, expresses the common British and French nationalist outlook on the history 
of the “North-East Frontier” of France:  
“It is this frontier which the Germans crossed in 1870, in 1914 and again in 
1940 – there are people in France who have suffered three German invasions!; 
and it was because of this frontier, and, of course, because of German 
ambitions and German strength, that the French were forced to introduce 
conscription as long ago as at the time of the Revolution [...]”384 
A curious way of explaining one of the core features of the construction of 
nationhood in France, regardless of the imperialist “ambitions” of the French 
empires. The rest of the passage speaks for itself. The idea of France as a model of 
civic nationalism was properly constructed in the decades following Sedan in 
contrast to the claims laid by Germany on the Alsace-Lorraine region which were of 
an ethnic, or more precisely, of a linguistic nature. Cultural arguments were in 
                                                 
382 Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 304. 
383 Martin, Vercingetorix, p. 233. 
384  Instructions for British Servicemen in France 1944, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, 
2005 (pages not numbered). 
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disfavour of the French claim on the region. The consequence was a switch from the 
traditional view of the formation of nations, which amalgamated history, language, 
race and politics, into a linearity focused on the idea of freedom – without in fact 
refuting any of the other arguments.  
The best example is certainly Ernest Renan who is still often uncritically cited as 
having written the paragon expression of civic nationalism in his famous conference 
“What is a Nation?”: “an everyday plebiscite.”385 Tzetan Todorov has analysed the 
change in Renan's approach as the original formulation of the opposition between 
civic and ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, this formulation consists in retaining a 
deeply rooted ambivalence of the “nation of free choice”, as promoted by Renan, 
and appears more of a construct of the mind than the expression of any social reality. 
“Mais ce n'est qu'ainsi que Renan parvient à revendiquer l'Alsace-Lorraine 
pour la France, sans pour autant renoncer à ses principes [humanistes]: selon 
tous les autres critères – maintenant répudiés – les Alsaciens et les Lorrains 
peuvent être plus proche de l'Allemagne ; mais leur volonté est de rester 
français. De cette manière, on valorise ce que les hommes ont de plus humains 
; se fonder sur les déterminismes divers, ou sur l'histoire, revient à privilégier 
ce qu'ils ont en commun avec les animaux. En somme selon Renan, on a le 
choix entre deux conceptions de la nation. Ou bien on la pense à la manière 
d'une espèce animale, et donc d'une race […]. Ou bien on définit la nation 
comme le consentement volontaire de ses sujets […].”386 
Todorov notes that Renan's philosophy goes against the tide of the dominant ideas of 
his time, including his own before Alsace-Lorraine became an issue of national 
integrity.387 We can also note that it goes against the dominant beliefs of the time 
regarding what constitutes the humanity of humanity.388 But notwithstanding the 
                                                 
385 “L'existence d'une nation est […] un plébiscite de tous les jours.” Renan, “Qu'est-ce qu'une 
nation?”, Chapter 3.   
386 “But it is only in this way that Renan manages to claim Alsace-Lorraine for France, without the 
need to renounce his [humanist] principles: according to all the other criteria – now repudiated – 
the inhabitants of Alsace and of Lorraine may be more related to Germany; but their will is to 
remain French. In this way, what is given value is what is the most human in men. To rely on 
various determinisms, or on history, means privileging what men have in common with animals. 
In short, Renan presents us with a choice between two conceptions of the nation. Either we think 
it up as a sort of animal species, that is, a race […]. Or we define the nation as the voluntary 
consent of its subjects [...].” Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres: Le réflexion française sur la 
diversité humaine, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1989, p. 304. 
387 Todorov, Nous et les autres, p. 297. 
388 See Chapter 2, Part 2.1 of the present work. 
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differences, Renan's ambiguous and certainly idealist conceptualisations continue to 
reflect the dominant positivist trends of late nineteenth century science. To resolve 
all the epistemological and indeed practical problems of the translation of individual 
will into a collective will, Renan turns to history.389 Despite having relegated it to 
the rank of the “determinisms” and savagery of the animal kingdom, history – 
meaning national history, with its heroic and glorious past and the cult of forefathers, 
etc. – appears once more as the definitive criterion of what would, ironically and up 
to this date, be praised as “civic” nationalism. 
4. Rationalised Races 
The Scientist Turn 
A focus on Renan's thought brings us to another important set of significations 
around the term of “race.” Similarly to the term “nation”, “race” would be given a 
refined signification in the process of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.390 
Racism, considered fundamentally as the belief in the division of humankind in 
different species, has certainly always been part of social imaginaries under one 
form or another.391 What is historically significant is the basis on which such 
divisions were performed, both symbolically and in practice, which have 
systematically, although not necessarily, lead to being conflated with xenophobia. 
But as we shall see, with all its variants, racism has never stopped being a “true 'total 
social phenomenon'.”392  
In the ancient régimes, the dominant belief, particularly on the side of the elites, was 
that race and class (or cast) were synonymous. The “blue blood” and fair 
complexion of the nobles could not be conceived as having anything in common 
                                                 
389 Todorov, Nous et les autres, p. 305. 
390 Renan, in spite of his humanistic predispositions, elaborates a concept of cultural race, or 
“linguistic race”, which applies – with all the contradictions it implies – to an ethnic conception 
of the nation. See Todorov, Nous et les autres, pp. 195-202. 
391 See Castoriadis “Reflexions sur le racisme”, pp. 32-36, in Le monde morcelé, pp. 29-46.  
392 Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?”, pp. 17-28, in Balibar and Wallerstein, Race, Nation and 
Class, p. 17. 
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with the dark and dirty complexions of those who worked the earth.393 Later, in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, under the aegis of Darwinism and its 
somewhat perverted by-products such as social Darwinism and scientific racism,394 
race was provided with a much refined and rationalised signification, similar in 
quality and range to that of “nation.” It would thus be impossible in the frame of this 
work to elaborate in depth the historical case of racism.395 Nevertheless, the 
dialectical relationship between racism and nationalism makes it necessary to briefly 
clarify two points of articulation between the two grids of significations which have 
had major consequences in the evolution of nationalism. 
The first of these points of articulation is the ideology of National-Socialism, which 
although often presented as an extreme nationalism, is primarily an extremely 
rationalised racism within the framework of nationalism.396 The Nuremberg Race 
Laws of 1935 stand out as the most obvious institutionalisation of the scientific 
racism and anti-Semitism of Nazism.397 Combining elements of eugenics, medicine, 
xenophobia and scientific racism, the psychotic nationalism of Nazi Germany 
established a strict hierarchy between populations, “races”, which were ranked in 
accordance to their inadequacy to the project of the reproduction of the pure Aryan 
race.398 In conjunction to the singularity of the Nazi regime and its ideology, it is 
also inscribed in a continuum of actions, reactions and retro-actions, which have 
                                                 
393 Throughout the Medieval Ages, a dark complexion referred to the peasantry more than it 
referred to the Moors for instance. But in the age of colonialism and nationalism, the 
signification was readjusted for the colonised non-white populations, which expressed the 
superiority of the white race, with all its “shades.”  
394 On social Darwinism, see Chapter 2, Part 2.1 of the present work.  
395 For an introductory inquiry into the 'subtleties' of racism, see e.g. Michel Wieviorka, Le racisme, 
une introduction, Paris, Editions la Découverte, 1998; Alana Lentin and Ronit Lentin [eds.], 
Race and State, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006. 
396 These racialist and anti-Semitic elements, independently of all connections and the particular 
iniquity of the Italian fascist regime of Benito Mussolini, would distinguish historical Fascism 
from national-socialism, at least until the institution of anti-Semitic legislation in Fascist Italy in 
1938. Renzo De Felice, Brève histoire du fascisme, Jérôme Nicols [trans.], Paris, Editions Louis 
Audibert, 2002 [2000], p. 108. 
397 The 1935 “Chart to describe the Nuremberg law” alone suffices to get a sense of the tragic 
pseudo-rational racism of the Nazi regime. A digital copy of the original chart held at the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection is available online at the Wikipedia website: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nuremberg_laws.jpg> [last accessed 12.01.2011] 
398 Enzo Colloti, Hitler and Nazism, Valerio Lintner [trans.], New York, Interlink Books, 1999 
[1995], pp. 70-78. 
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involved a wide array of what constitutes the formation of the modern welfare state. 
In an enlightening contribution, Detlev J.K. Peukert analyses how Nazi ideology 
answered to the crisis in the growth of the modern welfare state during the Weimar 
Republic. Although a deviant monstrosity, national-socialism appears as a 
redefinition of utopian social policies associated with the welfare state. It 
symbolically shifted the idea of health or purity to the social body (the Volk), which 
could survive the deaths of its individual members. But the process of social 
purification requested the destruction of all components which were defined as sick 
or deviant, indeed not even human, by the Nazi regime.399 The end of the Second 
World War led to the relativisation of scientific racism and the banalisation of 
nationalism in European states. In the decades after the fall of the Third Reich, the 
welfare policies, particularly in Britain and France, would still be imbued in a form 
of utopian nationalism – in which the destructive racism of national-socialism was 
replaced in reaction to Nazism by a humanistic paradigm – on the role of the state in 
caring for the nation. 
Liberated Poland did not have the luxury of the western states to implement such 
welfare policies. Its territory having shifted to the west by a few hundred kilometres, 
the central problem in the region was the definition of belonging. The solutions 
proved to be harsh and pragmatic, in part as a reaction to the violence of the Nazi 
occupation, and focused on ethnic and linguistic considerations which recall the 
treatment of these questions in the aftermath of the First World War.400 The result 
was a massive forced migration across the new borders which resulted from the 
remodelling of the states in Central and Eastern Europe. In the chaos of the 
aftermath of the war, all states wondered who their nationals were and how to sort 
out the populations.401 As the methods can best be described as expulsions, what the 
whole process illustrates is the nationalistic mindset of European authorities which 
                                                 
399 Detlev J.K. Peukert, “The Genesis of the 'Final Solution' from the Spirit of Science”, David F. 
Crew [ed.], Nazism and German society, 1933-1945, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 274-299, p. 
285.  
400 Pierre-Frédéric Weber, Le triangle RFA-RDA-Pologne (1961-1975): Guerre froide et 
normalisation des rapports Germano-Polonais, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2007, p. 215. 
401 Weber, Le triangle RFA-RDA-Pologne, p. 217. 
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could not fathom any other means of answering the questions at hand, but by 
establishing a semblance of homogeneous populations within their respective 
territories. The fact that throughout the twentieth century, and in fact across the 
globe, the vast majority of conflicts have been irreverent of any other possible 
solution, however complex, proves how the core doctrine of nationalism – one state 
for one people defined accordingly – is deeply entrenched in the imaginaries of the 
twentieth century.402 For the Polish authorities and its neighbours the objective set 
out in resolving their issue with Germany was fairly straightforward,403 and 
contained a sense of retribution for the war, which Pierre-Frédéric Weber's dramatic 
analysis expresses: 
“On peut polémiquer sur les intentions respectives, les méthodes employées au 
cours des étapes successives de ce processus, le but initial n'en reste pas moins 
irréfutable : résoudre de façon totale et définitive ce qui était alors perçu 
comme le problème de la présence allemande à l'est.” [emphasis added]404 
The Cultural Turn 
The second and final point of articulation leads us to briefly consider the post-World 
War II evolution of the idea of nationalism in Europe. While the term of nationalism 
became less acceptable in reaction the its totalitarian take over in the preceding 
decades. The political formations which still positively referred to nationalism where 
either the liberation movements in the colonies, or the regional nationalist 
movements and the far-right wing parties in established nation-states. This further 
evolved into the banal nationalism analysed by Billig and presented in the first 
chapter.405 
                                                 
402 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa after the abolition of the Apartheid 
regime stands as one famous exception, which despite its shortcomings, presents us with 
alternative attempts. 
403 In the case of the German-Polish relations after the Second World War, the division between the 
Soviet and American spheres of influence added to the complexity of the situation.  
404 “There can be a controversy about the respective intentions or the methods employed in the 
successive steps of the process [of expulsions], but the original objective remains obvious: 
resolve in a total and definitive manner what was then perceived as the problem of German 
presence in the east.” Weber, Le triangle RFA-RDA-Pologne, p. 222. 
405 See Chapter 1, Part 2.3 of the present work. 
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A concurrent evolution in racist xenophobia was informed by the banalisation or 
relativisation of the traditional nationalist discursive forms. Since scientific racism 
had formally become untenable, the evolution of racism came to be analysed by the 
1980s as “neo-racism”, “cultural racism” or as “differentialist racism.” This new 
racism apparently suppresses the hierarchical component dear to scientific racism, 
presenting in a reversed relativism the equality and hence incompatibility of the 
holistic cultures it takes for granted.406 Balibar, in inquiring how 'new' this racism 
really is, suggests it is rather a discursive rearrangement of long-running narratives 
of xenophobia such as modern anti-Semitism, but this could apply to social forms of 
exclusion long before the modern period.407 Balibar further elaborates how this 
reconvened racist discourse constitutes the framework in which the biological theme 
of racism is renewed. Although originally expressed in the extreme nebulae of far-
right political movements, the culturalist approach also drifts into the dominant 
neoliberal ideology: 
“This latent presence of the hierarchic theme today finds its chief expression in 
the priority accorded to the individualistic model (just as, in the previous 
period, openly inegalitarian racism, in order to postulate an essential fixity of 
racial types, had to presuppose a differentialist anthropology […]. In this way, 
we see how the return of the biological theme is permitted and with it the 
elaboration of new variants of the biological 'myth' within the framework of a 
cultural racism. Even [the] tendentially biologistic ideologies, however, depend 
fundamentally upon the 'differentialist revolution'. What they aim to explain is 
not the constitution of races, but the vital importance of cultural closures and 
traditions for the accumulation of individual aptitudes, and, most importantly, 
the 'natural' bases of xenophobia and social aggression.” [emphasis in 
original]408 
                                                 
406 We would like to argue that racism does not really apply to the range of phenomena of social 
exclusion which it usually describes, as exclusionary racism per se (the belief in human races) 
appears as only part of it and recent discoveries have established that the norm until 20,000 
years ago in the history of humanity when only our current species Homo sapiens survived, was 
the coexistence of various human races (the ill-fated Neanderthals being one the last to 
disappear), see e.g. . To our mind, xenophobia appears as a better – although far from perfect – 
term to encompass the varieties of these exclusionary practices. Given the fact that racism is 
commonly used in this overarching sense, we will retain it in the remainder for the sake of 
clarity.  
407 Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?” pp.23-24. 
408 Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?” pp.25-26. 
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Although nationalism cannot be simply associated with racism and xenophobia, we 
observe in the evolution of racist ideology the pattern of inclusion which we have 
observed in the transformation of nationalism as a dominant imaginary trend. 
Furthermore, considering the contemporary neoliberal make-up of dominant 
discourses across political institutions of established nation-states, it suggests how 
nationalism and racism combine their ambivalences and significations in the 
reproduction of the neoliberal order. The analysis of political discourses centred on 
the theme of “national identity”, which is the motivational thread in the following 
chapter, should prove enlightening in this regard.  
 – Chapter 4 – 
Contemporary Sections 
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– Part 1 – 
Political (Dis)Integrations: The Others Within 
 
1. Religious Demarcations 
Poland is widely perceived as one the 'catholic nations' of Europe, alongside Ireland 
or Spain for instance. But the importance of religion in Poland needs to be 
relativised: 
“The Catholic narrative of Polish history is far more than a recognition that 
Roman Catholicism was and is important in Poland: it is an ideologically 
loaded conceptual framework that gives specific meaning to the past and helps 
determine what is remembered and what is forgotten.”409 
It suggests, as Geneviève Zubrzycki contends, that religion has played a primary 
role only for a certain form of Polish nationalism, and further, that it did not always 
play a role for Polish nationalism.410 While the catholic community has been 
massively dominant in post-1945 Poland, the religious make-up of the populations 
in the Polish territories has always been diverse. The social and political dominance 
of Christianity in the European world was commonplace until the institution of a 
generalised form of secularism in the twentieth century. The French laicité, 
epitomised by the laws separating Church and state in 1905, is traditionally 
presented as the paradigmatic expression of secular institutionalisation. It is certainly 
epochal, but in the course of the twentieth century, constitutional and legal measures 
would be implemented across most liberal European states. In 1919, for instance, the 
newly established Republic of Poland legally recognised its minorities, granting its 
large Jewish minority political equality.411 
                                                 
409 Brian Porter, “The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History”, 
The Slavic and East European Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2001, pp. 289-299, p. 291. 
410 Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist 
Poland, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 36. 
411 In 1867 and 1869 respectively, Prussia and Austria had already granted the Jewish minorities on 
their partitions political recognition. Adam Dylewski, Les Juifs polonais, Uta Hrehorowicz 
[trans.], Bielsko Biała, Editions Pascal, 2004, pp. 14-15. 
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It would be a nationalist simplification to date the significance of Catholicism in the 
formation of the late modern Polish nation prior to the formulation of Polish 
nationalism.412 Roots can certainly be found in Sarmaticism, and the messianism of 
Polish romantic nationalism has played a definitive role in the development of a 
Polish national culture permeated with religion. But the idea of a culturally exclusive 
(and thus religiously) homogenised Polish nation was first formulated by Roman 
Dmowski.413 As a fairly accurate description of a social reality, it is a development 
of the second half the twentieth century whose causes have more to do with tragic 
policies and influences of foreign powers than with the designs of Polish reactionary 
nationalists of the first half of the twentieth century.414 
Before the partitions, the Polish-Lithuanian Republic, due to its particular tolerance, 
had throughout centuries attracted the largest Jewish community in Europe.415 In 
1939, there were 3.35 million “Poles of the Jewish faith”416 of a total population of 
about 35 million.417 More than one third of the inhabitants of Warsaw were Jewish 
citizens. In 1945, an estimated one tenth of Polish Jews had survived the Holocaust, 
and many left for Palestine or the West. What this meant for the make-up of the post-
war Polish society was the near disappearance of what had been its largest minority 
                                                 
412 This by no means aims at reducing the role of Catholicism but rather to slightly re-frame it. It is 
obvious it has played a century-old role in Polish politics, not the least considering the fact that 
the Polish state was landlocked between the German protestant states in the west and Orthodox 
Russia in the east. On the role of the Church in the nineteenth century, see Davies, God's 
Playground, Volume II, pp. 152-157 and Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, pp. 34-76. 
413 In distinction, at first, to the rather imperialist and multicultural nationalist project of the first 
president of the Second Republic, Józef Piłsudski, although both relied extensively on the ideal 
of the Polish szlachta . See Roman Dmowski, Myśli nowoczesnego polaka [Thoughts of a 
modern Pole], Wrocław, Nortom, 2008 [1933], p. 114; Bafoil, La Pologne, pp. 87-88. 
414 In the 1930s, like in many other European states, the government of Poland took a radical 
authoritative turn. What the relative republican liberalism had established in the early years of 
the Republic, prompted by the League of Nations, was replaced by more overt nationalist 
policies and the treaty on minorities was abrogated. Dylewski, Les Juifs polonais, p. 15; Davies, 
God's Playground, Volume II, p. 192. 
415 Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 176. 
416 The First Congress of the Founders of the Association of Poles of the Jewish Faith, Art. 1, 
quoted in  Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 190. For the figures, p. 194 and Dylewski, 
Les Juifs polonais, pp. 65-66. 
417 Jerzy Lukaszewski, “La population de la Pologne pendant et après la seconde guerre mondiale”, 
Revue de géographie de Lyon, Vol. 38 no.3, 1963, pp. 225-254, p. 228. 
 CHAPTER 4 – PART 1 165 
and the marginalisation of its distinctive cultural features, such as the Yiddish 
language.418  
The combination of the Nazi genocide and the expulsions of German nationals after 
the war left Polish society, for the first time in its history, in a state of relative 
homogeneity which would later be put to 'good use', so to say, by the national 
communist policies.419 Yet, taking also into consideration the creation of the nation-
state of Israel which further precipitated the emigration of Jews from Europe, we can 
observe how effective the transcultural dynamics of nationalism already was by the 
1950s.420 The Jews who remained in what had become since 1948 the People's 
Republic of Poland (Polska Reczpospolita Ludowa, PRL) were predominantly 
secular. In spite of the Stalinist claim of having resolved the question of 
nationalities, the Soviet block in general was organised according to nationalist 
principles.421 In Poland, the result of the 'Destalinisation' which followed Stalin's 
death in 1953 was national communism, a subtle compromise between symbolic 
independence and practical subordination to the Kremlin. One of the major political 
crises it faced was the crisis of 1968, which resolved itself in the clash between 
national and international affairs and resulted in an anti-Zionist policy across the 
Soviet block.422 Davies explains the absurd tragedy of the aftermath of the 1968 
crisis in Poland: 
“As a result of the disturbances of March 1968, the great majority of Poland's 
surviving Jews were forced to emigrate. In the course of a few months, the 
country's Jewish community was reduced from c. 40,000 to a mere thousand. It 
was a shameful episode which could be presented abroad as a resurgence of 
                                                 
418 By 1956, more than 95% of the 200,000 Jews who had remained in Poland after the war had 
emigrated. Dylewski, Les Juifs polonais, p. 18. 
419 According to Zubrzycki, “The Second World War and important structural changes in its 
aftermath would generalize and ossify the Polak-katolik [Pole-as-catholic] stereotype.” The 
Crosses of Auschwitz, p. 60. 
420 On Jewish nationalisms and the creation of the modern Jewish nation-state, see the ground 
breaking study by Shlomo Sand, Comment le peuple juif fut inventé? De la Bible au sionisme, 
Sivan Cohen-Wiesenfled and Levana Frenk [trans.], Paris, Arthème Fayard/Flammarion, 2008.  
421 Particularly the satellite states in central and eastern Europe. See Chapter 1, Part 1.1 of the 
present work. 
422 E.g. the 1967, the victory of Israel in the Arab-Israeli War, better known as the Six-Day War 
become a symbol of political dissidence in Poland, and pro-Israeli sympathies became anti-
Soviet expressions. Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, pp. 440-445. 
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Polish 'anti-semitism'. For if the initial wave of expellees contained a genuine 
core of ex-Stalinists and of former political criminals who had been purged 
from the Party with good reason, the purge soon turned into an undisguised 
attack on all persons of Jewish origin, irrespective of their conduct. Sadly or 
ironically, many of the victims were people who for one reason or another had 
voluntarily chosen to stay in Poland when most of their relatives and co-
religionists had left at the end of the war.”423 
Davies concludes that contrary to the traditional purges which occurred in the Soviet 
Union, “no one was actually killed.” But scars were deep both for those who had to 
leave, those who chose to leave in face of such injustice and those who remained 
behind, whose non-Jewish origins simply made them “dissidents” leading some to 
interrogation and prison cells rather than abroad. The consequences for the anti-
totalitarian movement in Poland were also dramatic: 
“Mars 1968 a sonné le désastre moral et intellectuel de la génération qui avait 
cru pouvoir contribuer à rendre le monde meilleur et remettre en cause les 
fondements du totalitarisme en projetant une vision idéalisée du marxisme.”424 
This also presents us with how deeply entrenched secular and left-wing ideologies 
were, at least in the educated classes of the time. Their failed attempt to engage a 
revision of the communist regime would eventually lead the democratic movement 
of the 1970s and 1980s to join forces with political movements under the wing of 
the Catholic Church of Poland.425 The role of the Church in providing a haven for 
political dissidence across the political spectrum and the 1978 politically significant 
election of Karol Wojtyła as Pope of the Roman Catholic Church were additional 
socio-historical significations which prompted the becoming and (self-) perception 
of the Polish society as a catholic nation.426 And yet, the situation was more 
                                                 
423 Davies, God's Playground, Volume II, p. 442-443. 
424 “March 1968 resulted in the moral and intellectual disaster of a generation which believed it 
could contribute to changing the world for better and could challenge the foundations of 
totalitarianism by projecting an idealised vision of Marxism.” Cyril Bouyeure, L'invention du 
politique: Une biographie d'Adam Michnik, Lausanne, Les Editions Noir sur Blanc, 2007, p. 
173. 
425 See for instance Adam Michnik's essay Kościół, lewica, dialog [The Church and the Left], Paris, 
Institut Littéraire, 1977, which promoted the rapprochement between the secular anti-totalitarian 
left and the Catholic institution. This dialogue was certainly decisive in the formation and 
success of Solidarność.  
426 On the relationship between the democratic dissidence and the Church see Bouyeure, 
L'invention du politique, pp. 173-195. 
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complex, having formed into a chiasmus of the different forces and institutions 
which presents all the intricacies of the traditional conceptualisation of nationalism: 
“There thus existed, under Communism, a double tension between ethnic and 
civic nationalism: that of the state's official civic discourse in contrast with its 
significant ethnic practices and/or effects, and that of the church's ethno-
religious discourse in contrast with its civic practices, since it served as the 
umbrella institution of the opposition.”427 
In the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Third Republic of 
Poland presented a rearrangement of the different parties which had joined forces 
under the unique formation which  Solidarność (“solidarity”) was. In the 
constitutionally secular state and in the face of a society developing under the 
auspices of consumerist individualism, the position of the Church has been less 
influential.428 Right to centre politicians have also often used the aura of the Church 
and of the catholic faith to attract voters.429 But more than the Church, Catholicism 
weighs heavily on contemporary Polish society as part of the larger negotiation of 
social significations. It is rarely questioned, but the questions which Adam Michnik 
regularly asks in the pages of the social-democratic daily, Gazeta Wyborcza 
(“electoral gazette”) which he founded in 1989, are symptomatic of the predicament 
of Polish society: 
“W jakiej Polsce chcemy żyć? W Polsce kalumnii, prowokacji i pogardy dla 
człowieka, w Polsce PiS, czy też w Polsce wspólnej, gdzie dla wszystkich jest 
                                                 
427 Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, p. 75. 
428 In spite of the numerous attempts to maintain its political role. The undermining of its position 
has caused a certain number of mixed reactions for church officials. The most radical, although 
marginal, are certainly the anti-Semite, nationalistic and creationist ravings of Tadeusz Rydzyk, 
a controversial priest who founded the extremist Radio Maryja (radio Marie) in 1991. As a sign 
of the more general reactionary tendency of the turn of the century, he further extended his 
media group by founding the daily Nasz Dziennik (“our daily”) and the private television 
channel Trwam (I endure). 
429 With relatively little effect, as as the case for Lech Wałęsa in the 1995 presidential elections, 
who despite his mythical personae, lost against the post-communist candidate, Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski. 
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miejsce, gdzie - mówiąc słowami poety – prawo zawsze prawo znaczy, a 
sprawiedliwość –  sprawiedliwość?”430 
Beyond the question of religion, the line of tension between the liberal and 
traditionalist imaginaries, which Michnik expresses here in his own political 
language, is certainly the deeper line of the struggle in the social negotiation of 
meaning. The popular reactions which followed the death of the right-wing 
traditionalist and populist president Lech Kaczyński in a plane crash in April 2010 
express how this line of social struggle runs both deeply and in the open.431 In the 
first days of the national week of mourning which followed the tragedy, a group of 
boy and girl scouts erected a cross in front of the presidential palace in Warsaw to 
commemorate the victims. By the time the week of mourning was over, the cross 
sparked a wild controversy between members of the public.432 A large group of 
supporters organised a round the clock vigil to ensure the cross would not be moved. 
The arguments in favour of maintaining the cross in its original location was a 
curious mixture of extreme catholic nationalism, anti-Semitism and anti Russian 
sentiment, cloaked in conspiracy theories. In interviews gathered at the time of the 
presidential elections held two months after the crash, one reads how “Poland is no 
more […]. We had Lech [Kaczyński] as president – a real Pole and a catholic, and 
they took him and murdered him.” The plural pronoun referred to, depending on the 
versions of the conspiracy theories, either the Russians or the political opponents of 
                                                 
430 “In which Poland do we want to live? In a Poland of slander, provocation and contempt for 
human individuals, in the Poland of PiS [“Law and Justice”, traditionalist right-wing party then 
in power], or in a common Poland, where there is a space for everyone, where – to speak like the 
poet – the law always means the law, and justice means justice?” Michnik, “Długi cień 
oszczerstwa” [the long shadow of slander], Gazeta Wyborcza, 19.10.2007. In 1989, in the first 
issues of the daily, he already formulated these questions in a nearly identical way, Bouyeure, 
L'invention du politique, p. 349.See also Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz, p. 76. 
431 In a tragica turn of history, Lech Kaczyński, alongside 88 Polish state officials, died in a plane 
crash at Smolensk in Russia on the 10 April 2010, on their way to commemorate the massacre of 
Katyń by the NKVD, the Soviet political police, in 1940.  
432 As Zubrzycki's analysis shows (focusing on another controversial event of placing crosses at 
Auschwitz by ultranationalist catholics in 1998), the symbol of the cross had become in the 
times of PRL, alongside other signs, part of a nationalist iconography “borrowed from Romantic 
messianism. […] together with other symbols, it created a language to express rebellion against 
the authorities.” The Crosses of Auschwitz, p. 69. 
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Kaczyński who some even portrayed as “Jews in disguise”.433 People in the street 
reacted in various ways to such displays of obscure defeatism, their reactions 
ranging from disbelief to rejection, which at times resolved into violence. 
Beyond the symbol of the tragedy, it also came to represent what many have termed 
a “street war” between its proponents and opponents.434 The rows caused by the 
question of the cross were also fuelled by the way the issue was brought up on the 
political stage. On many occasions, it became a political weapon in the speeches of 
Jarosław Kaczyński – twin brother to the deceased president and candidate to his 
succession.435 The attacks were primarily aimed against the other main presidential 
candidate, Bronisław Komorowski from the centre-right liberal party, Civic Platform 
(Platforma Obywatelska, PO):  
“Jeśli Bronisław Komorowski usunie krzyż spod Pałacu Prezydenckiego będzie 
jasne, kim jest, i po której jest stronie, w różnego rodzaju sporach dotyczących 
polskiej historii i polskich powiązań. Ten krzyż to symbol, można go będzie 
przenieść, jeśli stanie tam pomnik. Każdy, kto uważa inaczej dopuszcza się 
moralnego nadużycia.”436 
Placing the question on the level of morality can be interpreted to be a populist 
touch. The reference to Polish history and its implied 'correct' interpretation signify 
the historical demarcations in the struggle for the imaginary institution of a literally 
civil society and secular institutions in the face of reactionary forces. It also 
confirms Brian Porter's analyses quoted at the beginning of this section, on the 
relationship between Catholicism and Polish nationalism as “an ideologically loaded 
conceptual framework” which determines a particular vision of Polishness.  
                                                 
433 “Mieliśmy prezydenta Lecha - prawdziwego Polaka i katolika, to go wzięli i zamordowali. A jak 
po północy wygrywał wybory jego dzielny brat Jarosław, drugi katolik i Polak, to je sfałszowali. 
Polski już nie ma”, Dominika Olszewska, “To już jest wojna pod krzyżem” [war has broke under 
the cross], Gazeta Wyborcza, 15.07.2010. 
434 See previous footnote. 
435 He also was the first prime minister under the presidency of his brother in a coalition 
government (2005-2007) with the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR, ultra-
catholic) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona, left-wing populist). He is also the co-founder and 
president of the PiS party.   
436 “If Bronisław Komorowski removes the cross from under the Presidential palace, it will be clear 
who he [really] is, and on which side he is on, on a number of contested issues related to Polish 
history and Polish ties. This cross is a symbol, it will be possible to place it somewhere else, if a 
monument stand in its place. Anyone who thinks otherwise commits a moral abuse.” Jarosław 
Kaczyński, TVN24 (news channel), 16.07.2010. 
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Eventually, after many discursive tribulations, the social negotiations around the 
cross commemorating the victims of the presidential plane crash was resolved by 
moving it from the presidential palace to the nearby church of Saint Anne in 
November 2010. 
2. Marginal Assimilations 
The question of religion in contemporary state discourse across the globe has 
become dominant enough to be described as a return of religion. In France as well as 
in Britain, it is partly coated with 'Islamophobia' or 'Arabophobia'.437 This has 
become explicit since the terrorist attacks of 2001 in New York and the bombings of 
2004 and 2005 in Madrid and London respectively. But the discursive trend has been 
steadily growing since the previous decades in most European societies.438 In 
islamophobic discourses in post-colonial centres such as France and Britain (we 
could also refer to the Netherlands or Spain), the role of religion replaces the 
traditional role played by anti-Semitism.439 These countries, contrary to Poland, are 
immigration countries and the question of immigration has concurrently become part 
of the dominant political and social issues in the post-Cold war world. 
As we mentioned before, the strict secularism of the French state (laicité) has been 
institutionalised since 1905, and although regularly debated,440 it prevents in theory 
any form of ostentatious display of religion, especially from state officials. French 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy, who has been the herald of the theme of 'national 
identity' since the presidential campaign of 2007, has also become the first president 
                                                 
437 As Balibar notes, there is a “systematic confusion of 'Arabness' and 'Islamicism'.” “Is there a 
'Neo-Racism'?” p. 24 For a study which presents how the Muslim minority, contrary to the 
dominant discourse, is culturally well integrated in French society, see Jonathan Laurence and 
Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, 
Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 
438 E.g. Thomas Deltombe, L'islam imaginaire. La construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en 
France, 1975 - 2005, Paris, La Découverte, 2005. 
439 Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?” p. 24. This nevertheless does not mean the disappearance of 
anti-Semitisim, but only its reduction or its reframing as a less dominant discursive formation.  
440 One of the major debates since the 1990s has been the controversy about the wearing of the 
hijab in public institutions, such as schools. The “anti-scarf” discourses in the debate were often 
representative of the confusion of Islamicism with Arabness Balibar mentions. For a critical 
inquiry, see: Pierre Tevanian, Le voile médiatique. Un faux débat: “l'affaire du foulard 
islamique”, Raisons d'agir, 2005. 
 CHAPTER 4 – PART 1 171 
to have breached the rule of secularism expected from someone in his position.441 
The relationship Sarkozy establishes between religion and culture contributes to the 
generally culturalist promotion of national identity. Before his election as President, 
when he was a state minister and president of the major right-wing party, the Union 
for a Popular Movement (Union pour un mouvement populaire, UMP), Sarkozy 
published a book entitled Le République, les religions, l'espoir (The Republic, 
religions, hope), in which he expresses with little inhibition, his ideological take on 
these topics. Conversely, this formal ideology constitutes the basis for his culturalist 
promotion of the French national identity: 
“Je note que les juifs non pratiquants sont souvent présents dans les 
synagogues pour Kippour, que les musulmans non pratiquants 
considèrent que l’islam fait également partie de leur identité. Pourquoi ? 
Parce que nombre d’entre eux se sentent juifs ou musulmans dans le 
regard de l’autre. Le reniement ou l’indifférence à l’endroit d’un 
engagement religieux revient presque à se désolidariser d’une 
communauté de naissance, comme si on abandonnait un héritage, une 
facette de sa vie”442 
This passage reads of the particularistic or 'ethnicist' underpinnings of Sarkozy's 
vision of culture. The concept of “community of birth” echoes the essentialist 
concepts of the ultra-traditionalists on the far right of the political spectrum, 
although it is certainly also, if not more directly, inspired by American neo-
                                                 
441 The signing of the cross by the President on several occasions during official visits in 2007 and 
2010 at the Vatican, created a controversy without actual consequences. On the latest 
presidential visit and reactions by French politicians, see “La visite de Sarkozy au Vatican et ses 
signes de croix font des vagues”, AFP, LePoint.fr, 10.10.2010. 
442 “I notice that non-practising Jews often attend synagogues for [Yom] Kippur , that non-
practising Muslims consider Islam to be part of their identity. Why? Because most of them feel 
Jewish or Muslim in other people's opinion. The denial or indifference towards a religious 
commitment nearly amounts to dissociating oneself from a community of birth, as if one 
abandoned a heritage, a facet of one's life.” Nicolas Sarkozy, La République, les religions, 
l’espérance, Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 2004, p. 21. For a critical overview of the book, see 
Richard Monvoisin, “Le Sarkozy sans peine. Vol. 1 : la république, les religions, l’espérance”, 
<http://vigilance-laique.over-blog.com/ext/http://infokiosques.net/imprimersans2.php3?id_article=295>, 
[last accessed 30.07.2010].    
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conservatism.443 This ideological expression of ethnic communitarianism sheds a 
new light on the displays of religiosity by Sarkozy during his presidency. His faith – 
however true – becomes utilised as a set of signs expressing a 'feeling' towards the 
religious community which is stronger than the political function. These signs are 
also without doubt, in the political play for issue ownership, part of a political 
spectacle directed to voters for whom the Christian religion is a fundamental value. 
The passage further suggests that the French Republic is essentially of the Christian 
cultural stock, which the remainder of the book confirms, and that in return, the 
Jewish and Muslim communities are not part of this primordial essence.   
Sarkozy's further utilisation of cultural themes was made even more explicit during 
the presidential campaign of 2007. In the campaign programme, entitled Mon 
Projet: Ensemble tout devient possible (My project: together, everything is possible), 
the double standards of Sarkozy regarding secularism are hidden behind appropriate 
formulas: “la laicité, l'égalité entre la femme et l'homme et la liberté de conscience 
sont des principes avec lesquels je ne transigerai jamais.”444 Putting all of these 
formal elements in relation with Sarkozy's systematic stigmatisation of Muslims 
“who bleed sheep in their bathtub” (in reference to an obsolete practice during the 
traditional religious holiday Eid al-Adha), it becomes plain to whom the strictness of 
Republican standards apply.445  
The last point of Sarkozy's programme was entitled “Fiers d'être français” (Proud to 
be French, in the plural) in which Sarkozy, after having presented his plan to control 
immigration, states: 
                                                 
443 On the culturalist turn in far-right nationalist discourse in France, see Ruth Amossy, “ The 
National Front against the 'Off-the-peg thinking' of anti-racist groups, or: an examination of the 
proper use of accepted ideas in the new xenophobic debates”, Teresa Walas [ed.], Stereotypes 
and Nations, Cracow, International Cultural Centre, 1995, pp. 303-315. On neoconservatism and 
religion, see Mark Gerson: The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars, 
London, Madison Books, 1996, esp. pp. 284-292.  
444 “laicité, equality between man and woman, and freedom of conscience are principles I shall 
uphold always.”Nicolas Sarkozy, “Mon projet: Ensemble tout deviant possible”, p. 15, 
http://www.sarkozy.fr/lafrance/ [retrieved 24.11.2007] 
445 Declared in the early stages of the presidential campaign, during a talk show on the main private 
TV channel in France. Sarkozy, J'ai une question à vous poser , TV talk show, TF1, 05.02.2007. 
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“C'est finalement sans doute le pire de nos renoncements que d'avoir cessé 
d'être fier d'être français. Notre fierté repose d'abord sur l'identité de notre 
nation. Nous incarnons l'idéal national, parce que justement notre pays est 
constitué d'une multitude de peuples, de régions, de traditions et de cultures 
locales, depuis la métropole jusqu'à l'Outre-mer, enrichie par les vagues 
successives d'immigration, fédérée autour d'une ambition et d'une foi 
commune: être un grand pays, uni par les droits de l'homme et nos valeurs 
républicaines. Si je suis élu, je ne cesserai d'affirmer la fierté d'être français.”446 
The worn out reference to the richness of immigration certainly sounds once more 
appropriate, although partly dictated by common sense and partly by political 
correctness. It could even have sounded earnest had not Sarkozy deprived it of its 
meaning so often, as is even the case on the same page of his campaign programme. 
The suggestive religious vocabulary adds to the potential significations of Sarkozy's 
political statement, cloaked in dreams of grandeur which echo the long gone 
imperial glory and an attempt to reformulate the 'civilising mission' of the West.447  
Despite all the eloquence, Sarkozy's policy was already established in the eyes of the 
public as intransigent and pro-active. In the years preceding the 2007 presidential 
election, Sarkozy made a name for himself as a man of action as Interior minister 
                                                 
446  “Finally, our worst denial has without doubt been us ceasing to be proud of being French. Our 
pride rests primarily on the identity of our nation. We are the incarnation of the national ideal, 
precisely because our country is constituted of a multitude of peoples,  of regions and local 
traditions and cultures, from the Métropole to the oversea territories, enriched by successive 
waves of immigration, federated around common ambition and faith: to be a great country, 
united by human rights and our republican values. If I am elected, I will not cease to affirm the 
pride of being French.” Sarkozy, “Mon projet”, p. 15. 
447 To further make the imperialist reference in Sarkozy's discourse explicit, one can refer to 
Sarkozy's speech at Dakar University on 29.07.2007 which sparked a controversy  across the 
African continent as well as in Europe. In a mixture of shameless defence of the European 
colonial heritage in Africa and a paternalistic imprecations on Africa's essence and path to the 
future, he declared among other things:  “Le drame de l’Afrique, c’est que l’homme africain 
n’est pas assez entré dans l’histoire.” (The drama of Africa is that the African man has not 
entered history enough). The theme of the civilising mission (or civilisatory mission) had more 
generally been resurging in political discourse since the mid 1990s. See Dino Costantini, Juliette 
Ferdinand [eds.], Mission civilisatrice: le rôle de l'histoire coloniale dans la construction de 
l'identité politique française, Paris, Editions la Découverte, 2008, p. 290. 
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during President Jacques Chirac's second term (2002-2007).448 His policy had plain 
overtones of law and order and imposed a results-oriented culture (culture du 
résultat) on the police forces.449  
This tour of the formal expressions of Sarkozy's ideology amounts to a series of 
ambivalent discursive practices. These formulations often bring socio-cultural risk 
motives in relation to immigration to the front.450 At the same time, as we can 
already observe in the passage from the campaign programme, Sarkozy repeatedly 
aligns his approach to the tradition of French civic nationalist discourse formulated 
by Renan, stressing the will behind the national project. Shortly before the official 
start of the presidential campaign, he was already declaring on national television: 
“La France est une volonté, ce n'est pas un hasard.” (France is an act of will, it is not 
an accident).451  
The general ambivalence or permeations of Sarkozy's discourse on culture, national 
identity and immigration tends to be confusing. Regardless of the political 
objectives, the effect is the promotion of a 'totalising' (in the sense of all-
encompassing) and yet traditionalist national imaginary. In comparison to the 
reaction of the major candidate of the social-democratic opposition (Parti Socialiste, 
PS), Ségolène Royal, whose focus on the question of national identity were the 
symbols of the Republic and the theme of diversity,452 the rallying power of 
                                                 
448 Sarkozy had been Interior Minister on two occasions, a first period (2002-2004) in the 
government of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Rafarrin, and later, in the government of Dominique 
de Villepin (2005-2007). In the fall of 2005, the French “crisis of the housing estates” (crise des 
banlieues), which resulted in the declaring of a state of emergency, was set in the rising climate 
of securatisation, and in turn, fuelled the further evolution of state policies in this direction. See 
Mehdi Bhelhaj Kacem, La psychose française. Les banlieues: le ban de le République, Paris, 
Editions Gallimard, 2006; William J. Horobin, “Figuring the banlieues: contemporary political 
discourse in France”, MA thesis, Modern Languages and Critical Theory, University of 
Nottingham, 2007.   
449 For a critical assessment of Sarkozy's first term as Interior minister, see Laurent Mucchielli, “Le 
« nouveau management de la sécurité » à l’épreuve :délinquance et activité policière sous le 
ministère Sarkozy (2002-2007)”, Champ pénal / Penal field, nouvelle revue internationale de 
criminologie, Vol. 5, 2008, <http://champpenal.revues.org/3663> [accessed 22.10.2008]  
450 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society:Towards a New Modernity, London, Sage, 1992; Petersson, 
Stories About Strangers. 
451 Sarkozy, A vous de juger, political talk show (live), France 2, 30.11.2006, www.ina.fr [accessed 
06.02.2008]. 
452 See “Ségolène Royal 'veut réhabiliter le patriotisme du coeur'”, La Croix, 25.03.2007. 
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Sarkozy's discourse appears as having been much more effective in electoral 
terms.453 Sarkozy's wide ranging symbolic references, to traditions across the 
political spectrum effected on relegating most of the other political issues to a 
secondary plan.  
On 8 March 2007, on public television, Sarkozy announced his project for creating a 
“ministry for national identity and immigration”.454 Two days after the official start 
of Sarkozy's term as president, on 18 May 2007, the then officially named “Ministry 
for Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidary Development” 
(Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de l'Identité nationale et du 
Développement solidaire ) was created. Its first minister, Brice Hortefeux, a 
longstanding friend and political ally of Sarkozy, would reproduce the promotion of 
national identity and the stigmatisation of post-colonial immigration.  
If we compare Sarkozy's numerous rationales on the need for the control of 
immigration with the passages from speeches by Hortefeux after the creation of the 
Ministry for Immigration and National Identity (the short formula used in the media 
to refer to the ministry in question), we observe a similar reference to French 
citizens whose origins are the post-colonial immigration of the 1960s onwards to 
justify the institution and related policies. For instance, the following quote is an 
explanation by Sarkozy on the need for tighter immigration control shortly before 
the presidential campaign: 
“Dans les banlieues, nous payons le prix d’une politique de l’immigration qui 
n’a été ni choisie, ni voulue, ni revendiquée, ni organisée ; mais l’accumulation 
dans certains quartiers de fils et petit fils d’étrangers à qui on n’a donné ni 
formation, ni éducation, ni emploi a conduit à de véritables poudrières. J’en tire 
                                                 
453 This should be in part, but not exclusively, linked to the relevance of political issue ownership, 
which would suggest that issues such as immigration or national identity taken up by right-wing 
candidates are more believable. It should also be noted that Sarkozy was the first to raise these 
issues long before the presidential campaign started. This certainly played in his favour on 
several levels. Ségolène Royal's intervention on these issues appeared as an overdue attempt to 
counter the right-wing candidate on what were clearly “his” grounds. On issue ownership see: 
Patrick Egan, “Issue Ownership and Representation”, Working Paper, Institute of Governmental 
Studies, University of Berkeley, 2006, <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/54b3d7zh> [accessed 
04.09.2009]. 
454 Ludovic Blecher, “Sarkozy veut un ministère de l'immigration et de l'identité nationale”, 
Libération, 09.03.2007. 
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la conclusion qu’il faut maîtriser l’immigration, qu’on ne peut pas accepter tout 
le monde pour donner la chance de l’intégration à ceux qui ne l’ont pas.”455  
What is surprising is the relation created between what appear as economic 
problems which are actual problems and the discourse on the failure of the previous 
immigration and integration policies, which were in part the prerogatives of the 
Interior minister twice held by Sarkozy at the time of this declaration.456 The 
following extract from the press conference given by Brice Hortefeux on the 8 
November 2007 takes it a step further: 
“D’abord, osons regarder la vérité en face : le système français d’intégration a 
échoué. J’en veux pour preuve la concentration beaucoup trop forte de la 
population d’origine étrangère sur seulement trois régions sur vingt-deux : 60% 
des étrangers habitent en Ile-de-France, en Rhône-Alpes ou en Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur, parfois dans de véritables ghettos urbains. J’en veux aussi pour 
preuve le taux de chômage moyen des étrangers, supérieur à 20 %, soit plus du 
double de la moyenne nationale. Dans certaines banlieues, ce taux atteint les 
40%. Il faut donc dire la vérité aux Français : notre système d’intégration n’est 
plus un modèle. Et pour réussir l’intégration, il faut d’abord maîtriser 
l’immigration.”457 
                                                 
455 “ In the “banlieues”, we are paying the price of an immigration policy that was neither chosen, 
nor wanted, nor claimed or organized; but the accumulation in certain neighbourhoods of sons 
and grandsons of foreigners who never had any formation, any education, any job has created 
real powder magazines. I conclude that one has to control immigration.” A vous de juger, France 
2, 30.11.2006. 
456 The laws regarding immigration had already been tightened in 2004 by the Interior Minister at 
the time, Dominique de Villepin. The new codex came into force in 2005 (Code de l'entrée et du 
séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile). In 2003 and 2006, Sarkozy who was then Interior 
Minister, proposed additional laws which further restricted the rights of immigrants (Loi no. 
2003-119 du 26 Novembre 2003 relative à la maitrise de l'immigration, du séjour des étranger et 
de la nationalité; Loi no. 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l'immigration et à l'intégration) 
which has been in effect since July 2006, nearly half a year before the quoted declarations on the 
need for tighter immigration control.  
457 “First of all, let us be honest: the French integration system has failed. The proof is the much to 
high concentration of population of foreign origin in only three regions out of 22: 60% of 
foreigners live in Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes or in PACA, sometimes in real urban ghettos. 
Another proof is the average unemployment rate of foreigners, above 20%, which is more than 
twice the national average. In certain “banlieues”, this rate reaches to 40%. We have to say the 
truth to the French people: our integration system is not a model anymore. And to successfully 
integrate, one has first to control immigration.” Brice Hortefeux, Press Conference, 08.11.2007,  
<http://www.premierministre.gouv.fr/iminidco/salle_presse_832/discours_tribunes_835/discours
_brice_hortefeux_presse_57958.html> [accessed 25.06.2008, URL obsolete]   
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Most of the figures Hortefeux mentions could not be verified by the present 
author.458 In addition, their rounded-up numbers suggest an effort to obtain an 
authoritative effect. Leaving the petty rhetorical devices aside, we observe in both 
passages just mentioned an ambiguous and confusing discourse regarding 
“foreigners” and French citizens of foreign origin (issus de l'immigration is the usual 
French phrase) who inhabit the banlieues. The terms used in Sarkozy's declaration 
swing from “banlieues”, “sons and grandsons of immigrants” (a turn of phrase 
which actually refers to French citizens of foreign origin) and “immigration”. 
Hortefeux more plainly associates the “ghettos” with immigration, further directing 
the signification of who the French people he is addressing are: all of those who do 
not identify themselves with the association between immigration and the banlieues.      
These discourses symbolically disintegrate the parts of the French population which 
can be both recognised as being issus de l'immigration and in the banlieues. In spite 
of all the talk of the economic problems faced by the working class in general which 
inhabits the housing estates, this disintegration from the core of what is signified as 
Frenchness further marginalises French citizens of foreign origins who already are 
on the symbolic and social-economic fringes of the French society. Beyond electoral 
politics and particular policies, these observations confirm the established trends of 
the appropriation by mainstream politicians of xenophobic and nationalist discourses 
leading to the promotion of exclusionary discursive practices, with symbolic as well 
as actual consequences. Balibar already noted: 
“the assimilation demanded of […] a 'Black' in Britain or a 'Beur' [slang for 
Arab] in France […] before they can become 'integrated' into the society in 
which they already live (and which will always be suspected of being 
superficial, imperfect or simulated) is presented as progress, as an 
emancipation, a conceding of rights.”459  
                                                 
458 Most accessible statistics do not present similar methodoligcal terms. The closest we could find 
was an estimate that one third of immigrants were beneficiaries of social housing, which 
presents differences with the suburban housing estates since 2000, all municipalities of at least 
50,000 inhabitants are legally bound to allocate 20% of available habitations for social housing 
purposes. On statistics from 1996 see Julien Boëldieu and Suzanne Thave, “Le logement des 
immigrés en 1996”, Insee Premiere, no. 730, 2000.   
459 Balibar, “Is there a 'Neo-Racism'?”, p. 25. 
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Balibar further explains how in recent racist discourses express “all the ambiguity of 
the notion of culture”, referring to the universalistic or 'open' and particularistic or 
'closed' acceptations of the term. As far as nationalist discourses are concerned, they 
are also based on an inherent ambivalent play between the nation as a political entity 
and the nation as a cultural entity. Breuilly analyses how the nation is portrayed: 
“at one moment as a cultural community and at another as a political 
community whilst insisting that in an ideal state the national community will 
not be ‘split’ into cultural and political spheres. The nationalist can exploit this 
perpetual ambiguity. National independence can be portrayed as the freedom of 
the citizens who make up the (political) nation or as the freedom of the 
collectivity which makes up the (cultural) nation.”460  
Although the discursive elements presented in the previous pages, in the cases of 
both Poland and France, are far from being comprehensive and representative of the 
full range of political discourses, their relationality points towards a constant and 
fairly efficient discursive play between the various ambiguities of both xenophobic 
and nationalist discursive formations as well in between these formations. These 
formal significations point, in their promotion in mainstream political speeches, to 
an imaginary association between cultural exclusion and national belonging which 
may induce their further institution or reproduction as socially recognised 
significations.  
3. Historical Alignments  
Before articulating the case of mainstream political discourses in Britain on the issue 
of national identity, we need to overview the themes articulated for the Polish and 
French cases. Regarding the question of religion and secularism, Britain presents a 
different development from the two republican state formations of France and 
Poland. As a constitutional monarchy, the main difference is evidently the survival 
of the monarchy whose role has progressively become more symbolical or formal 
than strictly speaking political. The head of state has also remained the head of the 
Church ever since it was established in the sixteenth century as one of the first steps 
                                                 
460 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, p. 348. 
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of the Reformation.461 The diminishing role of the monarch has certainly allowed 
this official relationship between state and church to continue. It has nonetheless not 
hindered the development of secularism in political institutions of the state which 
partly reflects the social evolution of the British population.  
Anthony Blair, who served as Prime minister during two consecutive terms between 
1997 and 2007 is knowingly a devout catholic but was expected to refrain from 
blatant displays and promotion of his faith. A year after leaving the office of Prime 
minister and the world of British national politics, he founded the Tony Blair Faith 
Foundation which “aims to promote respect and understanding about the world's 
major religions and show how faith is a powerful force for good in the modern 
world.”462 Regardless of Blair's personal convictions, such a foundation would have 
been unimaginable were he still serving as the British Prime minister: 
“Indeed, after spending much of his decade in Downing Street fighting shy of 
discussing his deep Christian convictions for fear of alienating Britain's largely 
secular society, he is now free of such constraints”463  
Gordon Brown, Blair's successor as Prime minister, appears as less pious than his 
predecessor despite a number of general references to religion in his political 
speeches.464 Where Brown distinguishes himself more consistently from Blair is on 
his overt promotion of a national British identity which he already heralded as 
                                                 
461 See Chapter 3, Part 1.1 of the present work. 
462 The Tony Blair Faith Foundation website, <http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/pages/about-us>, 
[accessed 20.01.2010] 
463 Tom Baldwin, “Tony Blair's Faith Foundation to sell religion as force for good”, The Times, 
30.05.2008. There is one declaration of faith Blair made during his term which is worth taking 
note of. Although there is no direct reference to Christianity, Blair replied on an ITV1 talk show 
in 2006 that he prayed to God to help him decide to go to war in Iraq. These declarations were 
met with criticism, which nevertheless were of little consequence. What is significant is how it 
establishes, in similar vein as with Sarkozy, a connection with American neo-conservative 
politicians, and more particularly with George W. Bush with whom Blair went to war. On the 
declarations and reactions see “Blair 'prayed to God' over Iraq”, BBC News website, 
03.03.2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4772142.stm> [accessed 20.01.2010]. 
464 See e.g. James Chapman, “Brown DOES do God as he calls for new world order in sermon at St 
Paul's”, The Daily Mail, 01.04.2009, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1166182/Brown-
DOES-God-calls-new-world-order-sermon-St-Pauls.html> [accessed 22.01.2010] 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer under Blair's government.465 While Brown's speeches 
are generally more poised and less spectacular than those of Sarkozy or Hortefeux, 
we observe the same discursive practice. In both cases, immigration and national 
identity, sometimes termed citizenship in the British examples, the politicians state 
the lack of national identity and the failures of their respective models of integration.  
To the “denial of the pride of being French” stated by Sarkozy, Brown declares that 
Britishness should not “leave a hole” and that action should be taken in this 
respect.466 As far as it could be traced in his political speeches, Brown repeatedly 
declared the need for the United Kingdom to rediscover its Britishness. Delivering 
the British Council annual lecture on 7 July 2004, Brown spoke of a “belief” that 
urged him to continuously try to instil new life into Britishness:  
“I believe that just about every central question about our national future […] 
can only be fully answered if we are clear about what we value about being 
British and what gives us purpose and direction as a country. […] And I want to 
suggest that our success as Great Britain […] depends upon us rediscovering 
from our history the shared values that bind us together and on us becoming 
more explicit about what we stand for as a nation.”467  
The clarification of the values of Britishness implies it is not clear, which further 
confirms the problematic lack of a national identity in Brown's formal ideology. 
                                                 
465 Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer in Anthony Blair’s governments from 1997 
until 2007, before becoming leader of the Labour Party (24.06.2007) and as a consequence 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland since 27.06.2007. 
For an insight into Anthony Blair’s position on the question of “Britishness” and the differences 
with Gordon Brown's, see e.g. Keith Dixon, “Blair, Brown and Britishness: the end of an old 
song?” conference paper, 2007, <http://www.raisonsdagir.org /kd7.pdf>  [retrieved 17.02.2008].  
466 Britishness is precisely defined as national identity: “[…] a Britishness which welcomes 
differences, but which is not so loose, so nebulous that it is simply defined as the toleration of 
difference and leaves a hole where national identity should be.” Gordon Brown, “The future of 
Britishness”, speech at the Fabian society, 14.01.2006, <http://www.fabian-society.org.uk>/ 
[accessed 10.01.2008]. 
467 Brown “Speech at the British Council annual lecture, July 7 2004”, <www.guardian.co.uk/ 
politics/2004/jul/08/uk.labour1> [accessed 10.04.2008] In 2007, Jack Straw, then Leader of the 
House of Commons, would reproduce the same discourse as Brown in the political campaign for 
promoting the government's citizenship policies: ““We have to be clearer about what it means to 
be British, what it means to be part of this British nation of nations and, crucially, to be resolute 
in making the point that what comes with that is a set of values. Yes, there is room for multiple 
and different identities, but those have to be accepted alongside an agreement that none of these 
identities can take precedence over the core democratic values of freedom, fairness, tolerance 
and plurality that define what it means to be British.” The Times, 26.01.2007.    
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Similar statements where made by Sarkozy, like for instance in his campaign video 
clip on national identity:   
“If no one explains what France is to newcomers, to people who want to 
become French, how can we integrate them? The French integration model has 
failed because we have forgotten to talk about France. I do not want to forget 
[talking] about France, because France is at the core of my project.”468 
We observe here another element which is crucial in opening up the imaginary space 
for promoting new senses to be instituted within this space for national identity. In 
the passage taken from Hortefeux's press conference, we read “We have to say the 
truth to the French people: our integration system is not a model anymore. And to 
successfully integrate, one has first to control immigration.” In Brown's approach to 
the question, immigration and British citizens of foreign origins are less of a focus 
than in the speeches of French politicians. More precisely, they are not the only 
problems which Britishness is faced with. Brown in fact attempts, as is often the 
case for mainstream British politicians, to have more consensual approach to 
immigration in general as a positive element for the economy but he is also more 
attentive to the diversity of Britishness.469 When Sarkozy dramatically talks of the 
“failure of the French integration system”, Brown more diplomatically casts a doubt 
on how effective “the balance between integration and multiculturalism” is, or in a 
later formulation: “[w]hat was wrong about multiculturalism was not the recognition 
of diversity but that it over-emphasised separateness at the cost of unity.”470 Moving 
partly away from questions of integration, the forces that undermine the Union are to 
be found in the 'counter' regional nationalisms of this 'nation of nations':   
“Perhaps in the past we could get by with a Britishness that was assumed 
without being explicitly stated. But when our country is being challenged in 
                                                 
468 Sarkozy, “National Identity” Campaign video, 2006. For a full transcript in French, see Annex 8. 
469 Part of the reason for such a promotion of “diversity through unity” is certainly to be found in 
the terrorist bombings of 2005. The citizenship curriculum promoted by Alan Johnson, the 
Education Secretary in 2007, who initiated a curriculum review entitled Identity and Diversity: 
Living Together in the UK, (Keith Ajegbo, Dina Kiwan, Seema Sharma, Nottingham, DfES 
Publication, 2007) is representative of the policies aimed at countering home-bread terrorism. 
Announcing compulsory lessons in British history, including “Black and Asian history”, the 
review reads as a textbook example of civic nationalist discourse.  
470 Respectively, Brown, “The future of Britishness” and “We need a United Kindgom”, The Daily 
Telegraph, 13.01.2007.  
 182 CHAPTER 4 – PART 1 
Scotland, Wales and now England by secessionists, it is right to be explicit 
about what we, the British people, share in common and the patriotic vision for 
our country’s future.”471  
At first glance, Brown's promotion of nationalism appears explicitly civic albeit 
clouded in a very traditional rhetoric.472 Looking at the elements with which Brown 
proposes to fill in the space opened by the lack of national identity, they appear 
indeed as very traditional. Brown, certainly influenced by his higher education in 
history, heavily relies on key political events in what is presented as the “golden 
thread” of British history which, as Brown states, have “woven together [...] “our 
central beliefs [which] are a commitment to – liberty for all, responsibility by all and 
fairness to all.”473 
On the the key political events, Brown continues: 
““[…] there is […] a golden thread which runs through British history – that 
runs from that long ago day in Runnymede in 1215; on to the Bill of Rights in 
1689 where Britain became the first country to successfully assert the power of 
Parliament over the King; to not just one, but four great Reform Acts in less 
than a hundred years – of the individual standing firm against tyranny and then 
– an even more generous, expansive view of liberty – the idea of government 
accountable to the people, evolving into the exciting idea of empowering 
citizens to control their own lives. […] Of course the appeal to fairness runs 
through British history, from early opposition to the first poll tax in 1318 to the 
second; fairness the theme from the civil war debates [...] to the 1940s when 
Orwell talked of a Britain known to the world for its ‘decency’.”474 
All of these events refer to obviously significant events. But the British history 
exposed by Brown remains traditionally nationalistic on two grounds. First, they are 
all extracted from their historical contexts. The linearity thus created not only 
removes the transcultural density behind the events, but more importantly sets 
relevant British history primarily as the history of England. So when Brown talks 
anachronistically about Britain in 1689, it is either a surprising mistake coming from 
                                                 
471 Brown, “We need a United Kindgom”. 
472 In Brown, “The future of Britishness”, for example: “[our] shared civic values which are not 
only the ties that bind us, but also give us a patriotic purpose as a nation and sense of direction 
and destiny.”  
473 Brown, “The future of Britishness”. Most passages quoted from “The future of Britishness” 
appear in nearly the exact same form in Brown's “Speech at the British Council annual lecture, 
July 7 2004”. 
474 Brown, “The future of Britishness”. 
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a historian or a purposeful twist. Secondly and consistently this time, Brown makes 
no references to the struggles against English hegemony on the British Isles, or any 
mention of the actual reasons behind the diversity of contemporary British 
society.475 The historical linearity excludes thus all the formation of the British 
Empire and its unifying “tyranny” at home as well as overseas.   
The failed attempt at institutionalising his promotion of national identity confirms 
this traditionalist approach which aims at emulating the national institutions such as 
the one found in France or Poland (and in fact across the globe). On 5 October 2007, 
in the early stages of Brown’s premiership, the government launched a review on 
citizenship in Britain. The report, Citizenship: Our Common Bond was eventually 
presented to Brown by Lord Goldsmith in March 2008.476 It is particularly 
significant as it contains proposals for “enhancing the bond of citizenship” – a 
national day for instance – which for most were previously mentioned by Brown 
when promoting the “rediscovering” of British identity.477  
Beyond the formal and contextual differences, what is observable in terms of the 
promotion of nationalism in contemporary political discourses in the three cases 
which we have tried to unwind in this chapter is that the discursive practices related 
to nationalism lead to the same conclusion. They are all based on hegemonic 
discursive processes which were already made apparent in our analysis of Sieyès's 
pamphlet in the previous chapter. They generally involve the opening of spaces for 
the projected institutionalisation of social significations. The combination or play on 
the ambivalences inherent to the discursive formation of nationalism creates 
significant senses which are often supported by social or political institutions. In all 
                                                 
475 The only mention to the diverse origins of members of the British society in “The future of 
Britishness” was: “ we have always been a country of different nations and thus of plural 
identities – a Welshman can be Welsh and British, just as a Cornishman or woman is Cornish, 
English and British – and may be Muslim, Pakistani or Afro-Carribean, Cornish, English and 
British.” 
476 Lord Q.C. Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond, 2008, p. 88, <http://www.justice.gov.uk 
/reviews/citizenship.htm> [accessed 03.04.2008]. 
477 Brown, “The future of Britishness”; “We need a United Kindgom”; “We must defend the 
Union”, The Daily Telegraph, 25.03.2008.  Faced with increasing unpopularity, the policies were 
not instituted nor appear to have been taken up by the following coalition government since 
2010.  
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cases, regardless of the combination of themes, the promoted senses hint at 
exclusionary social significations.  
In more details, what we have observed is that in the case the Polish traditionalist 
discourses, the focus on the catholic faith as essential to Polishness excludes an 
imaginary that could interpret the history of the Polish peoples which would include 
their long-standing social-historical complexity, notably regarding the historical 
minorities. This exclusionary focus suggests a linear and narrow reading of history 
as it appears in Brown's account of British history, even if his focus is of a more 
political nature. The centrality of England in Brown's promotion suggests a 
generally uncritical appraisal of the role of the Empire in the construction of 
contemporary British society (without mentioning its global effects). This 
recentralising on the high culture of the state is finally clear in the opposition 
between the idealised and homogenised French identity and stigmatised immigration 
populations, which in speeches of the politicians in power in France, even tend to 
exclude actual French citizens as being part of a 'Frenchness' defined through their 
exclusion.  
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Deviations and Reproductions 
 
1. Appropriations of Extremism 
It has been previously suggested that the exclusionary significations promoted in 
discourses on national identity by mainstream political figures is supported by their 
appropriation of far-right rhetoric. The coalition governments of 2006-2007 of 
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz and Jarosław Kaczyński (the twin brother of the former 
president) of extreme parties (such as the ultra-catholic LPR) and the mainstream 
PiS may appear as a short term glitch, but it is certainly representative of political 
and symbolic associations between mainstream and extreme formations. Roman 
Giertych, co-founder of the LPR in 2001, served as minister for national education 
in both governments. The series of controversies sparked from the outset of his 
nominations reached beyond the scale of national politics.478 These did not prevent 
Jarosław Kaczyński from maintaining Giertych as minister of national education. 
The sole fact of having assigned Giertych to this particular ministry speaks for itself.  
In France, as was the case in many European countries, playing on people's fear of 
immigration and general insecurity was originally the prerogative of the far-right 
and became major political themes in the electoral breakthroughs of the Front 
National (FN) in the 1980s.479 By the time of Sarkozy became Interior minister, 
Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder and president of the FN, had become an established 
                                                 
478 On Giertych's open homophobia after having sacked Mirosław Sielatycki, then director of the 
Central Agency for the Formation of Teachers (Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli) 
for having suggested in a book that schools should contact gay organisation to promote open-
mindedness, and the reaction of the Council of Europe, see e.g. “Rada Europy przeciw decyzji 
Giertycha” (The Council of Europe condemns Giertych's decision), Gazeta Wyborcza, 
14.06.2006. The Ambassador of Israel also reacted in declaring he would refrain from getting in 
touch with the minister of national education, PAP (Polish Press Agency), 09.07.2006. On the 
national stage, as early as in May, an open letter to the Prime minister was set up demanding the 
removal of Giertych from office, see <http://www.bezgiertycha.rp4.pl/> [accessed 04.09.2009].   
479 Catherine Fieschi, Fascism, Populism and the French Republic: In the Shadow of Democracy, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, see pp. 11-12. 
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political figure.480 Sarkozy would make explicit references to the traditional 
positions held by the FN, borrowing on several occasions during and after the 
presidential campaign, formulas which were customary in the speeches of the FN 
leader. On several occasions, when asked to respond to criticisms suggesting that he 
was directly referring to the programme of the FN (particularly concerning 
catchphrases similar to “love or leave France”), Sarkozy systematically answered: 
“If Le Pen says the sun is yellow, I am not going to argue that it is blue.”481 Yet 
Sarkozy also manages to maintain ambivalence, usually with less tendentious 
explanations on the dangers of the far-right, managing even to suggest his populist 
appropriations as responsible or even necessary answers to the rise of the far-right:  
“[we] are the [democracy] where the extreme right is the strongest and where 
temptations of racism have in recent years been the most severe and the most 
dramatic. Maybe this should be reflected upon…”482 
Brown and his government seem to have come to the same conclusion as Sarkozy 
and more generally French mainstream politicians: that in order to counter the 
relatively successful extremist political formations, one needs to appropriate their 
rhetoric. But this means fighting them on their grounds. This is representative of a 
general shift to the right which has steadily been taking place since the 1980s, the 
traditional right-wing formations giving credence to far-right ideologies, and the 
centre-left formations giving credence to centre-right ideologies as left-wing 
formations generally appear out of inspiration.483  
                                                 
480 In the presidential elections of 2002, Le Pen reached the second round, losing against Jacques 
Chirac with 17,79 percent of the vote in what was the greatest success of the far-right in 
presidential elections. The FN's vote count was above the average in other national elections as 
well.   
481 Sarkozy,  TF1, 28.04.2006; TF1, 05.02.2007. An example of Sarkozy’s “love it or leave it” 
slogans date from the 22.04. 2006, during a UMP meeting in Paris: “If there are people who feel 
embarrassed of being in France, they shouldn’t feel embarrassed about leaving it”. These relate 
to a famous motto of the FN “France, love it or leave it” (“La France, aimez-la ou quittez-la”) 
also used by another far-right party (Mouvement pour la France), “France, you love it or leave 
it” (“La France, tu l’aimes ou tu la quittes”). 
482 Sarkozy,  TF1, 28.04.2006. 
483 Environmentalist formations do not seem to be very comfortable with the traditional left-wing 
continuum, although most of them would be regarded as centre-left. For an enlightening 
alternative representation of political typology replacing the simplistic left-wing right-wing 
continuum, see The Political Compass: <http://www.politicalcompass.org/> [last accessed 
05.11.20011]  
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The 'fronts' Brown faced, compared to the case of Sarkozy, were more numerous and 
each, one might say, was holding different grounds. On the one hand, the memory of 
the July 2005 bombings in London, which he portrays in connection to the question 
of integration,484 forms the front of the question of immigration and Islam. On the 
other, the successful electoral campaigns of separatist political parties and their 
significant gains in the form of devolved parliaments – particularly in Scotland 
where a referendum on independence after the 2011 elections is on the agenda of the 
leading party in the Scottish parliament, the SNP – demonstrate that the issue of the 
break-up of Britain more topical than ever. While Brown is himself a Scotsman, 
what he calls the “secessionist forces” are portrayed as one major justification for 
the promotion of a British national identity: 
“Perhaps in the past we could get by with a Britishness that was assumed 
without being explicitly stated. But when our country is being challenged in 
Scotland, Wales and now England by secessionists, it is right to be explicit 
about what we, the British people, share in common and the patriotic vision for 
our country’s future.”485 
Having defined the primary opponents of the Union, Brown is faced with yet 
another problem: the British National Party's (BNP) traditional ownership of the 
issue of British national identity. In a similar discursive strategy to Sarkozy's, 
although with a less extreme rhetoric, Brown refers to the BNP in order to assert that 
patriotism is not a value that should be left for the extremists to thrive on, but needs 
to be “[taken] back from the BNP”486, confirming the initial positioning mentioned 
before, that national identity has not been asserted enough by mainstream political 
actors: 
“[…] let us remember that when people on the centre-left recoiled from 
national symbols, the BNP tried to steal the Union Jack. Instead of the BNP 
using it as a symbol of racial division, the flag should be a symbol of unity, part 
of a modern expression of patriotism. So we should respond to the BNP by 
saying the union flag is a flag for Britain, not for the BNP; all the United 
                                                 
484 Brown, “The future of Britishness”; “We need a United Kingdom”. 
485 Brown, “We need a United Kingdom”. 
486 Brown, “We need a United Kingdom”. 
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Kingdom should honour it, not ignore it; we should assert that the union flag is, 
by definition, a flag of tolerance and inclusion.”487 
In light of Billig's analysis of banal nationalism and of the historical inquiry of the 
previous chapter, it becomes obvious that all the positioning by right or left wing 
majority parties in favour of a renewed promotion of national identity, even when it 
appears justified by a the lack of social cohesion, means the further banalisation of 
traditional nationalism. While civil society is certainly put to the test in immigration 
countries, the global movement of peoples has always been part of human history.488 
In this regard, the traditional paradigm of nationalism which has been organising 
states and peoples across the globe for the past centuries can hardly be considered 
successful. Diversity, be it religious or cultural (or sub-cultural) may also seem to 
put a strain on the cohesion of a given society. Once again, when inspecting the 
cultural diversity of Europe before the age of nationalism and globalisation, we 
observe that the number of languages spoken throughout Europe was far greater than 
the number of actual states or even of regional institutions. Contemporary diversity 
may prove as surprising.489 The failure in developing multilingualism as the norm, 
or rather the impossibility of imagining multilingualism – even in between high 
culture languages – has been the mark of the dominating nationalist framework 
developed in Europe. This framework imposed a single language beyond to be used 
as cultural language and not simply as working language (or lingua franca). In 
                                                 
487 Brown, “The future of Britishness”. 
488 Reasons, range and frequency have varied. Apart from enforced migration, such as slavery or the 
post-World War 2 expulsions, a certain number of constants remain. Economic reasons have 
been and remain the dominant global factor for migration. For the UK, in 2007, 44% of 
immigration was work-related, 37% in 2008. Migration Statistics 2008, Annual Report, Office 
for National Statistics, OPSI/Crown, 2009, p. 22. Depending on the state's policy, other factors 
can appear as primary. In France, immigration in relation to family appears as the dominant 
incentive, while work-related migrants and asylum seekers are significantly less numerous, 
“Immigration and the 2007 French Presidential Elections”, Immigration Backgrounder, no. 3, 
The Migration Policy Institute, 2007, p. 2. 
489 In 1999, a report to the Ministry of National Education, Research and Technology and to the 
Ministry of Culture and Communication established that in accordance with the European 
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages (1992), the current number of languages spoken 
on the French territory (including the overseas dominions) is 74 (26 in metropolitan France). 
Bernard Cerquiglini, “Les langues de France. Rapport Rapport au Ministre de l'Education 
Nationale, de la Recherche et de la Technologie, et à la Ministre de la Culture et de la 
Communication”, 1999, <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/dglf/lang-reg/rapport_cerquiglini/ 
langues-france.html#ancre156623> [accessed 30.09.2010]   
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relation to the parliamentary debate about the status of regional languages in France, 
Jean-Marie Rouart, member of the French Academy (L'Académie Française),490 
presents us with the plainest expression of such nationalistic ideology. Without even 
considering the possibility or fact of multilingualism, he perceives the use of 
regional languages, which he despises, as a threat to the essential superiority of the 
national language: 
“Les langues régionales, malgré leur charme, leur spécificité et leur importance 
pour le patrimoine français, ne doivent pas supplanter la langue française. En 
outre, le terme « langues » pour les idiomes de région me paraît abusif. Il s’agit 
plutôt de patois, de dialectes. Preuve en est qu’elles n’ont jamais produit de 
grandes œuvres littéraires, contrairement à la langue française. […] La France 
est un pays universel, international. Revenir aux dialectes locaux est une 
absurdité.”491  
We can wonder why the universalism represented by France, as Rouart claims, 
should be opposed to and fearful of such 'despicable' languages, of which the 
speakers have no means to establish as national languages per se – even if some 
radicals are perhaps hoping to do so, but it is very unlikely they will succeed.492 The 
reasons why speakers of regional languages or dialects have not produced a 
literature worthy of praise is precisely because of the existence of a lingua franca 
                                                 
490 The aim of the Académie is the improvement and standardisation of the French language. 
Created in 1635, it was suppressed during the French Revolution. Napoleon I restored the 
institution in 1803 which remains as a token of French linguistic imperialism up to this date.  
491 “Regional languages, in spite of their charm, specificity and importance for the French national 
heritage, should not supplant the French language. In addition, it seems to me that the use of the 
term of “languages” for regional idioms is excessive. They are rather patois, dialects. The proof 
is that they (sic) have never produced great literary works, contrary to the French language. […] 
France is a universal, international country. To return to local dialects is absurd.” Jean-Marie 
Rouart, interview, France Soir, 08.05.2008 <http://www.francesoir.fr/actualite/societe/langue-
guerre-des-patois-26187.html> [accessed 10.01.2011]. 
492 Perhaps the case of Ireland could be enlightening in this respect. Although we are not in the 
presence of a regional language, it proves the point even more so . Irish Gaelic, despite being the 
first official language and the pro-active policies in favour of establishing it as the main national 
language since 1922, has remained a secondary language. According to the Central Statistics 
Office of Ireland, just short of 42% of the population speak Irish (<http://beyond2020.cso.ie/ 
Census/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=75610>, accessed 10.01.2011]. According to the 
report The Irish Language and the Irish People, four fifths of the population support a form of 
bilingualism. Micheál Mac Gréil, The Irish Language and the Irish People: Report on the 
Attitudes towards, Competence in and Use of the Irish Language in the Republic of Ireland in 
2007-08, National University of Ireland Maynooth, 2009, p. 7, <http://www.pobail.ie/en/Press 
Releases/2009/April/file,9801,en.pdf> [accessed 10.01.2011]  
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(such as Latin) before the age of nationalism, or of the particularistic high cultures 
which were inherent in the formation of nation-states.  
Consequently, it is maybe necessary to turn our perspective upside down and wonder 
about the extent to which our nationalism makes us consider migration or diversity 
as presenting socio-cultural risks before considering the actual problems that arise 
when people rather than states are faced with both phenomena. It follows that a 
sense of risk is rather to be found in the culturalist and traditionalist promotions of 
national identities at a period when economic questions should certainly be put to 
the fore and alternative means of imagining political and cultural belonging should 
be explored.  
2. Hooliganationalism 
As an epiphenomenon of the general reactionary mood which has steadily become 
dominant in European politics, and presenting us with some of the consequences of 
enlivening traditionalist nationalist political discourse, the case of the English 
Defence League (EDL) stands out as an alarming synthesis of the reactionary 
significations of the contemporary European imaginary. It is the first of a series of 
Islamophobic organisations based on football hooligan subculture and related to 
already present Islamophobic organisations, such as the SIOE (Stop the Islamisation 
of Europe) whose motto reads: “Racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but 
Islamophobia is the height of common sense.”493  
The EDL claims it originated as a reaction to the violent protest by radical Islamist 
group Al-Muhajirun (“The Emigrants” in Arabic) against returning British troops 
from the Afghan war in March 2009.494 They present us with yet another facet of the 
discursive evolution of nationalist and xenophobic discourses since the 1980s 
                                                 
493 SIOE website, <http://sioe.wordpress.com/> [last accessed 20.01.2011]. Most websites of these 
organisations need to be accessed with a login. For the current inquiry, the present author did not 
find it necessary to access further information than is provided without website membership. 
Another website, <http://www.euro-reconquista.com/> lists a number of these clone 
organisations in its links. We can mention the Ligue de Defense Française (French Defence 
League], Scottish Defence League or the Dutch Defence League. The SIOE for its part has a 
number of national sites, as well as in Poland, and an American counterpart, the SIOA.  
494 Before becoming a national organisation, the name of the group was “The United Peoples of 
Luton” referring to the city were the Islamist protest took place.   
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towards their acceptability. Just as the banalisation of national significations entailed 
the appropriation of extreme nationalist discourses, the banalisation of nationalist 
significations entails the appropriation of mainstream discursive practices.495 In the 
mission statement of the EDL which is openly accessible on their official website, 
one reads: 
“The English Defence League (EDL) is a human rights organisation that was 
founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group of Muslim 
extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the 
sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure. Although these 
actions were certainly those of a minority, we believe that they reflect other 
forms of religiously-inspired intolerance and barbarity that are thriving 
amongst certain sections of the Muslim population in Britain: including, but not 
limited to, the denigration and oppression of women, the molestation of young 
children, the committing of so-called honour killings, homophobia, anti-
Semitism, and continued support for those responsible for terrorist atrocities.” 
(emphasis added)496   
We can observe here the acceptable discourse which cloaks the otherwise 
xenophobic and violent   demonstrations of the EDL.497 What we observe is that 
there are similarities between the array of topics which this “human rights 
organisation” covers and the themes Sarkozy mentions in his campaign clip on 
national identity and campaign programme, such the rights of women. But here, 
instead of the more general values we find in Sarkozy's discourse (equality between 
men and women), or such as the ones used by Brown (liberty, fairness and equality 
for all), all the themes are addressed with terms which directly denote violence, and 
indirectly call for it. 
                                                 
495 In fact, the latter appropriation pre-dates that of mainstream political discourse. See Amossy, 
“The National Front against the 'Off-the-peg thinking' of Anti-racist Groups”. 
496 “Mission Statement”, EDL official website, <http://englishdefenceleague.org/content.php?136> 
[accessed 08.01.2011]  
497 See e.g. Robert Booth and Sam Jones, “'Defence league' recruiting football fans to march against 
Islamic extremism”, The Guardian, 11.08.2009.  
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It is maybe surprising also to read that an anti-Islamic organisation seems concerned 
with such themes as molestation, homophobia or anti-Semitism.498 But they all 
contribute to enhance their acceptability. In the process which originated in turning 
the theme of discrimination on its head, we observe in this particular instance how 
far-right discourse has evolved to encompass groups whose struggle against 
discrimination is commonly established. The new leader of the FN, Marine Le Pen, 
seemed to follow the same route in her first speech as party president. Similarly to 
the EDL, she claims to be defending the rights of women, gays and Jews against the 
rampant Islamisation of France and Europe by Muslims who, although it is not 
formally stated, appear as misogynous, homophobic and anti-Semitic.499 Without 
going against the traditional core values of the FN, we can observe how, in a 
declaration where she categorically expresses her opposition to gay marriage, she 
turns the struggle against homophobia to her advantage: 
“Je pense que les associations soi-disant représentatives ne sont pas 
représentatives (des homosexuels) et l'immense majorité des homosexuels 
réclament non pas le droit à la différence mais le droit à l'indifférence”500     
Looking back at the mission statement of the EDL, we observe another feature 
which is characteristic of contemporary far-right political formations, namely their 
uncritical defence of what is assumed as their natural national identity and 
                                                 
498 The “the molestation of children” may be misinterpreted. It probably refers to the condemnable 
practice of excision, associated nowadays with Islam. It is unlikely the EDL is concerned with 
any other possible meaning behind the expression “the molestation of children”. According to 
Anne Chemin who investigated the situation in France, “Les excisions sont désormais rarement 
pratiquées sur le sol français, les filles étant excisées lors de séjours temporaires dans le pays 
d'origine de la famille ou suite à des reconduites ”, “50 000 femmes mutilées sexuellement 
vivent en France” (Nowadays, excisions are rarely practised, Le Monde, 25.10.2007. We can 
assume that the situation is similar in other countries which host Muslim communities. Both 
national legislations and international bodies such as the World Health Organisation, have 
enforced strict policies against this practice. In France, perpetrators risk up to 20 years of 
imprisonment.       
499 See Nolwenn Le Blevennec, “La Marine's touch : dix façons de renouveler le danger FN”, 
Rue89, 16.01.2011, <http://www.rue89.com/2011/01/16/la-marines-touch-dix-facons-de-renouveler-le-danger-
fn-185992> [accessed 16.01.2011]. 
500 I think that the so-called representative organisations are not representatives (of homosexuals) 
and the large majority of homosexuals do not call for the right to difference but the right to 
indifference. “Mariage gay: Le Pen "totalement contre"”, AFP, 28.01.2011. 
<http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2011/01/28/97001-20110128FILWWW00371-mariage-gay-
marine-le-pen-totalement-contre.php> [accessed 28.01.2011].  
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contemporary political institutions. This assumption constitutes the main 'acceptable' 
justification against their crusade against Islam: 
“[Islam] runs counter to all that we hold dear within our British liberal 
democracy, and it must be prepared to change, to conform to secular, liberal 
ideals and laws, and to contribute to social harmony, rather than causing 
divisions.” 
The statement continues: 
“If people migrate to this country then they should be expected to respect our 
culture, its laws, and its traditions, and not expect their own cultures to be 
promoted by agencies of the state. The best of their cultures will be absorbed 
naturally and we will all be united by the enhanced culture that results. The 
onus should always be on foreign cultures to adapt and integrate. If said 
cultures promote anti-democratic ideas and refuse to accept the authority of our 
nation’s laws, then the host nation should not be bowing to these ideas in the 
name of ‘cultural sensitivity’. Law enforcement personnel must be able to 
enforce the rule of law thoroughly without prejudice or fear. Everyone, after 
all, is supposed to be equal in the eyes of the law.” [emphasis added] 
It is obvious here what ideological underpinnings are expressed. It is ironic, that in 
the names of human rights, and claiming to fight the “Jihad”, the EDL and affiliated 
organisations respond by their own crusade. The imagery of the crusades is 
paramount across the websites of these organisations. In addition to the traditional 
nationalist football related paraphernalia, the national flags in the form of shields 
which recall those bore by the medieval crusaders can be found on nearly every 
single website of any of the national “defence leagues”. The finale sentence of the 
EDL's mission statement sounds indeed as disheartening call to arms: “The time for 
tolerating intolerance has come to an end: it is time for the whole world to unite 
against a truly Global Jihad.”  
The 'holiness' of the medieval crusades has been replaced with one of the 
foundations of modern societies, namely the rule of law; but the 'infidels' have 
remained the same. It is significant that in this respect, all these organisations, the 
defence leagues as well as the SIOE, officially support the state of Israel, which may 
also first come as a surprise. And yet, through their crusade imagery, one can easily 
assume how Israel stands for the outpost of the West, replacing the Middle Eastern 
Christian kingdoms and defending Jerusalem from the “Mohammedans”. But these 
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are mere assumptions, which even if were proven true, would make the discourses of 
organisations such as EDL and akin conspirational ideologues of 'Eurabia', even less 
admissible.501  
In relation to Brown's predicament, we observe that the English nationalist front 
appears in fact much more radical than the “secessionist forces” of Wales and 
Scotland for whom the contemporary means of negotiating their nationalist 
significations have been channelled into the political process known as devolution 
which can be dated back to the struggles for home rule in Ireland.502 In this process 
the traditional separatist and nationalist political groups,  such as the SNP in 
Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales and their supporters, have little in common with 
the far-right crusaders of the EDL or even the BNP for that matter. As Vernon 
Bogdanor notes: 
“Many of the supporters of the nationalist parties indeed have sought not 
separation, but the humanization of the state through a reduction in the scale of 
government.”503  
The political programmes of these nationalist parties also reflect such mainstream 
preoccupations, as they “are now more left wing, in political rhetoric but also now in 
government practice, than their Labour adversaries.”504 It is questionable whether 
Brown's traditionalist promotion of a British national identity has a direct influence 
on the ideology of organisations such as the EDL, and the actual extent to which 
such a promotion is indeed counterproductive is hard to assess. The nebulae of 
                                                 
501 The term Eurabia is a politically laden neologism coined by Bat Ye'or (pseudonym of Giselle 
Littman, meaning “daughter of the Nile” in Hebrew) which defines a Europe that has capitulated 
in the face of Islam. It was made popular with her book, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis, Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, Madison, 2005. Since 1983, she has been elaborating her ideology 
around the notion of dhimma which historically refers to non-Muslim people living under Sharia 
law. She applies this condition to the European societies in a paranoid contribution to the more 
widely popular idea of the clash of civilisation. It is significant that the expression, before it was 
adapted by Samuel Huntington in “The Clash of Civilisations?” (Foreign Affairs, 1993), was 
originally coined by Bernard Lewis in essay “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic 
Monthly, September 1990. Already in 1976, Lewis had formulated what would form the basis of 
the dominant discourse on the incompatibility of Islam and the West: “The Return of Islam”, 
Commentary Magazine, January 1976.  
502 Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999,  
p. 2. 
503 Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom, p. 297. 
504 Keith Dixon, “Blair, Brown and Britishness: the end of an old song?”. 
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identity politics which contributes to promoting traditional significations and the 
centrality of England, may indeed render discourses such as the EDL's more 
acceptable.  
3. Transnationalist Power Metal 
It is significant also that the EDL, contrary to traditional far-right parties, is adamant 
about clarifying its position as anti-Nazi.505 In October 2009, it called a press 
conference in a derelict warehouse in Luton to stage the burning of a Nazi flag. As 
BBC journalist Paraic O'Brien reports:  
“The windows of the warehouse had been boarded up. Fifteen men in 
balaclavas unfurled a swastika flag and proceeded to try to set it alight for the 
cameras. The message - look we are not Nazis.”506  
This sort of positioning is certainly different from the usually less spectacular and 
more ambiguous positioning of far-right political parties and organisation vis à vis 
national-socialism.507 But in the generalised process of the banalisation of far-right 
ideologies – and in the case of the EDL, its support for the state of Israel and 
cooperation with Jewish extremists –, these new procedures appear as part of a 
rhetoric of the new reactionary imaginary. The grid of significations it points to is 
that the opposition to national-socialism is no longer a safeguard for extremist 
ideologies, which is a dramatic evolution in the contemporary imaginary. One could 
argue that it is related to the evolution of the memory of the horrors of the Nazi 
regime, which is slowly passing from living memory to memory-history.  
Moving away from political organisations and far-right ideologies, a successful hard 
rock music band, or for the connoisseurs, a power metal band, presents us with a 
                                                 
505 The EDL has a “Jewish division” and in early January 2011 staged a common demonstration in 
Toronto with the Canadian branch of the extremist Jewish Defence League. On the Jewish 
division see Julian Kossoff, “The English Defence League, the Jewish division and the useful 
idiots”, Telegraph.co.uk, 19.01.2010, <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/juliankossoff/100059179/the-
english-defence-league-the-jewish-division-and-the-useful-idiots/> [accessed 27.01.2011] 
506 Paraic O'Brien “Under the skin of English Defence League”, BBC Newsnight, 12.10.2009, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/8303786.stm> [accessed  22.02.2009] 
507 Usually under the form of historical revisionism or even denial of the Holocaust.  
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peculiar recipe for success.508 The Swedish band Sabaton, the name referring to a 
piece of medieval armour, was founded in 1999. As most power metal bands, its 
music is a mix of catchy pop-like melodies played in fast tempos with a heavy metal 
sound. The main effect such music aims at producing is an epic feeling which is 
reflected in the traditional themes of the lyrics. It is not a genre usually associated 
with any sort of political engagement. Its imagery and rhetoric are generally those of 
heroic fantasy.509 In this regard, Sabaton started off as an ordinary power metal band. 
With the release of their second album, Primo Victoria (Abyss Studios, 2005), the 
band started gaining in popularity with its surprising and original theme of historical 
battles. A review of their fifth album, The Art of War (Black Lodge Records, 2008), 
which was their greatest success, summarizes Sabaton's particularity:  
“Power Metal lyrics often are equated with fantastic battles, dragons, knights 
and unicorns and while battles also play an integral part of Sabaton’s lyrics, 
they are far from being fantastic, quite the contrary, they are taking on the 
realities of historic wars, such as World War II, but thankfully without 
glorifying wars, rather pointing out the hardships and consequences, if you 
really listen to the lyrics and actually let them sink in, comprehending what the 
soldiers had to go through back then, it can actually be a pretty chilling 
experience.”510.  
Both the aforementioned albums feature for the most part, songs whose lyrics are 
inspired by historical military events, such as D-Day (“Primo Victoria”), the battle 
of Stalingrad (“Stalingrad”) or the Operation “Iraqi Freedom” (“Panzer 
Division”).511 On the album The Art of War, the song entitled “40:1” (forty to one) 
refers to the World War II battle of Wizna which opposed the Polish army to the 
invading Werhmarcht between 7 and 10 September 2010. In an interview, the lead 
singer recalls a letter he received from a Polish fan a letter relating the 
                                                 
508 In 2009, Sabaton was nominated in the category of “Best Heavy Metal band” (Bästa Hårdrock) 
for the Grammis, the Swedish equivalent of the Grammy Awards. The award is considered as 
one the most important on the metal scene in Europe. They lost to another Swedish metal band, 
In Flames, which is most certainly one of the most popular metal bands of the 2000s.   
509 One of first metal bands and certainly one of the most famous of the genre is the German band 
Helloween which was founded in 1978.  
510 Sabaton Review, The Metal Observer, 26.05.2008, <http://www.metal-observer.com/articles.php 
?lid=1&sid=1&id=14388> [accessed 15.09.2010] 
511 All the three featured on the album Primo Victoria.  
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“extraordinary” deeds of the Polish soldiers at the battle of Wizna.512 This account 
inspired the band to write a song which has considerably bolstered their popularity 
in Poland. In reaction to this tribute, the Polish government granted them honorific 
citizenship and a live performance was set up on the seventieth anniversary of the 
battle on its original grounds.513 In 2008, the association “Wizna1939” was created 
in the locality of Wizna which has been promoting the mythical battle ever since, 
even publishing a short comic book on the battle directly inspired by the song 
“40:1”.514 The official video clip of the song features a live performance of the band 
cut with fictional footage representing the battle of Wizna. The Polish flag is 
extensively present throughout the video: three or four are set on the stage, a couple 
of others are being waved by the public and the fictional flashbacks feature three 
shots of a floating Polish flag. On many occasions the lead singer weaves the Polish 
national flag on which “Polish Panzer Division” is written in black capital letters.  
Without even taking the lyrics into account, we already observe an overt promotion 
of nationalist symbolism, in which the reference to the German tank adds to the 
uneasiness of the imagery. But their seemingly explicit anti-Nazi lyrics at the same 
time allows for nationalistic expressions which recall the most militarist of 
nationalisms.515 But the association of a German military term with the Polish flag 
by a group of musicians dressed in military clothing suggest a more general 
fascination with militarism which appears as more ambiguous than their lyrics. This 
fascination is explicit in the chorus on the song “40:1”, which reads as follows:  
                                                 
512 Anna Nowacka-Isaksson. “Składamy hołd bohaterom [We pay tribute to heroes]”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 14.06.2008. 
513 Sabaton official website, <http://www.sabaton.net/band.html> [accessed 21.10.2010]. 
514 Rafał Roskowiński, Wizna 1939, 40 1: Art of War, R&R, 2008. See the association's official 
website: <http://www.wizna1939.eu/o_stowarzyszeniu.php> [accessed 21.10.2010]. On the 
official website of the Polish Army, we learn that the comic book was presented to the Army on 
the same day as the launch of the official video clip of the song by Sabaton on 22 February 
2008. The comic book can be downloaded free of charge on the Polish Army's website: 
<http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/articles/view/13197/59/komiks-wizna-1939.html> [retrieved  
25.10.2010]  
515 Sabaton had previously produced a similarly glorifying song on their album Primo Victoria, 
entitled "Counterstrike" whose theme was the Six-Day War of 1967. The official video clip 
featured in a similar fashion an extensive use of national symbols of Israel. 
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“No army may enter that land 
That is protected by Polish hand 
Unless you are 40 to 1 
Your force will soon be undone 
 
Baptised in fire 
40 to 1 
Spirit of Spartans 
Death and glory 
Soldiers of Poland 
Second to none 
Wrath of the Wehrmarcht brought to a halt”516 
The epic tone praising the valour of Polish soldiers is here well in line with what is 
expected from a power metal song. The Spartan reference is directly taken from 
Polish national military folklore in which the battle of Wizna has been coined, along 
with a few other battles, the “Polish Thermopylae”.517 Indeed the generally 
estimated ratio of forces was about 700 Polish soldiers against more than 42,000 
German soldiers. The Polish soldiers are said to have gloriously defended their 
position for four consecutive days and all would have perished in the process. The 
commander of the Polish forces, Captain Władysław Raginis, is said to have blown 
himself up with a hand grenade before losing the last bunker.518  
But according to historian Tomasz Wesołowski who specialises in twentieth century 
Polish military history, this popular romantic account is a myth.519 The battle would 
have taken place on 9 September, opposing fewer Polish soldiers, but with better 
equipment than is usually recounted, against 4,000 German troops, as the rest of the 
                                                 
516 For the complete lyrics, see Annex 9. 
517 See e.g. in the journal of the veterans of the Polish Army: A. Wiktorzak, “Wizna - Polskie 
Termopile” [Wizna – The Polish Thermopylae], Głos Weterana, no. 9, 1997.  
518 This account is widespread across the World Wide Web. For example, the articles in the various 
languages on the battle of Wizna on the Wikipedia website all tell the same story, based on the 
article in Polish.   
519 Tomasz Wesołowski appears to be in the process of writing a book about the original battle 
taking into account the only remaining military sources of the time, i.e. those of the Wehrmarcht, 
which according to him, provide a different picture than that of the contemporary popular 
representation of Wizna as the Polish Thermopylae. He has announced that his book would also 
cover the memory of the battle of Wizna in the decades after the war and its appropriation by the 
national-communist regime in the 1960s onwards where the contemporary myth originates. 
Tomasz Wesołowski, interview by Monika Żmijewska, “Wizna: niesłychany mit kampanii 
wrześniowej?” [Wizna: the incredible myth of the September campaign?], Gazeta Wyborcza 
Białystok, 06.09.2009. 
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column waited behind. The position seemed to have been abandoned, as there is 
little evidence accounting for the death of the large majority of Polish soldiers.  
Wesołowski presents how the myth was created by the local director of the military 
museum twenty years after the actual events in a manner typical of the propaganda 
of the PRL regime. There is a historical irony in the fact that the myth of the battle of 
Wizna whose origins are to be found in national-communist propaganda has become 
once again a symbol of Polish resistance thanks to a song by a Swedish power metal 
band: transnational reproduction of nationalism in the making.520 Wesołowski, who 
was born sometime in the late 1960s, adds that this myth was part of his upbringing. 
In response to those who would attack him for historical revisionism, he answers 
that his work does not undermine the heroism of the Polish Army in 1939, but that 
the contemporary national myths surrounding this period are still myths of pre-1989 
Polish national-communism. He states that other battles and other Polish officers 
would have been worthy of remembrance:  
“Na zafałszowanym micie nie można budować własnej tożsamości. Po co na 
siłę fetować obronę Wizny, skoro niedaleko jest Nowogród, gdzie rzeczywiście 
odbyły się ciężkie walki?”521  
But it is easy to imagine how the glorification of Polish soldiers suits an national 
imaginary focused on historical scars and tragic events such as the Second World 
War. The anti-communist policies after 1989 in Poland have focused on lustration 
policies (lustracja), which aim at limiting the participation of former collaborators 
of the communist regime in political affairs as well as in state administration. The 
Institute of National Remembrance — Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes 
against the Polish Nation (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej — Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni 
przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, IPN) has been the main body in charge of these 
policies since 1998. The radical anticommunist discourse developped around the 
IPN, by politicians such as the Kaczyński twins, is embedded is their nationalist 
                                                 
520 According to the available information, none of the members of the band had any particular ties 
with Poland prior to the release of the song “40:1”.. 
521 “One cannot build an identity on a falsified myth. Why should we forcefully praise the defence 
of Wizna, when not far away we find Nowogród where bloody battles have indeed taken place.”  
Wesołowski, “Wizna: niesłychany mit kampanii wrześniowej?”. 
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outlook. But as the work of historians suggest, there is perhaps more need for a 
critical self-reflection on the imaginary which frames these anticommunist policies. 
It seems to be extensively rooted in national-communism as the erasure of crimes, 
but also of social significations developed before 1989, is a enterpise which has 
failed in all post-Communist societies. Polish historians who confront this period, 
the way Wesołowski does, show how these significations have been foundational, 
for better and often for worse, in the formation of the contemporary Polish state and 
society.522   
   
                                                 
522 On the extent of nationalism in Poland before 1989, see Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, 
nacjonalizm. 
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– Part 3 – 
Transgressions: Binaries Revisited 
 
1. Fixity and Fluidity of Hybridity 
All the analyses of the two previous chapters confirm the simplistic frameworks of 
national imaginaries which seem incapable to adapt to complex social and historical 
conjunctures without relying on reactionary grids of significations. But this 
conclusion is perhaps not very surprising. The extent to which the reactionary drive 
is being integrated in the dominant imaginary may appear as more significant. It can 
be interpreted as a critical sign of the widespread generalised imaginary imbalance 
of late modernity.  
Sociologist Ulrich Beck argues that we have entered such a late, “reflexive 
modernity”. Beck argues what reflexive, or indeed radicalised modernity puts to the 
foreground: a paradigmatic change in which “we” have no other choice than to 
reflect on and even think beyond dualisms. It is a paradigmatic change as these 
dualisms or binaries are “modern mental habits”.523 As we have observed, one 
particular habit of thought of the modern nationalist imaginaries, is the binary 
opposition between the Self and the Other. Beck argues that “we” (the Self) can no 
longer imagine “ourselves” in such a binary opposition: the Other is among “us”, 
and even more, “we” are the Other.524 The most common metaphors for describing 
                                                 
523 Ulrich Beck, “How to think about Science?”, interview by David Cayley, CBC Radio One, 
December 2007  
524 This relates of course to what can be described as the postcolonial condition of the contemporary 
world – a condition that is not new, but which is, or so it seems, more and more experienced in 
everyday life.  Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Hybridity, So What? The Anti-Hybridity Backlash and 
the Riddles of Recognition”, Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 18 , no. 2-3, London, SAGE, 
2001, pp. 219-245, p. 238. 
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what are considered its main attributes, changeability and uncertainty, are the 
metaphors of fluidity and liquidity.525  
Cultural hybridity, as it is understood in postcolonial theory, is perceived as having 
the potential to go beyond the sort of modern binaries from which, as Beck suggests, 
contemporary social imaginaries have to find a way out. According to Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse, hybridity is precisely that: “Hybridity is to culture what 
deconstruction is to discourse: transcending binary categories.”526 But the term 
hybridity and the vast array of concepts it encapsulates have raised already long-
running discussions and debates.  
Hybridity refers notably to discourses and ideologies of racism. It traces the origins 
of the term back to the early seventeenth century. Derived from Latin, it was seldom 
found until the nineteenth century but in biological or botanical descriptions. Robert 
C. Young points out that in the first half of the nineteenth century, hybridity was 
used in the context of race mixture, especially in relation to human fertility. The 
increasing use of the terms “hybrid” and “hybridity” in the nineteenth century 
“marks the rise of the belief that there could be such a thing as a human hybrid.”527 
The belief, in other words, that there are objective human races. A significant aspect 
which emerges when reviewing the colonialist ideas about hybridity, is how the 
mixing of races was considered in a negative way. The negative aspect of human 
                                                 
525 “Fluid identities” or “boundaries”, “liquid modernity” or even “liquid life” are but a few of the 
metaphorical expressions extensively used in the past decade. See e.g. Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid 
Modernity, Cambridge, Polity, 2000; Liquid Life, Cambridge, Polity, 2005;  Liquid Times: Living 
in an Age of Uncertainty, Cambridge, Polity, 2006; Robyn Longhurst, Bodies: Exploring Fluid 
Boundaries, London, Routledge, 2000. 
526 Nederveen Pieterse, “Hybridity, So What?”, p. 238.  
527 Robert C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race, London, Routledge, 
1995, p. 6. 
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mixing can be found throughout human history, and it is best defined through the 
negative perception of its transgressive potential.528 
It is a positive reinterpretation of this transgressive, revolutionary aspect that runs 
through the contemporary counter-discourse on hybridity. Terms like bricolage (or 
simply colage), métissage, creolisation and indeed hybridity used in cultural studies 
and related fields do not express the racialist negative take on the concept. As it has 
been mentioned before, it is the particularity of the hybrid space to be able to 
transgress, or better, to transcend, to go beyond. The hybrid position is no longer 
seen by some as a “badge of failure or denigration, but as a part of the contestational 
weave of cultures.”529  
One of the major contemporary theorists recently associated with cultural hybridity 
is Homi Bhabha. In most of his works, Bhabha considers the interrelations and 
interdependence between the colonisers and the colonised. Through the colonial 
experience, the social categories exerted on the colonised (the ideas of superior and 
inferior human races and cultures for instance) imprints an imaginary, which collides 
with their own, “displacing” or “disjuncting” it. This “encounter” eventually creates 
new “hybrid” expressions (of culture, of belonging), which in turn challenge the 
beliefs and experience of the colonisers. Bhabha argues that these colonial – and 
postcolonial – cultural systems and statements are constructed in a “liminal space”: 
the “Third Space of Enunciation”530 Although ground breaking, Bhabha's theory is 
not without contradictions and has regularly been subject to criticism. A particularly 
strong criticism is expressed in the work of anthropologist Jonathan Friedman. One 
                                                 
528 The idea of fertility in the context of nineteenth century racial hybridity is a narrative that runs 
throughout the colonial experience and maybe even beyond. It was believed that the 
“hybridisation” of different human races would eventually cause the downfall of the different 
“pure” species. A downfall caused by supposed sexual lust and infinite fecundity of hybrids or to 
the contrary by their perceived biological inferiority, which made them barren. Marilyne Brun, 
“Transgressive Hybridity? The Historical Association of Hybridity and Transgression”, 
Conference paper, Work in Progress Days, 30-31.10.2007, School of Culture and 
Communication, University of Melbourne. 
529 Nyoongah Mudrooroo,Writing from the Fringe: A Study of Modern Aboriginal Literature, 
Melbourne, Hyland House, 1990, p. 24. 
530 The aim of his argument is the deconstruction the colonisers' (and more generally Western and 
modern) essentialist claims of an inherent purity of culture. Homi Bhabha, “Cultural Diversity 
and Cultural Differences”, in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin [eds.], The Post-
Colonial Reader, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 209. 
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of the main points of Friedman's critique is the elitist approach of Bhabha's work. He 
eventually defines the postcolonial theory of hybridity as the ideology of a new elite: 
a “postmodern” cosmopolitanism.531 In spite of what will appear to be rather 
simplistic and sometimes flawed arguments, some elements of Friedman's critique 
can bring up elements for further reflection.  
As much as hybridity theory aims for the deconstruction of essentialist categories, it 
has been criticised on grounds that it can only make sense “on the assumption of 
purity.”532 But Nederveen Pieterse adds:  
“Hybridization as a process is old as history, but the pace of mixing accelerates 
and its scope widens in the wake of major structural changes, such as new 
technologies that enable new phases of intercultural contact. [...] If practices of 
mixing are as old as the hills, the thematization of mixing as a discourse and 
perspective is fairly new.”  
The project of describing hybrid narratives and thematising the experience and the 
self-conscious perspective is at the core of Bhabha's works on cultural hybridity. 533 
These new forms, Bhabha argues, come together as a counter-discourse to the 
discursive dominance of the hegemonic structures and institutions of colonisation. 
The main narratives it opposes are what Bhabha considers to be essentialist national 
narratives of culture and belonging. The significance of these counter-narratives is 
their negotiation of space where hegemonic discourses homogenise culture and 
society.534 The coerciveness of hegemonic narratives can nevertheless be overcome. 
                                                 
531 Jonathan Friedman, “Global Crisis, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarelling: Cosmopolitans versus Locals, Ethnics and Nationals in an Era of De-
hegemonisation”, in Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood [eds.], Debating Cultural Hybridity, 
London, Zed, 1997, pp.70-89, p. 75. 
532 Nederveen Pieterse who has more extensively analysed the debate over hybridity, distinguishes 
two different varieties. One of those, “new hybridity”, is a process that can be observed 
(Mandarin pop, e.g.). The other variety, “existing or old hybridity”, is a discourse and a 
perspective, which creates a “hybridity consciousness”. Additionally, they connect in the 
experience of the “new” phenomena (“new hybridity”) and through the self-conscious 
perspective taken on performing and experiencing the processes (“existing or old hybridity”) 
Nederveen Pieterse, “Hybridity, So What?”, p. 221. 
533 In his theorisation, it precisely refers to “the creation of new transcultural forms within the 
contact zone produced by colonisation.” Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Post-
Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts,  London, Routledge, 2003, p. 118. 
534 This negotiation is a constant endeavour “that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge 
in moments of historical transformation.” Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London, Routledge, 
2004 [1994], p. 2.  
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The Third Place of Enunciation in which cultural hybridity comes into constant 
formation is a place of movement, of “fluidity”, which opposes the traditional fixity 
of national narratives. Referring to artist Renee Green's metaphor of the art gallery 
as a stairwell Bhabha develops the metaphor for describing the cultural negotiation 
which takes place in this space of différance:  
“The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, 
becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that 
constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white. The hither 
and thither of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, 
prevents identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. 
This interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility 
of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed 
hierarchy. ”535  
Cultural hybrid expressions, which have emerged from colonisation, are marginal 
cultural narratives. The space they need to be expressed cannot be imagined in the 
binary categories traditionally associated with the modern nationalist imaginaries:  
“[...]  the very idea of a pure, 'ethnically cleansed' national identity can only be 
achieved through the death, literal and figurative, of the complex interweavings 
of history, and the culturally contingent borderlines of modern nationhood.”536 
From this very brief overview of Bhabha's theory, two dilemmas already emerge. 
The first is related to the already mentioned problematic “assumptions of purity”. 
The ambivalence of Bhabha's account on the inclusive and exclusive properties of 
hybridity is confusing. On the one hand, liminal space is supposed to prevent 
“identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities”, suggesting that 
the polarities are in fact the boundaries of liminal space (and not spaces themselves), 
and as such, are included within the former. On the other hand, it is an “interstitial 
                                                 
535 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 5. 
536 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 7. At the same time, Bhabha sees the discourse of these 
narratives (as well as his) as the discourse of critique that can break down these essentialist 
barriers and make sense of the historical complexity (opposed to the historicity of the hegemonic 
narratives of the nation). As such, he proposes a further, political perspective for hybridity to 
take on: “The language of critique is effective not because it keeps forever separate the terms of 
the master and the slave, the mercantilist and the Marxist, but to the extent to which it 
overcomes the given grounds of opposition and opens up a space of translation: a place of 
hybridity, figuratively speaking, where the construction of a political object that is new, neither 
the one nor the other, properly alienates our political expectations, and changes, as it must, the 
very forms of our recognition of the moment of politics.” The Location of Culture, p. 37.  
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passage between fixed identifications”, between fixed “imaginaries”, which 
supposes (just like the concept of “Third Space”) that they are indeed spaces. This 
confusion, although not necessarily contradictory, needs to be clarified.  
The second dilemma, which is one of the points of criticism mentioned before, 
concerns the sources Bhabha uses to describe and conceptualise narrative processes 
of cultural hybridisation. In The Location of Culture, Bhabha draws on a very large 
array of literary, artistic and theoretical texts. The interweaving of all these texts 
creates a complex and hermetic whole which can indeed give the impression to 
voicing an elite condition (albeit marginal) rather than commonality and daily 
experiences of displacement. The lack of clarity, as mentioned above, helps to 
produce this impression. But Bhabha describes his endeavour in different terms, and 
reverses the argument: 
“There is a damaging and self-defeating assumption that theory is necessarily 
the elite language of the socially and culturally privileged. It is said that the 
place of the academic critic is inevitably within the Eurocentric archives of an 
imperialist or neo-colonial West.” (1994:19)  
Nevertheless, Bhabha has throughout his career been subject to charges of elitism 
and the like.537 As we shall see, Friedman's critique of Bhabha's theorisation is no 
exception.538  
2. Essentialist Cosmopolitanism  
Friedman gives a dramatic and alarming account of the world which is literally 
falling into pieces, moving away from the neat modernist classifications. Asserting 
that “the general fragmentation process of the world system” is under way, he 
                                                 
537 See Benjamin Graves, “Homi K. Bhabha: An Overview”, 1998, <http://www.scholars.nus.edu.sg 
/landow/post/poldiscourse/bhabha/bhabha1.html> [accessed 05.06.2008] 
538 Jonathan Friedman seems to hold a deeply rooted grudge against postcolonial theory of cultural 
hybridity as well as towards its theorists. Nederveen Pieterse's considers Friedman's arguments 
against hybridity to be “[...] representative of a wider view.” Nederveen Pieterse, “Hybridity, So 
What?”, p. 224. 
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considers the concurrent “theorisation of creolisation, métissage, mestisaje, and 
hybridity”539 to be: 
“[...] the intellectual cosmopolitan reaction to that process, one that contains a 
highly ambivalent posture with regard to to the ethnification process itself and 
the desire for something broader, more global, truly cosmopolitan and above it 
all. This is the hyphenated reality of the postmodern cosmopolitan, a reality 
that is defined not by the modern, the abstract, but by the plurality of 
knowledges, of cultures and of their continuous fusion.” (Friedman 1997:75) 
If the theorisation of hybridity is the “self-identification” of postmodern 
cosmopolitans, Friedman argues that “it has little to do with everyday problems of 
identity in the streets, even as it is part of the same world.” This is the recurrent 
elitist argument against theorists like Bhabha or Paul Gilroy. Friedman provocatively 
asks: “But who reads the poetry [...]?”540 What Friedman's criticism explains is his 
own ideological perspective. Through elements than run throughout his critique, 
Friedman also presents himself as a proponent of cosmopolitanism, but not of the 
same “age”, or of the same kind of cosmopolitanism. It is significant in the sense 
that it establishes a framework from which Friedman expresses his criticisms on 
hybridity theory.  
The new condition of the world, the one Bauman describes as “liquid”, is defined in 
Friedman's “neomedievalism” assertions as a sort of chaotic contemporary “Dark 
Age.”541 In this light, Friedman considers that the “model” for postmodern 
cosmopolitanism “is not the macro-nation but the medieval Church, the great 
encompasser. Ecumenical pluralism is the complementary counterpart of fragmented 
ethnic identities.”542 What transpires here is an opposition between modernity, or the 
modernist project Friedman associates with it, and what he describes as the 
postmodern “ethnification” of the world and postmodern cosmopolitanism. 
Friedman suggests that this condition has taken the world over, “forsaking 
                                                 
539 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press,1993, p. 2, quoted in  Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 75. 
540 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 74 and 79. 
541 Nederveen Pieterse, “Hybridity, So What?”, p. 238. 
542 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 75. 
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modernity.”543 It is in these dark ages that a new cosmopolitanism is thriving. It 
is“cosmopolitanism without modernism” and yet “not without modernity as such, 
but without the rationalist, abstract and developmentalist project of modernism.”544 
Friedman gives us more explicit clues on his interpretation of the true modernist 
cosmopolitanism: 
“The cosmopolitan of old was a modernist who identified above and beyond 
ethnicity and particular cultures. He was a progressive intellectual, a believer in 
rationality who understood cultural specificities as expressions of universal 
attributes. The new cosmopolitans are ecumenical collectors of culture. They 
represent nothing more than a gathering of differences, often in their own self-
identifications.”545 
Friedman appears to take the position of a nostalgic herald of the cosmopolitanism 
“of old”. By taking sides with a suggested idealist modernist approach, his critique 
appears to formulate a struggle for hegemony against what is defined as a political 
and normative discourse of hybridization.546 But the binary opposition constructed 
by Friedman seems to be in fact representative of the essentialist categories precisely 
opposed by postcolonial theory. But in the following point of his critique, that 
hybridity bases its possibility of identification on essentialist notions of identity and 
culture. In turn, it is hybridity theory that is considered essentialist and 
homogenising.547  
In relation to the lack of clarity and ambiguities found in Bhabha, and disregarding 
for now the elitist charge, it is hard not to give a certain credit to Friedman's 
criticism. It shows how the possible interpreting of liminal space as exclusive of 
essentialist notions (like those of homogeneous identities), can be considered to 
consequently reinforce their perceived fixity. A fixity opposed to the movement, to 
the différance contained in the liminal space. And yet, différance hints at a different 
                                                 
543 It is further explained as the “abandonment of the ideal of a strong social project and 
assimilation to that project” for the sake of multiculturalism, “the expression of a broad shift in 
the 'identity space' of declining Western modernity.” Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 72. 
544 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 76. 
545 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 83. 
546 Friedman, “The Hybridization of Roots and the Abhorrence of the Bush”, in M.Featherstone and 
S. Lash [eds.], Spaces of Culture: City-Nation-World, London, Sage, 1999, pp.230-255; 242.  
547 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 79. 
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interpretation. Friedman is again right to point a finger at the fact that “all cultures 
have always been the product of import and a mix of elements” adding with a sense 
of superiority that this “was a commonplace for early cultural anthropology”.548  
But this is the point where Friedman's argument is flawed. Conversely, his 
suggestive defence of modernist cosmopolitanism shows that his take on the work of 
post-colonial theorists, including Bhabha's, is also based on a misconception. It is in 
terms of representations and imaginaries that liminal space and hybridity as well as 
essentialist, homogeneous notions of culture and identity can make sense. In 
consequence, his criticism of “postmodern cosmopolitanism” as an elite discourse 
may well be justified. But his own discourse, albeit self-identified as being “above 
and beyond ethnicity” is similarly hegemonic and particularistic. Notwithstanding 
ambiguities in Bhabha's theorisations, the political project (the “hybrid perspective”) 
is indeed clearly stated. Similarly, other theorists do in fact argue in favour of what 
is perceived as a political resistance of cultural representations or as a “radical 
imaginary” which hybridity can produce.549 The reason why this is a criticism in 
Friedman's positioning relies on his idealistic representation of the modernist 
cosmopolitan project. Despite his acute critical look on hybridity, he lacks self-
reflexivity.  
Heavily relying on Claude Lévi-Strauss, Friedman writes that: “if cultures 
exchanged all their elements with one another on a continuous basis, there would no 
longer be any differences, and thus no mutual attraction.”550 The exclusion of 
relations of power and dominance in the abstract cultural exchanges he mentions 
show the oversimplification of his perspective. This is a crucial point as the political 
endeavour of postcolonial theory can precisely be summed up in the deconstruction 
of power relations – such as the coloniser/colonised relation – that have lead to 
                                                 
548 As a consequence, post-colonial theorists seem to suffer from “a confusion of perspectives”. 
Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 80. 
549 In this sense Friedman's political argumentation is correct. There is a self-conscious element of 
the theorisation of hybridity. But one could argue that this, as well as hybridisation, is self-
evident. Discursive formations are precisely about knowledge and power, although again, 
Friedman seems to discard the Foucauldian approach. Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 72. 
550 Friedman, “Global Crisis”, p. 77. 
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hybridisation. This in short means that they are historical relations and that their 
localised context can hardly produce a systematic theory, even though certain 
patterns can reappear in different contexts.551 
Friedman's rationale of modernist cosmopolitanism is in fact representative of 
Western ethnocentric discourses that carry essentialist notions.552 Apart from the 
nostalgic note about faith in rationality, the corollary attribute of the modern 
cosmopolitan is, according to Friedman, the knowledge about “universal attributes”, 
or more simply, about his own universal identity. It is useful to turn here to the 
critical insights of Craig Calhoun, who has produced a critical appraisal on 
belonging and modern cosmopolitanism. Calhoun shows how cosmopolitanism 
externalises culture as an object of consumption. He concludes his critical appraisal: 
“No one lives outside particularistic solidarities. Some cosmopolitan theorists 
may believe they do, but this is an illusion made possible by positions of 
relative privilege and the dominant place of some cultural orientations in the 
world at large. The illusion is not a simple mistake, but a misrecognition tied to 
what Pierre Bourdieu called the “illusio” of all social games, the commitment 
to their structure that shapes the engagement of every player and makes 
possible effective play. In other words, cosmopolitans do not simply fail to see 
the cultural particularity and social supports of their cosmopolitanism, but 
cannot fully and accurately recognize these without introducing a tension 
between themselves and their social world. And here I would include myself 
and probably all of us. Whether we theorize cosmopolitanism or not, we are 
embedded in social fields and practical projects in which we have little choice 
but to make use of some of the notions basic to cosmopolitanism and thereby 
reproduce it.”553 
In this perspective, we can easily draw conclusions in relation to the analyses of 
political discourse promoting national identities. It is evident that these promotions 
are expressed from the vantage point of an elite, which is disconnected from the 
realities of the 'commoners' to whom this promotion of projected identities is 
directed. 
                                                 
551 This is why Bhabha for instance highlights a necessary interrelation between theory and 
practice. See Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 19. 
552 It also raises the issue of loyalty as it is to be found in the political or “ethical cosmopolitanism” 
defended by Jürgen Habermas in order to move beyond particularistic solidarities. See e.g. 
Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, Cambridge, MIT 
Press, 1998. 
553 Calhoun, Nations Matter, pp. 25-26. 
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3. The 'Two Nations' Rap Remix 
If hybridity theories are simply elite discursive formations fighting for hegemony 
with other similar elite formations which all resonate in the discursive field of 
nationalism, and as a matter of consequence, none of them is able to transcend 
essentialist categories, we could wonder whether we are left but with bitter 
cynicism. In spite of this, Calhoun does not refrain from formulating a political 
perspective in continuum with his self-reflexive discernment: 
“Cosmopolitanism by itself may not be enough; a soft cosmopolitanism that 
doesn’t challenge capitalism or Western hegemony may be an ideological 
diversion; but some form of cosmopolitanism is needed.”554 (2002) 
He suggests that: 
“[...] we should want to transform it, not least because as usually constructed, 
especially in its most individualistic forms, it systematically inhibits attention 
to the range of solidarities on which people depend, and to the special role of 
such solidarities in the struggles of the less privileged and those displaced or 
challenged by capitalist globalization.”555 (2007:26)  
Postcolonial theory and related studies appear as one domain in academia, a 
traditional locus of cosmopolitanism, where the idea to provide a space for the 
expression and the formulation of marginal stories of solidarities is fundamental. But 
it has to be careful not to induce a reification of its own terms. A certain number of 
studies show how what could be interpreted as new imaginings, as the promotion of 
hybrid significations, can turn into exclusionary social institutions. For example, 
Viranjini Munasinghe presents in his case study on Indo-Trinidadians in Trinidad, 
how state discourse celebrates hybridity and impurity, and as such seems to form a 
counter-narrative to traditional Western nationalist discourses. However “[l]ike all 
nationalist narratives [...] it remains a narrative that excludes, in this case those 
people who were thought to embody purity because they never mixed in the first 
place.”556  
                                                 
554 Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism is Not Enough: Why Nationalism and the Politics of Identity Still 
Matter”, paper presentation for the National University of Singapore, March 2002 
555 Calhoun, Nations Matter, p. 26. 
556 Viranjini Munasinghe, “Nationalism in Hybrid Spaces: the Production of Impurity out of 
Purity”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2002, pp.663-692, p. 685. 
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Yet, Calhoun suggests that we should not dismiss the value of particularisms. It is, 
like Bhabha suggests, on the margins of the nation that hybrid perspectives can 
promote inclusive imaginary significations.557 In addition, it is “in moments of 
historical transformation” that “cultural hybridities [...] emerge”.558 In other words, it 
is during critical historical moments of struggle, for recognition for instance and not 
necessarily for hegemony, that new imaginings and significations can emerge. On 
the same thread, recognition can mean inclusion which, as we suggest in the second 
chapter of the present study, entails their social imaginary institutionalisation. 
In 2005, during the crisis of the banlieues, images of French cities burning and 
falling into chaos were thoroughly aired throughout media networks. As we have 
mentioned before, politicians also took advantage of the situation, and risk-driven 
and nationalist discourses were easily justified. The spectacle and experience of the 
crisis fostered an already latent uneasiness towards French postcolonial minorities 
and immigrants. But this crisis has also produced a less elitist mobilisation which 
hoped to counter the dominant imaginary. Many rap or hip hop artists for instance 
who had in the previous two decades been the heralds of the inhabitants of the 
banlieues, reaffirmed their status as 'older brothers' in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Musical artist Kery James, whose latest video clip, “Banlieusards” (a slang term 
designing derives from banlieue and refers to its inhabitants) was extensively 
screened on French television networks and on the World Wide Web in early 
2008.559 
In the video clip of “Banlieusards”, we can see a picture frame being passed on from 
James to many famous and professionally successful people who were raised in the 
banlieues. The frame is passed on throughout the video clip, taking snapshots of 
                                                 
557 Bhabha, “DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation” in Homi 
Bhabha [ed.], Nation and Narration, New York, Routledge, 1990, pp.291-322.  
558 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 2. 
559 Since at least 1996, James has been regarded as a spokesman for the “banlieues” along with 
other members of his rap formation of the 1990's Ideal J. They became famous with their first 
album Original MC's sur une mission with notably a song entitled “Ghetto français” (“French 
Ghetto”). Born in Guadeloupe, James was raised in a housing estate in the south-east of Paris, in 
Orly. Another more prominent 'older brother' who features in the video clip is former 
professional football player Lilian Thuram who has regularly expressed his opposition to 
Sarkozy's discourse and policies. 
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each of the participants. Under each frame appears a caption with the name and 
profession of the person in the frame. All the participants join in the final chorus at 
the end of the clip. The lyrics do not focus on cultural or ethnic themes.560 But the 
main theme that runs throughout the song is about the marginal social and economic 
situation of the peoples of the estates. The people, “we”, are opposed here to the 
state, “them” – and not to the majority community:  
“[...]nous dans les ghettos, eux à L'ENA 
Nous derrière les barreaux, eux au sénat 
Ils défendent leurs intérêts, éludent nos problèmes”561 
Here James does not address “them”, the state officials, but the banlieusards. His 
message is expressed in the rhetorical question: “Mais [...] qu'a-t-on fait pour nous 
même ?” (But what have we done for ourselves?). The motto “on n'est pas 
condamné à l'échec” (we are not doomed to failure) is repeated throughout the song 
and also appears on the shirt James wears in the video clip. What is important is that 
the theme of ethnicity and cultural particularism is turned upside down. James 
explicitly expresses the idea of an inclusive French nation:  
“ Le 2, ce sera pour ceux qui rêvent d'une France unifiée 
Parce qu'à ce jour y'a deux France, qui peut le nier ? 
Et moi je serai de la 2eme France, celle de l'insécurité 
Des terroristes potentiels, des assistés 
C'est c'qu'ils attendent de nous, mais j'ai d'autres projets  
Qu'ils retiennent ça.”562 
The lyrics read of a significant distinction between the people and the state, arguing 
for a unity of the people without or regardless of the state – without expressing a 
revolutionary project of hegemonic institutionalisation. This shift in the 
significations from the master narrative of the nation-state and nationalism can be 
                                                 
560 There is a brief mention about the varied skin colour of the banlieusards and about colonisation. 
561 The ENA stands for the National School of Administration (Ecole Nationale d'Administration), 
famously the one institution of higher education in which the majority of French politicians are 
educated. “We, in the ghettos, they, in the ENA/ We, behind bars, they, in the Senate/ They 
defend their interests, elude our problems.” Kery James, “Balieusards”, À l'ombre du show 
business, March 2008.  
562 “The 2 will be for those who dream of a unified France/ Because today there are two French 
nations, who can deny it?/ And I will be of the second France, that of insecurity/ Of potential 
terrorists, of social security/ This is what they expect from us, but I have other projects/ Let them 
hold on to that.” James, “Balieusards”. 
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regarded as the expression of a sense that emerges during a critical moment. 
Thematically though, there is no hybrid theme. What we find for instance are themes 
related to diversity (which is relayed in the video clip) and to a lesser degree of a 
working class culture. It is not a call for anarchy, but a message driven by a Marxist 
consideration that the ruling class, driven by its own interest, points to responsibility 
of the ruling class in diverting attention away from what is socially significant. In 
relation to hybrid imaginary representations, the process is inclusive of what would 
traditionally (or in the dominant discourse) be considered the Self and the Other. 
Both, the “banlieusards” and the rest of French society which is implied are part of 
the project of unity James expresses. In the perspective of social imaginary 
significations, we observe in the anti-establishment ideology expressed in the song 
as a comprehensive popular definition – the nation of the French people – , is 
opposed to the nation as it is defined and imagined by the state's professional 
administrators. This discursive process clearly reminds us the one Sieyès expressed 
in 1789, where the Tiers état was imagined as representing the French people in its 
entirety.563 
The potential for hip-hop movements to “transcend the divisions that are ever more 
openly fostered by the French state” was already identified in 1997 by Steve 
Canon.564 The interweaving of cultural, political and social significations that are 
signified in these productions present what should remain at the centre of hybridity 
theory: the transcending of exclusionary imaginaries. All other elements in a study – 
such as the ones presented in this work – are socially and historically localised. It is 
clear that it is about providing a space for marginal stories rather than risking the 
reification of new forms which do not necessarily follow or express new social 
significations. 
Radical social imaginary significations are indeed political transgressions, and it is 
expected to oppose these to fixed, traditional expressions of culture. What 
                                                 
563 See Chapter 2, Part 1.3 of the present work. 
564 Steve Canon, “Paname City Rapping: B-boys in the banlieues and beyond”, A. Hargreaves and 
M. McKinney [eds], Post-Colonial Cultures in France, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 150-166, 
p. 163. 
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Friedman's criticism of Bhabha indirectly point to, is the importance of class and 
social relations in the context of cultural expressions and significations.565 If we take 
Friedman's anthropological statement for granted, namely that all cultures are the 
result of a process of hybridisation, logically, the spaces of the Self and those of the 
Other are the obsolete “third spaces of enunciation” for those that identify with 
them. This raises of course problems about the historical development of cultures. It 
suggests that crystallisations of cultural significations are part of their evolution. As 
far as nationalism is concerned, our historical inquiry implied it was once a third 
space set of significations which has crystallised as first and fixed space of 
enunciation. Similarly, when an identified hybrid culture is reified and 
institutionalised by state discourses and practices, even though these originally echo 
a popular signification, and however novel it may appear, it eventually becomes a 
represented closed space of enunciation. It consequently loses its radical power to 
become an established instituted and instituting imaginary.566  
 
                                                 
565 This may be lacking in Bhabha's account, inasmuch as one does not consider national and 
traditional hegemonic cultures related to one particular class, which, as our study suggests, may 
well be the case.  
566 This is why it is fundamental to stress the historical 'locality' rather than the linear historicity of 
these phenomena. The historicity can bring validation to expressions perceived as long-running 
historically (such as perceived traditions, which are generally legitimation for instituted 
imaginary significations) whereas “new” forms will be discarded as simply invented, momentary 
creations of marginal, up-rooted, unstable or ill-identified people. Whichever term is preferred, 
what hybridity theory points to, when interpreted as a historical auto-ecosystem of cultural 
formation, is not only to significations of 'race', of métissage, but also of gender, class and 
maybe above all of imaginary significations that are constantly subjected to différance. Bhabha 
is perhaps wrong in defining the “place of hybridity” as something new. Theorising hybridity as 
“ neither the one nor the other” is maybe theoretically very attractive, a revolutionary tabula 
rasa, but it does not have the performative potential he claims it has. Bhabha, The Location of 
Culture, p. 37. 
 
 CLOSURE  217 
– Closure – 
De Nihilo 
 
 
The labyrinth which we originally entered now appears to have been the threshold to 
other representations. But beyond metaphors, the epistemological approach 
attempted in this study looked for localised historical moments as discursive original 
spaces of enunciation and to analyse parts of the imaginary significations they 
include and exclude. If our dominant social representations, our imaginary spaces 
close up, the struggle for recognition becomes indeed a struggle for hegemony, as it 
was observed in the significations and evolution of the republican imaginary during 
the pre-national modern period. Binary categories can not be transcended if they are 
discarded. The modus operandi which has been historically successful appears to be 
the interplay between the inclusion of radical significations which, however 
paradigmatic they are, are marginal and minor in accountable terms. But their social 
institutionalisation comprehends their associations with already instituted imaginary 
significations. Following Calhoun's suggestion, we should seek to transform 
established significations as no one is above the established particularistic – and 
hence essentialist – modes of thinking.  
“Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed” goes the principle 
expressed by Anaxagoras. However, in the world of human culture, certain 'things' 
certainly get lost. But if the mode through which social meanings change is indeed 
an auto-eco-system, then no significations are created with nothing but are rather 
created from nothing – cum nihilo and ex nihilo as Castoriadis writes.567 It means 
that radical significations are yet but part of a potential imaginary which our 
formulations do not include. But as human history goes, all can and will be 
somehow transformed. 
                                                 
567 See e.g. Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution, pp. 359-364. 
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– Conclusion – 
 
“J'ai glissé dans cette moitié du monde pour laquelle l'autre n'est que 
décor”568  
The first of the introductory questions which motivated this study was concerned 
with the mode through which nationalism, as a social imaginary, is being reproduced 
in contemporary European societies. On the tour of nationalist texts presented and 
analysed in this work, nationalism appears as a fundamental characteristic of our 
contemporary social imaginaries – in Europe, but also of an embryonic global 
civilisation. It cannot be reduced to the account of particular nationalisms. 
Independently from where we look at nationalism, as a social imaginary, nationalism 
informs our rationalised mapping out of the world, synthesising a global complexity 
beyond comprehension, but maybe not beyond imagination. Nationalism, as a 
political doctrine or a shared set of social beliefs, tends to hide or resist the 
transcultural reality of the post-colonial and post-Cold War world (dis)order.  
Layout 
It is complicated to assess the extent to which state-based promotions of nationalism 
echo popular cultural expressions. Such promotions seem to have mixed electoral 
results. The cultural signification of nations, at least in states which present us with 
long running national imaginary institutions – which is the case for Britain, France 
and Poland – has to be assumed as a social reality. Some of the expressions of these 
institutions prevent the imaginary institution of the plurality of societies, while they 
also channel imaginary negotiations between the inherent plurality of human 
societies and the political principle of nation-states.  
In the first chapter, we analysed the dominant features of nationalism in a critical 
overview of representations and academic theories about nationalism. The inherent 
                                                 
568 Annie Ernaux, La Place, Paris, Gallimard, 1983, p. 96 
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deterministic aspect of nationalist imaginings prompted the elaboration of an 
theoretical framework in the second chapter, which was intended to make sense of 
closed representations without falling in the trap of the reproduction of the 
deterministic outlook of its object of study. The hold of national imaginaries on 
history, which was another dominant feature of nationalism made explicit in the first 
chapter, inspired the historical inquiry in the third chapter before engaging with an 
analysis of contemporary discourses promoting nationalism. The transhistorical, 
although fragmentary, understanding which stemmed from the third chapter led to 
the observation of recurrent modalities in the reproduction of nationalist 
significations in the three nation-states under study. 
Nationalism, its doctrine, its tools, its particular formations, have been and are being 
formed transculturally.569 As such, a particular national imaginary never stands 
alone – it takes other such formations for granted through their correlations. Through 
the history and formation of nationalism in the three European nation-states involved 
in this study, it has become clear that representations which are perhaps useful for 
obtaining a rational view of our globalised world, are based precisely on what this 
view is hiding: a continuous crossing of walls and borders. Such is the norm of the 
formation of cultures. The fact that many conventional anthropologists applied a 
similar approach exclusively to so-called primitive cultures thus refraining from 
applying it to their own western cultures expresses the ethnocentric state of mind 
and the preconceived superiority and particularity of one's own position. 
In the contemporary period, the 're-nationalisation' of political ideologies – also 
expressed in the swing from communist and socio-democratic political discourses in 
favour of a more liberal discourse – resulted in the narrowing of the terminology 
expressing the complexity of social issues. The political scope of negotiations of 
social significations has thus been reduced to identity politics. This is perhaps in the 
process of being reassessed in reaction to the economic crisis which started in 2008. 
The crisis has awakened a renewed interest for traditional anti-capitalist 
                                                 
569 If one could say “transnationally” here, it would be inaccurate. It would mean that nations are 
considered as homogeneous cultural formations, which goes against the present argumentation. 
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philosophies and ideologies, such as Marx's analyses. But beyond the insight of 
Marx and the terminology of Marxism, we would argue that it is rather in the 
opposition between privileged and under-privileged classes that the lines of 
contemporary negotiations of social significations are being redefined.570 The 
spectacular focus on cultural issues in the past decades was also nourished by the 
lack of clear political lines of opposition, effectively homogenising mainstream 
political programmes. In reaction to a reduced scope of social negotiations, this is 
perhaps equally in the process of being reassessed. 
Chaos  
In the wake of the multiple crises of the first decades of the twenty-first century, 
nationalism in Europe is predominantly state-centred and, as such, cannot be the 
vessel for anti-establishment liberal discourse as it perhaps was the case in other 
historical contexts – such as during the struggles against the Anciens Régimes in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the colonial liberations during the second 
half of the twentieth century. From significations of dissent, nationalist terms of 
social negotiations have shifted to continua of representations. This linearity has 
allowed the promotion and imposition and the more or less conscious and accepted 
homogenisation of social imaginaries around central state institutions (actual or 
projected). Since the end of the Cold War, the closure of the imaginary is being 
defined though a new irreducible Other which replaces race as a dominant 
signification of social exclusion:  cultural identities. This relates to the failure of the 
so-called cultural turn and of cultural relativism which in fine have backfired after 
their confrontation with traditional and reactionary representations. The fact that 
political and social movements who claim to be representing the working class – 
which is the case of the EDL – base their discourses on notions such as identity and 
reduced representations of culture seems to confirm the backlash of anti-racist 
discourse. The cultural struggle (as opposed to class struggle) has exchanged vertical 
                                                 
570 It appears as a more pragmatic and open way to describe the demands for social and economic 
justice as it is expressed for instance in Kery James's song presented in the last section of the 
fourth chapter and which seems to be expressed in the wave of protests in Tunisia and Egypt in 
winter 2010-2011 which were still ongoing while these lines were being written. 
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power relations for horizontal power relations, leaving the former virtually 
unchallenged. Through the definition of the Other as the 'culturally different', 
however shallow the definition of the Other may be, social struggles have turned to 
subjective perceptions for legitimacy more often than they have turned to the 
complexity of integral cultural power. This creates, among other effects, a new 
impetus for 'monocultures', based on the principle that common values – often 
translated into ethnic attributes – are sufficient to enact social ties. 
On hindsight, this evolution is perhaps less surprising that it is in fact worrying. The 
modern radical imaginary has always contained authoritarian grids of significations. 
In a transhistorical perspective, the authoritarian historical moments have imprinted 
significations beyond the historical moments during which authoritarian and 
reactionary significations were formulated and institutionalised. As a result, they 
enclose imaginary spaces of subsequent grids of significations and restrict the 
creative potential of social entropy. These enclosures trigger the demand for an 
imaginary order which has to partly include significations in order to disintegrate the 
grid of their authoritarian form.571 The order which was established in the aftermath 
of the Second World War is an example of such an evolution. It presented features 
which had been synthesised by Nazi ideology. The original ideological synthesis of 
these features in the particular form of Nazism was, at least as a state-based and 
dominant ideology, certainly disintegrated. But as Nazi ideology was itself based on 
significations also developed in liberal and communist states, some of these 
associations, such as the intimate relationship between a state and a culturally 
defined population, were not broken up and were reproduced to support the post-war 
order.572 By extension, these processes suggest, alongside the banalisation of 
nationalist discourses, that national European imaginaries contain potential 
significations which tend to reproduce a totalitarian character basing in their 
                                                 
571 The case Nazism – which is here understood as the extremely rationalised association of 
xenophobia, racism and nationalism – confirms this argument as it still appears as a a 
fundamental referent in contemporary imaginaries. 
572 In spite of their many differences, the social movements in Eastern and Western Europe in the 
late 1960s and 1970s can be read as local expressions which opposed the socially and politically 
reactionary ideologies of the period.  
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discursive opposition to historical totalitarian ideologies such as Nazism. Whether a 
new synthesis, such as the one expressed by the EDL centred on Islamophobia, will 
carry on spreading is uncertain. In the light of the analysis carried out in the present 
work, we can expect that such formulations will at least maintain their marginal 
positions in the foreseeable future.  
The appropriation of national symbolism and nationalist discourse in mainstream 
political discourse presents us with different problems. While it is perhaps intended 
as a resolution of problems of social cohesion and of the crisis of political 
representation, the results of these utilisations of nationalism are not conclusive. 
Beyond these issues, their interplay with the dominant neoliberal economic policies 
– which tend to hamper the traditional ties of social solidarities based on traditional 
nation-state institutions, such as social security or pension funds – raises questions 
about the reasons for the association of neoliberal policies with national identity 
politics by political elites. This brings us back to the idea that contemporary lines of 
demarcation are being negotiated between the privileged political and economic 
elites and the rest of society. To assess the extent to which clear-cut national spaces 
favour the restoration of the power of economic elites which processes of 
neoliberalisation re-establish, we would need to extend our study to economic 
discourses and reassess the present conclusions accordingly. 
The various global crises, the political and social stagnation of the European Union 
and perhaps the barely escapable national mindset, brood a generalised feeling of 
dissatisfaction which may lead to the inquest of a new imaginings and new 
institutions.573 While a number of existing threads appear as worthy of attention --
such as the threads of democracy, of open systems of knowledge and of complexity 
– the actual grid of significations that may counter the contemporary reactionary 
drive, is an imaginary radicality that is yet too marginal for its dominant 
institutionalisation. The radical ideology which would reflect these significations 
would not only need to take contemporary economic issues into account, but social 
                                                 
573 The popular risings in Tunisia and Egypt in winter 2010-2011, which may spark further revolt 
across the region, suggest that such a feeling of dissatisfaction of people against their rulers 
cannot be excluded.  
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and environmental issues as well. In addition, the complexities of the global variety 
of cultural formations would also need to be taken into account. Independently of 
the many differences and variations, global issues we are faced with are by 
definition humanity's common issues. This presents the extent of the challenge to 
come. Concerning nationalism, the inherent ambivalence between cultural and 
political belonging (between nationality and citizenship for instance) would perhaps 
benefit from a reconfiguration in imaginaries which would include national 
processes of identification without retaining them as the only social formations of 
cultural and political legitimacy. In this perspective, the prospect could be defined in 
the imaginary institution of a culture of complexity, which to be cultural in the true 
sense of the word, would need to become a social praxis of conscious and 
reciprocally responsible acting powers – these individuals being part of the elites or 
of the multitudes.574 
                                                 
574 The concept of multitude was elaborated by Michael Hardt andAntonio Negri in contrast to their 
concept of a global empire. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy 
in the Age of Empire, New York. Penguin Press, 2004. See also Yann Moulier Boutang [ed.], 
Politique des Multitudes: Démocracie, intelligence collective et puissance de la vie à l'heure du 
capitalisme cognitif, Paris, Editions Amsterdam, 2007.  
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– Annexes – 
 
Annex 1 
 A graffiti tag in Lyon, France, 2008 (personal archives): 
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Annex 2 
Promotional posters in Athens, Greece, during the summer of 2009 (personal 
archives): 
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Annex 3 
Three pieces of Yanko Tsvetkov's “Mapping Stereotypes: The Geography of 
Prejudice”, available online at: http://alphadesigner.com/project-mapping-
stereotypes.html 
 
“Where I Live” (Editorial for Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 2009
228 ANNEXES 
“Europe According to France” 
“Europe according to Britain”
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Annex 4 
Amateur “Mappings” 
 
 
 
“Europa według polaków” [Europe according to Poles], Author and source unknown 
Selected translations: 
Greece: “hot!”; Ukraine: “ours”, “the Russians'”; Lithuania: “ours”; Estonia and 
Latvia: “Lithuania 2 and 3”; Spain: “Strawberries”; Portugal: “Little Spain”; 
Norway and Iceland: “cold”; 
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Annex 5 
 
Polish tourist board “Polish plumber” campaign poster 
 
 
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4115164.stm [retrieved 03.02.2007]
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Annex 6 
Reproduction and translation of the introduction of Qu'est-ce le Tiers état? by 
Joseph-Emmanuel Sieyès 
 
 
First page of Joseph Sieyes's (1748-1836) pamphlet Qu'est ce que le Tiers Etat? 1789, Wikipedia, 
Creative Commons, <http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Qu27est_ce_que_le_Tiers_Etat.jpg> 
[accessed 29.11.2010] 
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Translation  
“What is the Third estate? 
The plan of this work is quite simple. There are three questions we need to ask 
ourselves. 
What is the Third estate? Everything. 
What has it been in the political order? Nothing. 
What is it asking for? To become something in this order.  
We will see if the answers are just. We shall then examine the means which have 
been put off, and those which need to be implemented, in order for the Third estate 
to become something in effect. We will thus write: 
What were the attempts of the Ministers, and what the privileged orders themselves 
propose in its favour. 
What should have been done. 
Finally, what remains for the Third estate to take its due place.”  
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Annex 7 
Portrait of Stanisław Antoni Szczuka (1652? - 1710), Polish noble, politician and 
writer (Anonymous author). 
  
Source: Wikimedia Commons, 
<http://pl.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Plik:Stanislaw_Antoni_Szczuka_%281652_1654-
1710%29.jpg&filetimestamp=20060707032407> [retrieved 22.07.2010]
234 ANNEXES 
Annex 8 
Nicolas Sarkozy – Campaign Clip on National Identity (transcript) 
Dramatic Music in the background575 
[ensemble, la France sera / un pays respecté et aimé] 
Close-medium shot “Mes chers compatriotes, je suis candidat à la présidence de la 
RF. Eh bien, un candidat à la présidence de la RF, cela doit parler de la France. Je 
crois à l’identité de la nation française. Je crois à l’identité nationale. La France n’est 
pas une race, la France n’est une ethnie, la France est une communauté de valeurs, 
c’est un idéal, c’est une idée. La France est une multitude de petites patries qui, en 
s’additionnant en on fait une grande. Nous avons notre identité et nous devons la 
défendre.”  
Mise-en-abîme, Talking to children: “Ce que vous êtes aujourd’hui c’est le produit 
des générations qui vous ont précédés. On n’a pas le droit de tourner le dos à ça. Et 
vous-mêmes vous transmettrez le flambeau à une autre génération, vous transmettrez 
des valeurs, des modes de vie, des règles.” 
Close-medium shot “Alors j’ai dit “il faut identité et immigration” Pourquoi ? Parce 
que la France doit accueillir de nouveaux français, des français venus de plus loin. 
Nous les accueillerons avec leur propre identité, mais eux, ceux qui nous rejoignent, 
doivent accepter l’idée que la France vient de bien loin, qu’elle a commencé avant 
eux, et qu’ils doivent eux la respecter.” 
Interview : « Les femmes, en France, sont libres, comme les hommes, libres de 
circuler, libres de se marier, libres de divorcer, le droit à l’avortement, l’égalité entre 
les hommes et les femmes, ça fait partie aussi de notre identité.  
[La France est un grand pays/ soyons fiers d’être français] 
Close-medium shot “Si on ne dit plus à ceux qui viennent, à ceux qui veulent devenir 
français, ce qu’est la France, comment voulez-vous qu’on les intègre ? [intégration] 
L’échec de l’intégration à la française, c’est parce qu’on a oublié de parler de la 
                                                 
575 All text in italics concern is the present author’s description of the style of the video; all text in 
brackets are captions transcribed from the original video. 
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France. Moi je ne veux pas oublier la France parce que la France est le cœur de mon 
projet. A tous ceux qui veulent devenir français, je veux leur dire que je vais leur 
rendre la fierté d’être français, mais que la France mérite d’être aimée, mérite d’être 
respectée, et que la France est porteuse d’un idéal qu’il faut partager ou refuser. Je 
comprends qu’on puisse le refuser, mais si on le partage, alors il faut aimer la 
France.” 
[ensemble tout devient possible / sarkozy.fr]  
The video clip is available online [accessed 24.11.2007]: 
<http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1qz2d_lidentite-nationale> 
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Annex 9 
Sabaton, “40:1” [The Art of War, Black Lodge Records, 2008] 
 
Baptised in fire. 
40 to 1 
 
So silent before the storm 
Awaiting command 
A few has been chosen to stand 
As one outnumbered by far 
The orders from high command 
Fight back, hold your ground 
 
In early September it came 
A war unknown to the world 
No army may enter that land 
That is protected by Polish hand 
Unless you are 40 to 1 
Your force will soon be undone 
 
Baptised in fire 
40 to 1 
Spirit of Spartans 
Death and glory 
Soldiers of Poland 
Second to none 
Wrath of the Wehrmarcht brought to a halt 
 
The 8th of September it starts 
The rage of the Reich 
A barrage of mortars and guns 
Stand fast, the bunkers will hold 
The captain has pledged his life 
I'll face my fate here! 
The sound of artillery strike 
So fierce 
The thunder of guns 
 
So come, bring on all that you've got 
Come hell, come high water,  
Never stop 
Unless you are 40 to 1 
Your lives will soon be undone 
 
Baptised in fire 
40 to 1 
Spirit of Spartans 
Death and glory 
Soldiers of Poland 
Second to none 
Wrath of the Wehrmacht brought to a halt 
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Always remember, a fallen soldier 
Always remember, fathers and sons at war 
Always remember, a fallen soldier 
Always remember, fathers and sons at war 
Always remember, a fallen soldier 
Always remember, buried in history 
 
No army may enter that land 
That is protected by Polish hand 
Unless you are 40 to 1 
Your force will soon be undone 
 
Baptised in fire 
40 to 1 
Spirit of Spartans 
Death and glory 
Soldiers of Poland 
Second to none 
Wrath of the Wehrmarcht brought to a halt 
 
No, no, no  
Lyrics taken from Rafał Roskowiński, Wizna 1939, 40 1: Art of War, R&R, 2008 
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– Résumé – 
 
 
Introduction  
Nietzsche décrivait le nationalisme de son temps comme une couche de glace. Celle-
ci a peut-être bien fondu depuis. Et ainsi les eaux du nationalisme ont continué de se 
répandre. Cette dissémination – sociale et historique – du nationalisme implique une 
forme de transformation. Compte tenu de la dimension sociale et historique de 
l’épiphénomène qu'est le nationalisme,576 sa reproduction dans le temps et ses 
transformations se font écho. C’est dans ce sens-là que nous pouvons parler de 
nationalisme au singulier. Il en va de même pour ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui le 
néolibéralisme. La variété des phénomènes ou des représentations englobées par le 
terme de néolibéralisme est telle qu’elle présente de nombreuses contradictions.  
Ainsi, il est difficile de définir simplement un champ imaginaire autrement que par 
la description analytique d’un champ en particulier. Ainsi, nous considérons que la 
pratique théorique et la pratique empirique se forment et s’informent l’une l’autre. 
Avant de pouvoir élaborer un raisonnement théorique dans l’optique de considérer le 
nationalisme comme un champ imaginaire social – un champ dont l’imaginaire 
social est la nature métaphorique -, il importe de considérer le terme de nationalisme 
lui-même et ses significations formelles contemporaines.  
Ainsi, le premier chapitre de ce travail de thèse prend comme point de départ un bref 
aperçu de phénomènes décrits comme émanant du nationalisme. Cet aperçu prend 
comme point de départ le plus grand bouleversement social et historique 
contemporain – qui est la réunion d’une certaine Europe et dont la date de 1989 est 
                                                 
576
 Cette étude étant portée sur l’imaginaire social, défini par Castoriadis à travers deux dimensions 
de l’expérience humaine, le social et l’historique - car l’un n’a pas de sens sans l’autre dans le 
cadre de l’imaginaire social -, la terminologie de « social-historique » empruntée à Castoriadis 
sera utilisée pour faire référence directement à ce cadre. 
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devenue le symbole.577 Certaines acceptions des sens communs du terme 
nationalisme peuvent ainsi être observées. Ils sont le point de départ de l’élucidation 
de quelques points théoriques du champ d’étude sur le nationalisme. La nature de la 
relation entre les deux permet de contraster le savoir sur le nationalisme avec sa 
reproduction formelle sociale-historique. En élaborant sur cette approche critique, un 
certains nombre d’approches contemporaines sont misent en avant pour définir une 
compréhension assez large et remise au goût du jour du ou des sens formels du 
terme nationalisme.  
En prenant en compte certaines des avancées dans le domaine d’étude du 
nationalisme, le deuxième chapitre opère un glissement pour élucider le cadre de 
l’étude, c’est-à-dire acquérir une compréhension de ce qu’est l’imaginaire social. 
Tout en gardant à l’esprit l’optique de nouer le champ d’étude sur le nationalisme 
avec celui de l’imaginaire social, ce chapitre rend compte de certains recoupements 
théoriques – et certaines fois des décrochages – qui  s’opèrent entre plusieurs 
disciplines, telles que la linguistique, la philosophie ou encore l’anthropologie. 
Toutes ces relations rendent à leur tour compte d’un certain mode de fonctionnement 
de l’imaginaire. Ce fonctionnement peut se définir comme le mode transculturel de 
(re)production des significations imaginaires. D’un point de vue conceptuel, la 
signification apparaît comme un cycle de glissement d’une dimension imaginaire à 
une autre. Mais ceci est un cycle imparfait. La raison principale en est l’expérience 
du temps. Et cette expérience est certainement très lourde de significations pour 
l’espèce humaine. Ainsi, ce filage de significations influe très fortement sur le 
moment dont il devient le passé.  
La problématique de ce travail de thèse est contenue dans les questions suivantes : 
comment, et donc dans une certaine mesure pourquoi, le nationalisme se reproduit-il 
comme un imaginaire dominant à l'époque contemporaine ? Tournée de façon plus 
normative, la question peut être reformulée de la façon suivante : malgré sa 
                                                 
577
 Il s’agit bien de situer ce symbole dans l’espace de référence européen, qui est celui de l’auteur. 
Certaines conséquences de ce bouleversement ont certes été globales (une nouvelle étape dans le 
capitalisme globalisé, le néolibéralisme, par exemple), et d’autres phénomènes participent peut-
être aussi d’une tendance plus globale de libéralisation, telle qu’elle a pu également s’exprimer à 
Taïwan en 1987, ou encore en 1989 en Chine.  
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banalisation, au sens où l'entend Michael Billig, cet imaginaire ne reproduit-il pas un 
caractère totalitaire que le sens commun du nationalisme lui reconnaît pourtant ? Ces 
questions se fondent sur l'analyse originale de Benedict Anderson de la nation 
comme communauté imaginée et sur l'élaboration théorique de l'imaginaire social 
selon Cornelius Castoriadis. 
 
1. Le labyrinthe du nationalisme 
Le nationalisme – dont le champ est vaste et ramifié – se définit à la fois en relation 
avec les objets d’étude et par l’approche de ladite étude.  Les études sur le 
nationalisme menées depuis quelques décennies ont certainement répondu à un 
grand nombre de questions à son sujet.  Néanmoins, nous pouvons sans exagérer 
observer qu’elles ont également laissé de nouvelles questions en suspens.  Après la 
chute du bloc soviétique, beaucoup avait le sentiment qu’un monde nouveau – que 
l’on espérait meilleur – était en gestation. Certaines projections idylliques 
dépeignaient un monde enfin uni et libéré du joug de l’idéologie.  Le nationalisme, 
qui apparaissait comme une de ces idéologies arriérées, se devait donc de 
disparaître.  Cependant, l’on oubliait qu’une partie de ce que l’on célébrait, 
l’indépendance, la démocratie, l’auto-détermination, avait un prix et qu’à l’époque 
moderne, ces dernières n’ont presque toujours pris forme que dans un cadre 
nationaliste.    
La dernière décennie du XXe siècle fut ainsi un triste rappel que le nationalisme ne 
s’était pas fané et qu’il  hantait toujours les rêves et les cauchemars du monde 
d’après la guerre froide.  En effet, au grand dam des « messies » des temps 
nouveaux, l’histoire ne s’est pas arrêtée.578  Dans le cas du nationalisme, certains 
observateurs mieux avisés écriront que « le nationalisme régnait en maitre » 
(Norman M. Naimark). Ce que l’on a appelé la balkanisation de l’ex-Yougoslavie en 
est certainement la plus terrible des manifestations. De guerres civiles en massacres, 
                                                 
578
 La thèse de la fin de l’histoire est associée à Francis Fukuyama : in “The End of History?”, The 
National Interest 16, Summer 1989 et The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free 
Press, 1992.  
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sept nouveaux états-nations ont émergé (le dernier en date étant le Kosovo en 2008) 
en développant un nouveau discours identitaire en opposition avec le discours 
nationaliste yougoslave ainsi qu’avec les discours nationalistes des nations 
voisines.579  
La violence de cette manifestation du nationalisme – qui va rappeler celle de 
l’Allemagne nazie – va reconduire le sens commun du nationalisme comme étant 
confiné à une idéologie extrémiste et totalitaire.  Cependant, au milieu des années 
1990, le sociologue Michael Billig observait la dynamique de fond du nationalisme 
(dans ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler les états-nations établis), en analysant comment, 
sur une durée plus longue, le discours du nationalisme s’est « banalisé », ou plus 
simplement, comment il s’est reproduit pour former un inconscient collectif.  
Ainsi, le premier chapitre interroge la relation entre le sens commun et le sens 
universitaire du terme nationalisme. Dans quelle mesure le sens commun reconnaît-
il ce caractère totalitaire et comment les théories sur le nationalisme le comprennent-
elles ? Le sens commun reconnaît ce caractère dans l'expression radicale, extrémiste 
du nationalisme.  La première sous-partie présente cette analyse à travers un court 
inventaire des manifestations du nationalisme en Europe depuis 1989.  Les théories 
sur le nationalisme font traditionnellement écho à la conception du nationalisme au 
sens commun tout en lui reconnaissant d'autres formes.  La dichotomie entre le 
nationalisme dit « civique » et le nationalisme dit « ethnique » est emblématique de 
ces théories. Cette classification fut élaborée par Hans Kohn et se retrouve plus tard 
largement réutilisée et discutée.580   
Hans Kohn étudiait le phénomène nationaliste à un moment de l’histoire qui allait 
voir l’apparition du nationalisme-socialisme. Le nazisme est certainement un des 
exemples les plus flagrants d’une idéologie totalitaire. Mais Kohn reconnaissait déjà 
au nationalisme des manifestations plus variées. La classification qui s’ensuit peut 
                                                 
579
 Comme le montre l’exemple de la Macédoine, la contestation de symboles nationaux ne se limitait 
pas aux nations émergeantes de l’ex-Yougoslavie, mais également aux états-nations plus 
anciens, et, en l’occurrence, à la Grèce.  
580
 Cette discussion est certainement un des axes clefs dans le développement du champ d’étude sur le 
nationalisme. 
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être considérée comme une tentative de comprendre le national-socialisme tout en 
reconnaissant des formes « positives » du nationalisme. Mais cette dichotomie va 
ainsi opposer les nationalismes britannique ou français (ou occidentaux en général) 
au nationalisme allemand (ou oriental). Dans le premier cas, les nationalismes 
occidentaux sont dits civiques, c’est-à-dire que l’on considère qu’ils se fondent sur 
la citoyenneté et la société civile ;581 dans le deuxième cas, les liens primordiaux 
sont ceux du sang et de la terre.  
En passant sur les amalgames et les simplifications, cette dichotomie, qui peut certes 
apparaître dans certains cas comme un outil de réflexion, est elle-même idéologisée 
car elle a historiquement été une vision moraliste des phénomènes nationalistes plus 
qu’une approche critique. Elle participe à la banalisation du nationalisme en sous-
entendant que les formes civiques – opposées, donc, aux formes ethniques – n’ont 
pas l’atavisme ni le caractère exclusif des formes orientales. S’il ne fait pas de doute 
que c’est bien le cas pour le nazisme, il serait trompeur de considérer que les autres 
nationalismes sont essentiellement différents et d’attribuer au seul nationalisme 
allemand (du moins jusqu’à la moitié du XXe siècle), les excès du nationalisme et 
des phénomènes d’exclusion associés.     
L'approche critique qu'explicitent Michael Billig et Craig Calhoun précise que cette 
dichotomie reproduit un sens erroné.  Alors que le sens commun ne reconnaît que le 
nationalisme des « autres », certaines théories reproduisent à leur tour cette 
projection en différenciant un nationalisme jugé comme modéré et civique, et en 
l'opposant au nationalisme extrême et culturel. De fait, même dans les cas où 
certains auteurs reconnaissent leur propre nationalisme méthodologique (selon 
l'expression d’Ulrich Beck), celui-ci est différencié du nationalisme au sens 
commun. Il en va de même pour d’autres catégories d’analyse, telles que le concept 
d’ethnie développé par Anthony D. Smith. En réifiant ou en idéalisant les 
communautés pré-nationales, et malgré un grand raffinement du cadre d’analyse des 
théoriciens ethno-symbolistes tels que les cadres élaborés par Smith, ce concept 
                                                 
581
 On peut même considérer que la forme civique – qui est une forme idéalisée – est perçue comme 
émanant du progrès et de la modernité européenne qui était vue (et peut-être l’est-t-elle toujours 
d’une certaine façon) comme la  civilisation même. 
 268 RÉSUMÉ 
amène à une lecture essentialiste et déterministe de ce que sont l’ethnicité et le 
nationalisme. 
L’importance donnée à «  l’origine ethnique des nations » au cours des dernières 
décennies n’est pas seulement liée à la résurgence du nationalisme dans ce qu’il est 
convenu d’appeler l’est de l’Europe, elle est également en partie liée au discours 
politique réactionnaire en occident qui émerge dès la fin des années 1970. Selon 
John Breuilly, ce discours est symptomatique d’une évolution d’une politique 
consensuelle vers une politique de conflits plus marquée.582 Le discours académique 
en général s’est également transformé avec la réémergence de grandes théories et de 
débats plus polarisés. Les manifestations du nationalisme qui ont suivi la chute de 
l’union soviétique doivent ainsi être reconsidérées à la lumière de cette perspective.  
Le nationalisme a été une partie intégrante de la formation des sociétés et des États à 
l’est du rideau de fer ainsi que des mouvements d’oppositions et de dissidences tels 
que Solidarność en Pologne (quoique apparaissant sous la dénomination moins 
controversée de « patriotisme »). Néanmoins, le rideau de fer ne devrait pas être 
considéré comme une frontière informée par le nationalisme.583 En effet, le 
nationalisme sous toutes ses formes a été un élément fondateur et partagé des États 
et des sociétés des deux côtés du « mur ». Les discours nationalistes à l’ouest ne se 
sont pas soudainement tus pour laisser ceux de l’est s’exprimer. Les sentiments et les 
discours nationalistes ont évolué vers ce qui pourrait être considéré comme une 
normalisation. Par conséquent, la réémergence du nationalisme en Europe centrale et 
orientale peut être considérée comme une mise à jour des discours sociopolitiques. 
Une poussée nourrie en partie par les idées et les sentiments contenus par la 
coercition étatique et l’approvisionnement soudain de pratiques établies dans les 
démocraties libérales.  
                                                 
582
 Les personnalités politiques telles que Thatcher et Reagan représentent cette évolution. 
583
 « Informée », c’est-à-dire dont la forme a subi l’influence, « de l’interieur », d’autres formes, en 
l’occurrence ici, celle du nationalisme. Considérant la définition qu'en donne Aristote, le terme 
de "forme" désigne ici  détermination (ou structure) unifiante d’une substance. Cependant, nous 
ne l’envisageons pas de façon statique, mais associons le couple forme et matière à un autre 
couple de catégories d’Aristote, celui de l’acte et de la puissance.  
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Le nationalisme n’apparaît pas comme « une erreur morale », mais comme le tissu 
organisateur du monde moderne. Une étude critique du nationalisme induit un 
engagement politique sur les modalités d’organisation et de représentations des 
sociétés modernes. En reconnaissant le nationalisme comme un phénomène 
historique fondateur de la modernité, il nous faut reconnaître, dans le but d’élaborer 
une étude critique, notre propre nationalisme. Le premier pas d’une approche 
critique est l’autocritique. Umut Özkirimli écrit : « les nationalistes n’ont pas de 
pays ». Il aurait pu également écrire : « nous sommes tous nationalistes ».  
Un des éléments cruciaux pour l’étude et la compréhension du nationalisme est la 
construction du passé. Les circonstances historiques qui ont défini les passés 
nationaux sont liées à la modernité de la forme nation. Selon Pierre Nora, une des 
caractéristiques qui définit la modernité est l’accélération de l’histoire. On peut 
formuler la problématique du nationalisme dans ce contexte comme suit : par quels 
moyens a-t-on produit et reproduit les passés nationaux ? La conceptualisation de 
l’histoire d’un point de vue nationaliste se fonde sur deux paradigmes. Le premier 
est le lien entre le présent d’une part et d’autre part les faits glorieux et le peuple du 
passé ; le second la conviction que la forme nationale contemporaine est 
l’achèvement logique de cette « glorieuse » généalogie.  
Ces paradigmes suscitent la croyance en l’idée d’une nation déterminant l’ordre 
naturel et universel de la vie politique de l’humanité (Ernest Gellner). Même si cette 
croyance peut être sincère, elle n’explique aucunement le processus par lequel ces 
histoires nationales ont accompli leur destin assigné. La grande majorité des 
académiciens s’accordent à dire que le devenir national a été un processus de 
création. Nora suggère que l’accélération de l’histoire est la justification ontologique 
des « lieux de mémoires » qui répondent au sentiment de perte mémorielle induite 
par cette accélération. Par conséquent, sous la forme d’archives symboliques, s’est 
développée la nécessité d’un renforcement des identités. Cependant, les corps 
sociaux ont eu tendance, à travers les époques, à construire des murs symboliques ou 
idéologiques lorsqu’ils se percevaient en danger. Ce qui n’explique pas pour autant 
la production massive et homogène de lieux de mémoires au cours des XIXe et XXe 
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siècles. Comme le décrit l’historien Eric Hobsbawm, toutes ces traditions produites 
en masse l’ont été sous les auspices du nationalisme d’État 
Lorsque l’on examine la constitution du passé national à partir de ces traditions 
créées à l’époque moderne, il faut prendre en compte deux niveaux d’analyse. Le 
premier est la structure (ou les moyens) par laquelle ces traditions sont signifiées ; le 
deuxième est le contenu signifiant diffusé à travers la (re)production de ces 
dernières. Aux questions que pouvaient se poser ceux qui décidaient de l’institution 
des lieux de mémoires, telles que « quelle culture et quel territoire ? », le 
nationalisme offrait des réponses qu’ils considéraient déjà comme évidentes, 
inclusives de toute autre alternative. Ainsi, les notions telles que « la terre des 
ancêtres » et « la culture héritée » (le contenu est secondaire dans un premier temps) 
ouvraient la voie à l’institution de lieux de mémoires pseudo-traditionnels. Les 
traditions nationales modernes innovent du point de vue de la quantité, de l’étendue 
et de l’homogénéité, et certainement de leur contenu. Mais l’innovation ne s’opère 
pas du point de vue de leur fonction sociale. Ces « nouvelles » traditions 
reproduisent la conception de l’histoire avec laquelle elles ont été produites, c’est-à-
dire la conception des élites et des corps sociaux décisionnaires. Le nationalisme en 
général fournit les clefs pour comprendre le passé qu’il crée, et permet de choisir ce 
qui doit être érigé, représenté, commémoré. Mais le nationalisme en soi n’est lui-
même qu’un mode de pensée, un mode d’appréhension du monde social-historique : 
ce sont les individus qui le (re)produisent (volontairement ou par habitus) qui en 
sont les agents. 
Or les règles de la vision nationaliste du monde posent ensuite le problème du choix 
du contenu car, par définition, cette sélection n’offre qu’une version tronquée des 
réalités sociales qu’elle prétend représenter. La sélection culturelle et les 
transformations des significations sociales induites par le nationalisme furent 
implémentées par les couches sociales qui se considéraient comme « l’élite de la 
nation. » Nous pouvons les considérer comme les premiers « croyants. » L’objectif, 
ou plutôt le résultat escompté, était de remplir l’espace imaginaire entre le centre du 
pouvoir symbolique, idéalement l’État, avec le peuple reconnu par ce centre comme 
étant le sien. Les programmes scolaires, les commémorations nationales, les 
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monuments ainsi que les théories et discours politiques et sociaux – qu’ils soient 
machiavéliques ou de bonne foi, calculés ou naturalisés – apparaissent tous comme 
différents aspects de cet effort de remplir – ou de cacher – le vide problématique de 
l’espace imaginaire national.  
L’expression « nationalisme banal », selon Billig, décrit la reproduction de 
l’imaginaire national dans les États-nations établis. Contrairement au « plébiscite de 
tous les jours » de Renan, le nationalisme banal est la reconnaissance insouciante de 
l’État-nation par ses membres. Le discours académique est également sujet à cette 
reproduction, par exemple à travers l’historiographie nationale (ce qui est quasiment 
une tautologie au cours du  XXe siècle). L’attachement à ce discours, qui reflète un 
manque d’esprit critique des sciences sociales conventionnelles, a été critiqué par 
Beck. C’est ce qu’il appelle le nationalisme méthodologique. Mais se placer en 
dehors du cadre discursif du nationalisme n’est pas chose aisée. Il est cependant 
nécessaire de commencer à construire un cadre d’analyse qui permette une étude 
critique tout en évitant la simple reproduction du discours et de l’imaginaire 
nationalistes. 
 
2. Le fil d’Ariane 
Le deuxième chapitre explore ainsi les propriétés du discours en relation avec la 
notion d'imaginaire social dans le but de concevoir le champ de l'imaginaire comme 
champ d'investigation. Le chapitre explicite donc le mode de (re)production des 
significations imaginaires. Le fil du discours apparaît dès lors comme le fil d'Ariane 
qui permet de sortir du labyrinthe. Dans un premier temps, il s'agit d'expliciter les 
liens entre discours et imaginaire social à travers les signes, c'est-à-dire les 
représentations et les significations sociales. Il est ainsi question des stéréotypes 
(représentations figées) et des mythes selon l'analyse de Roland Barthes. Mais ces 
liens établis comme « différance » (Jacques Derrida), appellent une logique 
différente de celle des systèmes structuralistes. Elle se met alors en place sous la 
forme métaphorique de l'Unitas multiplex (Edgar Morin), qui est la conception du 
système ouvert. En termes mathématiques, ce système peut s'apparenter à une 
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fonction relativement simple qui, appliquée à la fabrique du sens social, permet de 
rendre compte de sa complexité (par analogie, comme en géométrie fractale).  
La première partie de ce chapitre s’ouvre sur le concept de formation discursive qui 
met en avant la relation différentielle entre les unités du discours et les fonctions de 
ces unités. Cette relation, entre les signes et les énoncés, se présente sous la forme 
d’une tension fluide entre représentation et signification. Une représentation est 
fictivement fixée, mais elle peut potentiellement se référer à des significations 
indéterminées. Conjointement, une signification en contexte sera déterminée par un 
glissement lui-même inscrit dans la situation dans laquelle le signe est exprimé. En 
conséquence, un signe particulier peut faire référence à une série d’énoncés 
possibles (simultanément ou de façon indépendante), et les énoncés peuvent être 
déterminés par différents signes ou par différentes séries de signes. Les lieux de 
mémoire dont il est question dans le premier chapitre peuvent être caractérisés de 
cette façon. Les monuments aux morts de la grande guerre sont les premiers 
exemples de la commémoration institutionnalisée sous la forme de monuments 
dispersés à l’échelle nationale. On observe ici comment opère une formation 
discursive. La signification d’un monument aux morts particulier est, dans un 
premier temps, la composition de signes qui dirigent, à un autre niveau et dans un 
deuxième temps, la signification plus générale du monument comme 
commémoration nationale par la glorification de la localité. 
Le processus des formations discursives mène à l’intériorisation des significations 
qu’elles portent. Ces dernières apparaissent alors comme naturelles et immédiates 
(littéralement sans médiation). Cet habitus de cadres de références et 
d’interprétations est composé d’histoires et de narrations, telles que celles racontées 
par les monuments aux morts. Ces cadres fournissent une grille de préconceptions 
qui permettent de rendre le monde social signifiant. Le stéréotype est la forme la 
plus simple de ces préconceptions. Et les stéréotypes, ou préjugés, sont parties 
prenantes des histoires dites et redites dans la reproduction des cadres sociaux de 
référence et d’interprétation. Ces histoires font aussi partie de la formation 
discursive du nationalisme.  
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Les stéréotypes nationaux, envers soi ou envers les Autres, agissent comme des 
processus de différentiation entre imaginaires sociaux. Ils font partie de la 
construction sociale de la réalité. Les images du soi-national sont contenues dans les 
stéréotypes qui représentent les Autres. Elles donnent à la nation un statut qui se veut 
unique, et par là même elles retirent aux autres nations la possibilité formelle de 
s’octroyer ce même statut. Ainsi, les stéréotypes peuvent être à la fois négatifs ou 
positifs. Au-delà de leur fonction d’économie (Walter Lippman), les stéréotypes 
peuvent aussi avoir une fonction pratique : ils représentent dans un sens le fait que 
« nous » connaissons quelque chose (au sujet) du monde dans lequel nous vivons. 
Poussés à leur limite, les stéréotypes se brisent face à la complexité de la réalité 
sociale qu’ils tendent à masquer. D’autre part, étant donné cette complexité, ils sont 
symptomatiques de la nécessité d’approches simplifiées qui permettent d’accéder à 
ces réalités. Cependant, ces associations essentialistes sont généralement considérées 
comme des fixités de première et de dernière instances. En d’autre terme, des 
identités. L’approche essentialiste du nationalisme réduit la complexité du tissu 
social de façon exclusive.  
Pour rendre compte de la complexité du monde social, de la formation sociale des 
significations, les conceptions fermées apparaissent comme insuffisantes. La 
sémiologie structuraliste (telle que celle utilisée par Barthes dans son analyse des 
mythes) se fonde sur des objets fermés et amène à une causalité unidirectionnelle et 
linéaire entre les différents niveaux de sens. Pour éviter ceci, le système de 
production de significations sociales est considéré comme un système ouvert et 
dynamique (Morin). Cette formation ouverte du sens commun correspond à la 
« métaphoricité des métaphores » qu’élabore Paul Ricœur. L’aspect fictif des 
métaphores relate la façon dont les êtres humains font expérience de la réalité : 
puisque la réalité est fuyante, des éléments fictifs sont nécessaires pour l’organiser 
de façon narrative. C’est ce que Ricœur appelle la redescription, qui affine la notion 
d’identité : une métaphore n’est pas simplement la copie de ce à quoi elle se réfère, 
elle est aussi le transfert du même à l’Autre (dans le temps, dans la forme, etc.). En 
résumé, le tissu des significations sociales apparaît comme un système ouvert auto-
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régulé, un « auto-éco-système », selon Morin, qui comprend le réseau, l’écheveau et 
les fils des significations sociales.  
La deuxième partie du deuxième chapitre répond à la question de savoir ce qu’est 
l'imaginaire dominant. Bien qu’étant fonctionnellement un système ouvert, le jeu des 
significations subit l'influence des idéologies à travers des négociations du sens 
social que l'on peut considérer comme le filage et l'effilage du tissu social. Inspiré de 
la définition de la culture selon Morin, les termes de négociation ou de filage ont 
l'avantage de suggérer que l'activité humaine est au centre de ce système ouvert, au 
lieu de considérer l'être humain comme un reproducteur passif des significations 
culturelles dans lesquelles il ne serait que suspendu (comme le suggère la définition 
de la culture selon Max Weber). Cette négociation, comme elle est en partie 
démontrée à travers l'étendue et l'évolution du concept de culture depuis la fin du 
XIXe siècle, s'opère à travers des réductions, des rationalisations, des précisions et 
des redirections du sens des significations sociales. Par extension, l'idéologie 
nationaliste informe et forme l'imaginaire national qui est reproduit tant qu'il est 
reconnu (et considéré comme créateur/générateur de sens).  
La reproduction n'étant jamais simple copie ou copie conforme, elle forme et 
informe en retour l'idéologie. Ainsi, cette reconnaissance s'opère dans la relation 
entre l'imaginaire institué et l'imaginaire instituant, laissant, du moins en théorie, un 
espace de création (imaginaire radical) que l'on peut considérer comme l'effilage et 
le retissage informés. L'imaginaire dominant semble opérer précisément de telle 
manière, en intégrant en partie les fils de résistance, de compétition, d'opposition, de 
divergence ou plus généralement de différence, dans le but de désintégrer leurs 
significations. Il en va de même pour l'imaginaire national qui offre des points 
d'accroche et de réduction à travers une histoire linéaire écrite, un territoire et une 
langue fixés comme nationaux. 
Anderson parle de « communauté imaginée » pour décrire la nation, en précisant par 
extension que toute communauté est imaginée. Castoriadis définit l’imaginaire 
comme le champ du réel qui n’est pas tangible ni nécessairement conscient, mais qui 
est en relation dialectique avec le champ d’action des sociétés humaines. Il le définit, 
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lui donne un sens, l’institue. Dans les deux cas, nous avons une réhabilitation de 
l’imaginaire comme champ du réel et non comme fantasmagorie. Dans les deux cas, 
nous avons aussi une certaine notion de la « totalité » de l’imaginaire : toute 
institution est imaginaire et toute communauté est imaginée. Ceci renvoie aux 
définitions de la notion de culture que l’on peut trouver à l’époque où le débat ne 
s’articulait pas autour des notions de particularité et d’universalité, mais où il portait 
plutôt sur la distinction entre nature et culture. Une des premières définitions de la 
culture exprime cette conception : elle est un “complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society.” (Edward Tylor). Dans cette conception, la 
culture n’est pas explicitement différenciée de la politique ou de l’économie comme 
champs d’action séparés, puisque a priori, la question ne se pose pas. Au contraire, 
tout ce qui est de l’ordre de l’humain est culturel.  
Une entité sociale est une puissance d'agir (Frédéric Lordon), c’est-à-dire qu’elle est 
à la fois  productrice, réceptrice et reproductrice de significations et de 
représentations sociales. Autrement dit, le fournisseur, le tisserand et la machine à 
tisser (auto-eco-système). L'idéologie au sens littéral (ou philosophie) est ainsi 
considérée comme la conscience du processus de la (re)production des significations 
sociales. Ainsi, l'autonomie idéologique se traduit non seulement par la conscience 
de ce qui est intégré et tissé, mais encore par le choix conscient de 
l'ouverture/fermeture de la réception et de l'ouverture/fermeture de la (re)production 
(émission, promotion). L'autonomie est le potentiel conscient. L'hétéronomie est 
donc la restriction de ce potentiel par des puissances d'agir tierces (entités sociales 
ou institutions). L'imaginaire institué est l'imaginaire potentiel hétéronome, 
l'imaginaire instituant est l'imaginaire actuel (dynamique autonome/hétéronome), 
soit le retissage des éléments du premier. L'imaginaire radical apparaît ainsi comme 
sortant de l'imaginaire potentiel autonome.  
Une représentation (signe) ne fait de sens que si ce dernier est social, c’est-à-dire, s'il 
est partagé par la reproduction reconnue (consciemment ou non) par deux puissances 
sociales. Le sens ainsi donné pointe vers la signification. Une signification est ainsi 
l'association, à travers le jeu des signes, de plusieurs sens. Une signification 
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dominante est cette association, car c'est elle qui, au moment contemporain, est au 
centre du processus de création/altération, d'intégration/désintégration des 
significations imaginaires et du lien qu'elles maintiennent ou perdent avec les 
signes/représentations. Ainsi, si l’on assigne à la signification de l'idée de nation, à 
partir du XIXe siècle, la définition de Gellner : « une doctrine politique qui 
considère que l'unité politique et l'unité nationale doivent être conformes », ou celle 
de Calhoun, « un État, un peuple », on peut comprendre en quoi elle est 
fondamentale. Car elle propulse une dynamique de dés/intégration d’une force 
inouïe : par l'association des signifactions qu'elle postule, elle devient déterminante 
autant pour définir ce qu'est l'unité politique – également comme institution (l’État) 
– que pour définir l'unité nationale, nommée par l’expression « le peuple ». Il va de 
soi que le potentiel totalitaire de cette association est particulièrement grand, étant 
donné la facilité formelle de se représenter son fil conducteur.   
Ainsi, s'il est rationalisé à l'extrême, ce fil devient irrationnellement exclusif (dans le 
sens où l'auto-éco-système tend à ne devenir que système). À l'inverse, il a un 
potentiel totalitaire dans sa capacité à intégrer (associer) et donc à altérer pour se 
reproduire au-delà de la rationalité. Cette capacité va suffisamment loin, et elle est 
dorénavant capable de reprendre à son compte sa propre critique pour former 
comme un système de croyances qui, en dehors du paradigme nationaliste, ne 
feraient plus aucun sens (car demandant une autonomie accrue de déconstruction et 
de reconstruction des significations). Une autre formation culturelle a atteint un tel 
niveau d'altération et de reproduction « totalisatrice » : le capitalisme.  
 
3. Filaments des Histoires Imaginaires Nationales 
Le troisième chapitre présente les prémisses d'une histoire de l'institution de 
l'imaginaire national. Ce processus de formation des imaginaires nationaux ne 
considère pas simplement l'idée de nation en soi, mais bien la formation d'un 
imaginaire effectivement national, c’est-à-dire d'un imaginaire suffisamment 
reconnu socialement pour qu'il soit considéré de façon relationnelle (d'imaginaire 
instituant à imaginaire institué selon les termes de Castoriadis). L'histoire de l'idée 
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de nation relève de l'histoire de l'idéologie qui est en corrélation directe avec 
l'histoire de l'imaginaire. Il serait cependant réducteur de ne prendre en compte que 
l'évolution de l'idée car, s’il y a bel et bien un imaginaire national institué, l'idée de 
nation en est informée. Le chapitre commence par l'analyse des histoires nobiliaires 
qui, par opposition et par glissement des significations, vont former les histoires 
nationales.  
Les significations imaginaires qui se sont mises en place pour composer ce qui 
deviendra le nationalisme en Grande-Bretagne (« Britishness ») peuvent être 
retracées au début de la période moderne. Ces significations ont évolué et se sont 
formées à travers des conditions historiques particulières à l’aire géopolitique 
qu’aujourd’hui nous appelons les Iles Britanniques. Dans le royaume d’Angleterre, 
la Réforme fut un long processus qui participa au changement cosmologique que 
l’on appelle la modernité. Par exemple, le principe théologique sola scriptura qui est 
un principe central de la théologie protestante a eu comme conséquence la 
dépréciation de certaines sources de pouvoir traditionnelles de l’Ancien Régime. 
Ainsi, le cosmos promu par la Réforme devient radicalement différent au fil du 
temps de l’ordre traditionnel qui établit le Saint-Siège comme l’autorité centrale à 
l’époque médiévale.  
Le pouvoir du pape et les significations sociales associées ont donc diminué – perdu 
du sens – à mesure que se propageaient les significations liées à la Réforme. Les 
premières significations « laïques » de ce nouvel ordre furent institutionnalisées en 
1648 grâce aux traités de la Paix de Westphalie.  Celle-ci établit la reconnaissance de 
la souveraineté des États induisant de fait une redéfinition de la notion de 
souveraineté. Cette reconnaissance désintégra la signification du pouvoir papal (qui 
était la base de la reconnaissance de la royauté) en faveur des rois et des princes 
d’Europe. Une des premières conséquences de ce nouvel ordre fut l’émergence de la 
monarchie absolue, dans les États protestants comme dans les États catholiques, qui 
regroupe la représentation de l’État avec celle du monarque dans une seule série de 
significations.  
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Plus tard, aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, cette notion de souveraineté sera redéfinie en 
faveur de l’idéologie libérale, dont la cosmologie est fondée de façon plus radicale, 
et donc plus englobante, sur l’individu (dans un premier temps au singulier). Ainsi, 
la notion de « peuple » qui lui sera associée ouvrira la voie à une nouvelle 
signification de l’imaginaire moderne. L’association des États modernes avec un 
nouveau discours de légitimité fondé sur la notion abstraite de peuple. Ceci 
deviendra le patron du nationalisme et le tissage de ces significations sera incarné 
par l’identification de peuples particuliers avec des États particuliers, en remplissant 
les espaces vides imaginaires et matériels entre les deux. 
Les significations fondatrices d’imaginaires nationaux particuliers varient en 
fonction des différentes conditions géopolitiques et historiques. En Grande-
Bretagne, c’est la monarchie puis l’entreprise coloniale qui pourvoiront 
successivement les fils élémentaires à ce qui deviendra la maille imaginaire de la 
« Britishness » au XIXe siècle. Le premier de ces éléments fut le résultat d’une 
conjoncture particulière qui, par le jeu des règles de successions entre les maisons 
royales d’Écosse et d’Angleterre, formalisa l’unification des couronnes plus d’un 
siècle avant le traité d’union de 1707. Entre temps, l’entreprise coloniale de 
l’Angleterre va prendre son essor – alors qu’elle sera un échec pour l’Écosse. Tous 
ces filaments ainsi que les intérêts des différentes élites vont se tisser de telle façon, 
pour que la notion d'Empire britannique permette – du moins pour un temps – 
l'adhésion des élites écossaises à l’imaginaire national britannique en gestation. On 
observe par la suite comment l’Empire, et l’entreprise coloniale qui y est associée, 
ont émaillé un imaginaire en le tissant aux intérêts mercantiles d’une certaine classe 
sociale – l’élite – avant que ne soit tissée la signification de « peuple » britannique. 
Même si servant formellement les intérêts de la nation, l’Empire apparaît avant tout 
comme l’élément qui légitime, dans un premier temps, la formation d’une élite 
économique commune.  
Une autre série de significations qui ont également formé – et été informées par – ce 
devenir des imaginaires nationaux à travers l’Europe trouve son origine dans la 
montée du républicanisme (sous ses diverses formulations). Les idées républicaines, 
qui apparaissent à la Renaissance, sont fondées sur une doctrine relativement 
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simple : celle de l’opposition à l’idée que la monarchie soit la meilleure forme de 
gouvernement. Au cours du XVIIe siècle, les idées républicaines se répandent à 
travers la noblesse et la bourgeoisie des États européens. Sans prétendre à une 
analyse critique de la notion de républicanisme, nous pouvons néanmoins considérer 
que le républicanisme, selon les acceptions de la théorie politique moderne, est un 
entre-deux entre le libéralisme et ce que nous appellerons, faute de mieux, le 
« communautarisme.» Les idées et les doctrines républicaines sont un ensemble de 
différentes formes qui jonglent avec différentes conceptualisations de la notion de 
liberté, interprétée de façon libérale (par exemple, la liberté individuelle) ou de 
façon communautaire (par exemple, l’égalité politique). Nous considérons donc que 
le républicanisme est un des fondements épistémologique de l’imaginaire moderne 
radical.   
En Angleterre, deux séries majeures d’événements ont été enclenchées par des idées 
républicaines : les deux révolutions anglaises. La première série d’événements, les 
guerres civiles de 1642-1646 et de 1649-1651, et la période du Commonwealth de 
1649 à 1660, ont été influencées de manière dominante par les tendances 
communautaires. Au contraire, la révolution dite « glorieuse » de 1688, qui institua 
une monarchie constitutionnelle, entérina le succès des tendances libérales du 
républicanisme. Dans le royaume de France, les idées républicaines resteront à la 
marge pendant cette période. Ce n’est qu’après le long règne de Louis XV que 
l’imaginaire républicain commença son essor rapide. Des émergences républicaines 
apparaissaient alors à travers l’Europe et les rangs de la « République des Lettres » 
s’étoffaient, les yeux rivés sur le royaume de France. Quand les significations 
radicales de philosophes de cette « république » furent largement propagées, la 
période révolutionnaire qui s’ensuivit fut le théâtre de la rencontre des différentes 
tendances du républicanisme. La violence matérielle et symbolique de la Révolution 
est l’expression de cette rencontre qui définira l’éventail des doctrines politiques, 
souvent contradictoires, qui définiront toutes les idéologies de la modernité tardive. 
Malgré leurs différences, toutes ces significations radicales et les doctrines qui y 
sont associées pointaient vers le même changement de paradigme. Ainsi, au vu de sa 
signification transhistorique, la Révolution Française peut être considérée comme un 
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des moments sociaux-historiques qui ont fait basculer l’équilibre du pouvoir en 
faveur des significations radicales de la modernité. La Révolution était elle-même le 
résultat des écheveaux des institutions radicales qui contestaient, à travers toutes 
sortes de frontières, l’imaginaire institué de l’ordre divin. 
Une des significations, au cœur de ce changement, qui s’est cristallisée à la fin du 
XVIIIe siècle, est celle de « peuple » : elle était alors devenue le symbole de la 
contestation de la cosmologie instituée du pouvoir. En résumé, le « droit des 
peuples » s’opposait à la « Loi de Dieu ».  En pratique, elle s’exprimait dans la 
compétition des institutions modernes envers tous les niveaux de pouvoirs des 
anciens régimes à travers l’Europe. La contestation de l’imaginaire institué 
s’articulait autour du point majeur de l’incarnation de la légitimité du pouvoir. Alors 
que la représentation de Dieu fut systématiquement reléguée au niveau de la 
conscience personnelle, l’espace imaginaire laissé ainsi vacant put être investi par 
une autre représentation : celle des peuples. L’expression du nationalisme 
s’engouffra dans cette brèche.  
Le pamphlet Qu’est ce que le Tiers-Etat ? d’Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès apparaît 
comme l’expression de ce réagencement radical. Fondé sur l’idée d’une loi 
commune, le pamphlet présente dans un premier temps comment les nobles et leurs 
privilèges constituent un différent « peuple » au sein de la « Grande Nation ». En 
terme légaux, Sièyes présente la loi comme elle est, (de lege lata), démontrant que 
les privilèges des nobles empêchent d’unifier la nation sous une loi commune (de 
lege ferenda). Inversement, la nation représente tout le monde, définie comme le 
corps de citoyens légalement égaux. Cette redéfinition libérale de la nation, qui la 
fait passer d’une communauté vague à une communauté liée par un contrat de 
reconnaissance mutuelle de droits, n’est pas une particularité française. D’un point 
de vue idéologique, la popularité de cette définition est l’expression des élites 
libérales cosmopolites européennes.  
Sièyes décrit les éléments qui légitiment l’ordre traditionnel. Sa critique se fonde sur 
l’idée que l’ancienneté d’une loi ne la rend pas nécessairement juste. Néanmoins, il 
va employer l’histoire contre la noblesse. Il s’oppose ainsi aux droits de conquête 
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qui légitiment l’aristocratie des ordres nobles. Sièyes explique que ces droites 
remontent à la conquête de la Gaule par les tribus Germaniques, notamment les 
Francs. Selon lui, la noblesse originale a disparu ou s’est intégrée dans la noblesse 
franque. Par conséquent, cette « vraie » noblesse de la nation s’oppose à cette 
dernière. Dans un deuxième temps, une nouvelle noblesse a émergé du tiers-état et 
l’a divisé. Sièyes invite toutes ces différentes noblesses à revenir dans la nation. 
Pour ce faire, il démontre par une série de syllogismes sophistiqués en quoi la 
légitimité de l’ancienneté, bien qu’absurde, favorise en fait la nation. Ce passage du 
pamphlet est très important car il conclut le reductio ad absurdo de la revendication 
de la légitimité des nobles. Ainsi s’opère l’ouverture d’un espace imaginaire dans 
lequel une nouvelle légitimité peut prendre place. Cette rhétorique annonce le 
nouveau paradigme dont le but est la désintégration de l’imaginaire de l’Ancien 
Régime. La première signification de ce nouvel imaginaire est la « révélation » (ou 
l’éveil) de la nation à soi-même. Le nationalisme est ainsi exprimé dans sa forme la 
plus raffinée, c'est-à-dire la plus fine, en cela qu’elle va tisser son devenir, à savoir 
l’association d’un État à un peuple.  
En Pologne, la continuité de l'histoire de la descendance des nobles se maintient et 
se nationalise, eu égard aux conditions historiques particulières d'un État polonais 
inexistant et d'une noblesse assujettie ou en exil. Alors que la ferveur révolutionnaire 
florissait en France, une partie de la noblesse et de la bourgeoisie polono-
lithuanienne alliée au roi de Pologne tentait de réformer et de restaurer une forme 
autonome d’État face à l’effondrement et au démembrement de la République de 
Pologne-Lituanie. Ils étaient nourris des idéaux radicaux de la République des 
Lettres. Malgré leurs efforts, le roi abdiqua et l’État disparut. Il en résulta 
néanmoins, avec la Constitution du 3 mai 1791, l’un des plus grand symboles de 
l’histoire nationale de la future Pologne. Même Karl Marx exprima son admiration 
face à la radicalité de la première constitution écrite européenne. En dépit de son 
importance symbolique, cette tentative de réformer la « démocratie noble » en 
faveur d’un gouvernement mixte moderne s'acheva dans le démantèlement de l’État. 
C’est à la suite de ce démantèlement que le terme « polonais » changea de 
signification. D’une définition politique, qui faisait référence à la citoyenneté de 
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l’ancienne république (c’est-à-dire aux nobles, aux Sarmates), le terme prit un 
nouveau sens « ethnique » pour définir les communautés de langue polonaise en les 
distinguant des autres minorités au sein des empires qui avaient annexé les territoires 
de l’ancienne République. Selon la définition politique moderne, nous pouvons dire 
qu’il n’y avait alors plus de nation polonaise. Néanmoins, l’idée d’un État polonais 
indépendant, qui représenterait ce nouveau peuple distingué des autres par sa langue, 
allait faire son chemin. La formation de la République de Pologne en 1918 fut rendu 
possible par la formation, au long du XIXe siècle, d’une haute culture nationaliste 
polonaise.  
Alors qu’un État polonais, au sens nationaliste, n’avait jamais existé, l’idée de la 
perte de la « Pologne éternelle » et de sa restauration future ont été le ferment du 
nationalisme polonais. Ainsi, malgré l’inexistence d’institutions étatiques, une 
culture nationale polonaise allait fleurir de la même façon qu’en France ou en 
Grande Bretagne. C’est au cours du XIXe siècle que les consciences nationales vont 
prendre forme à travers toute l’Europe et au-delà. Cet aspect de l’imaginaire 
instituant du nationalisme était perçu comme un éveil, lui-même traduisant une 
conception linéaire du temps. Inspirée des histoires de légitimité nobiliaire, cette 
conception a été recentrée sur la notion de peuple projetant des lignées dans un passé 
mythologique et lointain. Cette forme de simplification de l’histoire est au cœur de 
la légitimation des relations de pouvoir, qu’ils soient anciens ou modernes. 
Cependant, malgré cette simplicité, les contenus culturels et pratiques du cadre des 
nations modernes ne sont pas disponibles : ils seront produits, négociés et reproduits 
tout au long du XIXe et du XXe siècles. C’est ainsi que la descendance gauloise du 
peuple français se définit tout au long du XIXe siècle. Si elle débute dans son 
opposition à l'histoire franque germanique des nobles, cette ascendance est plus tard 
récupérée par Napoléon III avec la formation du mythe de Vercingétorix. Elle sera 
institutionnalisée sous la Troisième République, dans ce qui sera le premier livre 
d'histoire de l'Education nationale (le « Petit Lavisse », utilisé jusqu’aux années 
1960 également dans les colonies), sous la fameuse formule « nos ancêtres les 
Gaulois. »  
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4. Sections contemporaines 
Le quatrième et dernier chapitre présente l’analyse des discours contemporains sur le 
nationalisme. Après un chapitre présentant les grandes lignes du «  long moment 
historique » de l'imaginaire national, celui-ci analyse dans le moment contemporain 
(2003-2010) les termes et les significations des discours des principaux 
représentants politiques dans leur promotion de « l'identité nationale ». Il apparaîtra 
que dans le sillage des discours de l'extrême droite qui détournent le relativisme 
culturel à partir des années 1990, les discours des politiciens dits « républicains » 
(ou mainstream en anglais), poursuivent une banalisation accrue de thèmes 
nationalistes. Cependant, cette banalisation s'opère dans une optique politique 
différente, qui est celle du néolibéralisme et non pas, à l'instar de l'extrême droite, 
dans une optique idéologiquement simpliste du nationalisme intégral. L’analyse du 
discours met ensuite en relation avec les discours politiciens ceux des formations 
sociales et groupements ultranationalistes. Le but de cette mise en parallèle est de 
décrypter, dans la mesure du possible, les relations entre ces différents types de 
discours nationalistes et de mettre en avant les termes variés de la négociation 
sociale contemporaine en faveur d’une réaction généralisée dont le nationalisme 
n’est qu’une facette.  
La Pologne est largement perçue comme une des « nations catholiques » d’Europe, 
au même titre que l’Espagne ou l’Irlande, par exemple. La communauté catholique a 
certes été prédominante dans la Pologne d’après 1945, mais la composition 
historique des populations et des communautés religieuses des territoires polonais 
était bien plus diversifiée. L’importance hégémonique du Christianisme dans le 
monde européen fut la norme, depuis l’institution de l’Eglise de Rome jusqu’à celle 
d’une sécularisation plus généralisée au cours du XXe siècle (induisant un processus 
de désacralisation). La loi de séparation de l’Église et de l’État de 1905 en France 
apparait certainement comme le symbole de ce changement. Dès 1919, dans la 
nouvelle République de Pologne, des mesures constitutionnelles reconnaissaient les 
différentes minorités en leur octroyant une forme d’égalité politique, notamment à la 
plus grande minorité juive d’Europe qui s’était installée sur les territoires du 
Royaume de Pologne depuis le Moyen-âge.    
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Il serait donc trop simple de dater l’importance du Catholicisme (et du Christianisme 
en général) dans la formation de la nation polonaise contemporaine avant la 
formulation du nationalisme polonais. Le « sarmatisme » des nobles de la 
République de Pologne-Lituanie, ainsi que le messianisme romantique de la haute 
culture polonaise en exil ont certainement joué un rôle déterminant dans la 
formation d’une culture nationale polonaise centrée sur la religion. Cependant, la 
première formulation cohérente de la nation polonaise comme entité culturellement 
exclusive date de la première moitié du XXe siècle. Elle deviendra une quasi réalité 
sociale par la force de la tragédie de l’histoire dans la deuxième moitié du XXe 
siècle.  
Une série d’événements, qui commencent avec le génocide des juifs perpétré par les 
nazis et la politique d’expulsion et de déplacement de populations après la guerre, 
laisseront une société polonaise qui, pour la première fois dans son histoire 
nationale, sera relativement homogène. Cette situation, associée à la mort de Staline, 
permit l’institution d’un « communisme national » à travers tous les pays satellites. 
Dans la République Populaire de Pologne, cette idéologie perpétuera de façon 
tragique l’homogénéisation de la société polonaise. Elle trouvera son dénouement 
dans la crise de 1968, au cours de laquelle la politique de purge antisioniste du 
Kremlin poussera, de fait, ce qui restait de la communauté juive (ironiquement 
majoritairement communiste, et donc laïque) à quitter leur pays.      
Les conséquences de cette crise ont eu un impact très profond sur la société 
polonaise dont l’homogénéisation « ethnique » est une conséquence certes ironique 
et tragique, mais surtout conjoncturelle. Comme l’écrit l’historien Norman Davies, 
la crise de « Mars 1968 a sonné le désastre moral et intellectuel de la génération qui 
avait cru pouvoir contribuer à rendre le monde meilleur et remettre en cause les 
fondements du totalitarisme en projetant une version idéalisée du marxisme. » On 
observe alors la portée qu’avaient les idéologies laïques au sein de la classe éduquée 
de l’époque. L’échec de leur révision du communisme soviétique vers un 
communisme antitotalitaire déclenchera, à partir des années 1970, l’union des 
diverses forces dissidentes sous le couvert de l’Église. Le syndicat Solidarność 
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(« solidarité ») en sera l’héritier, et jouera, au cours des années 1980, un rôle 
essentiel dans la transition vers la sortie du communisme.  
Cependant, la ligne d’opposition entre les dissidents « laïques » et les opposants 
« catholiques » réapparaîtra au grand jour dès 1989. À plusieurs occasions, la société 
civile de la Troisième République de Pologne (dont la constitution est laïque) se 
trouvera mise sous pression par les émergences issues d'un imaginaire catholique 
traditionnaliste. La dernière en date de ces émergences suivit la mort accidentelle du 
président Lech Kaczyński (issu du parti majoritaire de la droite catholique) et de 88 
hauts responsables de l’État en avril 2010. Dans ce que certains ont appelé « une 
guerre de rue », la commémoration de la mort du président a occulté celle des autres 
disparus. Alors que la situation politique était exceptionnelle, des formulations 
violentes ont parcouru toute la société autour d’une croix érigée devant le palais 
présidentiel. La ligne d’opposition qu’exprimait cette émergence a été récupérée de 
façon opportuniste par les politiciens de la droite catholique dans le but de mettre à 
mal l’équipe de transition au pouvoir, elle-même issue de la droite libérale. En se 
plaçant sur un plan moral en promouvant l’idée que l’identité polonaise catholique 
est la vraie identité polonaise, ces discours risquaient d’envenimer la situation. Aux 
termes d’une âpre négociation, la croix put être déplacée et la « guerre de rue » prit 
fin. Cependant, cet épisode réactualise une ligne de démarcation qui traverse la 
société polonaise, et qui s’inscrit de façon plus durable dans l’histoire.  
La question de la religion, dans les discours politiques contemporains à travers le 
monde, est devenue suffisamment importante pour que l’on puisse parler d’un retour 
du religieux. En France, ainsi qu’en Grande Bretagne, cette question est drapée 
d’Islamophobie ou d’Arabophobie (Etienne Balibar), bien avant les attentats 
terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 à New York. Dans une certaine mesure, 
l’Islamophobie a pris la place, dans les espaces imaginaires traditionnels, de 
l’antisémitisme et de l’anticommunisme. Dans les pays d’immigration ainsi que 
dans les anciens centres coloniaux, la question de la religion s’est trouvée associée à 
la question de l’immigration et l’Islam y occupe une place de choix. La laïcité stricte 
de l’État français prévient, du moins en théorie, toute démonstration ostentatoire de 
signes religieux, également pour les représentants de l’État. Le président de la 
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République française, Nicolas Sarkozy, a été, depuis son passage au ministère de 
l’Intérieur en 2002-2004, le héraut de « l’identité nationale. » Il a promu, à travers 
ses différentes fonctions, une vision « ethniciste » et une exclusivité culturelle de 
l’identité française traditionnellement associée aux formations d’extrême droite, ou 
aux « débordements » des jeunes démocraties de l’Est.  
L’analyse des discours du président français, ainsi que des porte-paroles et des 
différents ministres issus de son parti, présentent une désintégration symbolique 
d’une partie de la population française : ceux qui sont identifiés comme étant issus 
de l’immigration (le terme actuel est plutôt : issus de la diversité) et ceux vivant 
dans les banlieues. Ainsi, ces discours suggèrent qu’être français signifie ne pas être 
issu de cette diversité et ne pas être marginalisé économiquement. On observe ainsi 
comment, dans les espaces ouverts par cette désintégration, s’opère une division 
symbolique de la société française directement inspirée des discours xénophobes et 
nationalistes de l’extrême droite.  
En Grande-Bretagne, la question de la religion ainsi que le développement d’une 
société séculaire ont suivi des routes quelque peu différentes de celles que l’on a 
observées dans les formations républicaines en Pologne et en France. En tant que 
monarchie constitutionnelle, la première différence évidente est celle de la 
survivance de la monarchie, dont la signification politique a été progressivement 
reléguée à un niveau symbolique. Néanmoins, le chef de l’État, c’est-à-dire le 
monarque, est resté le chef de l’Église (et ce de façon continue depuis le XVIe 
siècle). On peut considérer qu’au vue de son rôle politique diminué, la relation du 
chef de l’État avec l’Église apparaît alors comme peu problématique. Cependant, 
cette association symbolique a également empêché le développement d’institutions 
politiques laïques telles qu’elles peuvent apparaître dans d’autres États.  
Ce que l’on observe dans les discours politiques de hauts représentants de l’État, tels 
que l’ancien premier ministre Gordon Brown, fait écho aux discours analysés dans le 
cadre français (par exemple sur le thème de l’échec du système d’intégration). Ainsi, 
c’est une même rhétorique qui ouvre des espaces dans lesquels est reproduite la 
vision d’une identité nationale réduite et passée. Cependant, la question de 
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l’immigration est relativisée dans le cadre britannique (par rapport au cadre 
français), car l’unité nationale se trouve également mise à mal par les forces 
« sécessionnistes » régionales. Au-delà des différences, ce que l’on observe dans 
toutes ces différentes pratiques discursives pointe vers une même grille de 
signification : en se fondant sur l’ambivalence du sens de certaines significations – 
qui font certes partie de la formation discursive traditionnelle du nationalisme – ces 
pratiques ouvrent des espaces pour tenter de les refermer sur des significations 
sociales  fixées et exclusives.  
Toutes ces analyses confirment les cadres simplistes des imaginaires nationaux qui 
semblent incapables de s’adapter aux conjonctures sociales et historiques 
complexes. Dès que ces cadres se trouvent sous pression, la tendance générale est 
celle d’un repli autour de grilles de significations réactionnaires. Mais cette 
observation n’est peut-être pas très surprenante. En revanche, la manière dont la 
force réactionnaire s’intègre dans l’imaginaire dominant apparaît comme plus 
signifiante. Elle peut être interprétée comme le signe du déséquilibre critique de 
l’imaginaire de la modernité tardive. Le sociologue Ulrich Beck considère que nous 
sommes en effet entrés dans la modernité « réflexive », et que cette modernité 
arrivée à maturité nous pousse vers un changement de paradigme. Selon lui, ce 
changement ne nous donne pas d’autre choix (il faut entendre : pas d'autre choix 
progressiste) que le dépassement réfléchi des dualités (ou binarités) modernes. Une 
de ces dualités, que Beck décrit comme des « habitudes mentales modernes », est 
l’opposition entre le Soi et l’Autre – ce qui est observé de façon évidente dans le 
nationalisme.  
La conceptualisation de l’hybridité culturelle, qui reste très discutée, est perçue 
comme portant en elle le germe d’un dépassement des dualités. D’autres termes 
associés à cette conceptualisation – bricolage, métissage, créolisation – ont tous cette 
particularité de pointer vers l’ouverture d’espaces pluriels (à opposer à 
l’unidimensionnalité de l’homme moderne). La discussion des théories de 
l’hybridité culturelle et du cosmopolitanisme nous amène à reconsidérer 
l’importance de la notion de classe sociale dans le contexte des relations de pouvoir 
qu’expriment les expressions et les significations culturelles. Ceci suggère 
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également que la « cristallisation » des représentations des significations imaginaires 
fait partie du processus de l’évolution culturelle (ce qui renvoie à l’analyse des 
stéréotypes présente dans le deuxième chapitre). Ainsi, il apparaît dans le cas du 
nationalisme, que ce dernier a évolué d’un imaginaire radical, lui-même le résultat 
d’une série de déconstructions puis de reconstructions (autrement dit, d’un 
bricolage), pour finalement recristalliser un cadre de représentations sociales 
binaires entre lesquelles s’effectue le processus d’institution des significations 
sociales modernes en tension (ou en contradiction selon Rudolf Rucker) avec 
l’expérience quotidienne de la vie sociale. 
 
Conclusion 
La première des questions qui ont introduit cette étude concernait le mode avec 
lequel le nationalisme – considéré comme un imaginaire social – était reproduit au 
sein des sociétés contemporaines européennes. Le nationalisme apparaît en effet de 
façon évidente comme une des caractéristiques fondamentales des imaginaires 
sociaux européens – en Europe, mais également comme le ferment d’une société 
globale encore embryonnaire. Le nationalisme ne peut cependant pas se réduire au 
compte rendu des différents nationalismes particuliers. Indépendamment de la 
perspective que l’on prend pour étudier le nationalisme, ce dernier nous informe sur 
l’organisation rationaliste du monde, synthétisant une complexité globale au-delà de 
notre entendement, mais cependant peut-être accessible par un certain imaginaire. 
Le nationalisme, comme doctrine politique ou une série de croyances partagées, tend 
à masquer et à s’opposer à la réalité transculturelle et encore désordonnée de notre 
monde postcolonial et post-guerre froide.    
Ce que l’on observe au niveau des discours politique – à travers une 
renationalisation des discours politiques – est le rejet des termes et la réduction des 
significations qui permettent de rendre compte de la complexité du monde social-
historique, particulièrement lorsque ce monde est en transition. La portée des 
négociations des significations imaginaires a ainsi été réduite dans le champ 
politique aux questions relevant de ce que l’on appelle en anglais identity politics. Il 
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se peut que cette tendance commence à s’inverser après la série des crises 
financières commencée en 2008, et que de nouvelles formulations (ainsi que des 
formulations, remises à jour, d’anciens termes de contestation, comme ceux 
empruntés au marxisme) remettent en cause la grille de significations binaires et 
réactionnaires que les néolibéraux ont soutenu – par inconscience parfois – dans leur 
conquête du pouvoir. De même, le spectacle qu’ont offert au cours des dernières 
décennies les questions culturelles (le « clash » des civilisations par exemple) a 
également nourri l’alignement des positions de négociations des significations 
sociales, et a donc brouillé les lignes de démarcations politiques.  
À l’aube du XXIe siècle, le nationalisme européen apparaît de façon dominante 
comme nationalisme d’État, et ne peut en conséquence être porteur de significations 
progressistes s’opposant aux institutions dominantes (comme cela a été le cas dans 
les luttes contres les « anciens régimes » d’Europe ou à travers les libérations 
coloniales). Les termes du nationalisme ont ainsi évolué à partir de significations 
radicales, pour devenir des continuums de représentations. Cette linéarité a permis la 
promotion et l’imposition – ainsi que l’acceptation plus ou moins consciente – 
d’imaginaires sociaux homogénéisants autour d’institutions étatiques centralisatrices 
(qu’elles soient réelles ou projetées). Cependant, les différentes crises qui traversent 
le globe, la stagnation (ou pis) de l’Union Européenne ainsi que le cadre encore 
inévitable du nationalisme, inspirent un sentiment de mécontentement qui, bien 
qu’éveillant les démons de la réaction, peut également motiver la recherche de 
nouveaux imaginaires et de nouvelles institutions. Dans cet horizon, une perspective 
possible pourrait se définir par l’institution imaginaire de la complexité. Celle-ci, 
pour être culturelle au sens plein du terme, devra être une praxis des puissances 
d’agir conscientes d’elles-mêmes et réciproquement responsables – que ces 
individus fassent partie des élites ou des multitudes.  
 
 
 
